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ABSTRACT 
 
ISAAC A. WEINER: Religion Out Loud: Religious Sound, Public Space, and American 
Pluralism 
(Under the direction of Thomas A. Tweed and Randall R. Styers) 
 
 
This dissertation attends to complaints about religion as noise.  I draw on court 
records, archival sources, and oral histories to analyze three American legal case studies 
in which neighbors complained about religious sounds spilling over into public space: an 
1877 dispute about the volume of bells at an Episcopalian church in Philadelphia; a 1948 
Supreme Court case about Jehovah’s Witnesses operating sound trucks in an upstate New 
York public park; and a 2004 dispute about a mosque broadcasting the Islamic call to 
prayer in a historically Polish-Catholic Detroit neighborhood.  Drawing on an 
understanding of noise as “sounds out of place,” I argue that through disputes about 
public religious sounds, Americans have demarcated and contested the proper place of 
religion and religious adherents in the U.S. spatial and social order.  Noise complaints 
have offered a useful means for containing religion, for demarcating and delimiting its 
boundaries, but religious devotees also have used public sounds to claim place for 
themselves, pushing against popular and legal conceptions of religion.  In the cases I 
analyze, I find that disputants aimed to demarcate religion’s place in relation to three 
particular boundaries.  They tried to draw clear lines between public and private, between 
religion and non-religion, and among diverse religious communities.  But the contested 
sounds also crossed and collapsed these symbolically significant and pragmatically useful 
iii 
boundaries, complicating efforts to map religion’s borders.  This dissertation thus calls 
attention to the shifting and permeable boundaries of American religious life.  It offers a 
model for interpreting American religious diversity that centers themes of embodiment, 
contact, and exchange.  It underscores how both sound and law have mediated public 
interactions among diverse religious communities.  And it highlights the everyday 
material practices through which Americans have mapped religion’s boundaries, rather 
than analyzing these boundaries as products of abstract intellectual debate.  This 
dissertation proposes that interpreting American religious life will require scholars to 
become more attuned to the sounds of religious difference.  In debates about whether 
religion should be practiced quietly or out loud, we can hear competing conceptions of 
religion’s place in the modern world.
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  CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: 
LISTENING TO AMERICAN RELIGIONS 
 
Under our system of religious freedom, people have gone to their religious 
sanctuaries not because they feared the law but because they loved their God.  
The choice of all has been as free as the choice of those who answered the call to 
worship moved only by the music of the old Sunday morning church bells. 
-- Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 
319 (1952) (Black, J. dissenting) 
 
In 1952, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a New York City program that permitted 
public schools to release students during the school day in order to receive religious 
instruction.  Writing for the majority in Zorach v. Clauson, Justice Douglas famously 
described the American people as a “religious people whose institutions presuppose a 
Supreme Being.”  Less noted were Justice Black’s comments in dissent, quoted above.  
Black regarded New York City’s program as an unconstitutional “combination of Church 
and State,” for religious groups were benefitting from the “coercive power of the state.”  
The American people were by and large a religious people, Black concurred, but they 
also were divided.  Sectarian conflict during the eighteenth century had made necessary 
the First Amendment’s provisions, which aimed to isolate the state from the sphere of 
religious activity.  Religious freedom was properly a matter of individual choice, Black 
maintained, wholly unconstrained by government interference.  Individuals should be as 
 
free in their devotion as they were free to respond to the call of “the old Sunday morning 
church bells.”1
In his Zorach dissent, Justice Black offered a seemingly unremarkable statement 
of the voluntary principles that underscore the American doctrine of religious freedom.  
Yet his comments warrant a further hearing, for his choice of analogy revealed implicit 
assumptions about the nature of religion and about its place in American life.  First, 
Justice Black described religion as a practice, as something that people do with their 
bodies, rather than as something they merely believe in.  This seems significant in its own 
right, for U.S. courts have long distinguished belief from practice, holding that only the 
right to believe is absolute.  But Black also offered a theory of religion that subtly 
emphasized its affective, rather than intellectual, dimensions.  Individuals were “moved” 
to love and worship God by the chimes of church bells, not because they had assented 
rationally to a set of philosophical propositional truths.  In fact, Black’s comments do not 
necessarily “presuppose a Supreme Being” at all, but instead leave open the possibility 
that the pealing of bells might invite listeners to encounter God for the first time.  
Religious devotion was as much about hearing as about believing, Black implied.2
Second, Justice Black suggested that religious devotion normally was confined to 
certain places and times.  Individuals have retired to their “religious sanctuaries,” he 
wrote, presumably referring to houses of worship or built environments set apart from the 
other spaces of social life.  And they have gone there in response to the call of “Sunday 
                                                 
1Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 318-9 (Black, J. dissenting). 
2In a 1901 article, the American psychologist of religion James H. Leuba classified theories of religion as 
intellectualist, affective, or volitional/active.  Justice Black appears to emphasize both the affective and 
volitional dimensions of religion, implying that feeling leads to action.  See James H. Leuba, “Introduction 
to a Psychological Study of Religion,” Monist 9 (January 1901): 195-225. 
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morning church bells,” underscoring the traditional time for Christian communal 
worship.  Yet calling attention to church bells was also to acknowledge that the sounds of 
religious devotion spill outside the walls of religious institutions.  Bells audibly announce 
Christian presence to an outside public.  Although individuals might choose to enter a 
church, thereby regulating the sounds they hear within the context of worship, it is far 
more difficult to control what sounds one hears on city streets.  Ears have no equivalent 
to eyelids.  Justice Black emphasized that religious freedom properly was considered a 
matter of free choice, yet the choice he described was how to respond to religious sounds, 
whether to heed or ignore their call, not whether to hear them in the first place. 
Third, Justice Black assumed that there was nothing objectionable about “the 
music of the old Sunday morning church bells,” even though individuals could not 
choose whether to hear them.  Describing the bells as “old” reinforced the status of their 
sounds as traditional, ordinary, customary, or normal.  Although the government had no 
right to interfere in matters of religious choice, surely churches could use auditory 
announcements to compete for the attention of passersby.  Yet church bells are not the 
only religious sounds that spill over into public space, and the introduction of “new” 
sounds has not always gone unnoticed or unchallenged.  Not all religious sounds sound 
so “normal.”  For example, there have been a number of legal disputes over the last few 
decades centering on the right of mosques to broadcast the azan, or Islamic call to prayer.  
Religious diversity has complicated Justice Black’s choice of analogy.  Imagine, for 
instance, the different effect of Justice Black’s words had he written instead: “The choice 
of all has been as free as the choice of those who answered the call to worship moved 
only by the voice of the Friday afternoon muezzin.”  What different conception of 
3 
American religious identity would such a statement have implied?  Justice Black’s 
seemingly banal comments about the meaning of religious freedom concealed underlying 
assumptions about Christianity’s normative status in American society.3
But even church bells have not always gone unchallenged, for not all bells sound 
the same.  In fact, American Christians rarely have given ear to the “music of the old 
Sunday morning church bells,” but instead have heard the clashing chords of multiple 
chimes competing for attention.  As Justice Black noted in his Zorach opinion, there is 
nothing particularly “new” about religious diversity, for Christian sectarian conflict was 
one of the factors that made the provisions of the First Amendment necessary in the first 
place.  And the options available to religious Americans only have increased.  In other 
words, Americans might feel moved to respond to the call of church bells, but they still 
must choose which bells to heed.  Religious diversity can be experienced as melodious 
harmony or as unbearable cacophony.  As one writer put it in 1915: “Why should a 
Quaker be wakened by a Roman Catholic bell; or a Presbyterian by an Episcopal bell or a 
Methodist by a Baptist bell?  If church-bells could be so constructed that they would be 
guaranteed to waken only the members of the church in which they are hung, they could 
be tolerated, but so long as they continue to arouse believers in opposing faiths, our non-
sectarian laws ought to be strong enough to silence them.”  In the name of religious 
neutrality, this anti-noise advocate implied, Americans might in fact have a right to quiet, 
a right not to hear the music of the bells.4
                                                 
3The “muezzin” is the term for the man designated to recite the call to prayer.  I purposely refrain from 
explaining this in the text in order to call attention to the assumptions about audience that Justice Black’s 
statement implied. 
4Imogen B. Oakley, “Public Health Versus the Noise Nuisance,” National Municipal Review 4 (April 
1915): 231-37, quoted in Raymond W. Smilor, “Personal Boundaries in the Urban Environment: The Legal 
Attack on Noise, 1865-1930,” Environmental Review 3, no. 3 (Spring 1979): 29. 
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For this critic, the bells of a competing denomination’s church constituted an 
intolerable annoyance, a public nuisance, rather than a call to worship.  He might have 
read Justice Black’s description of the “old Sunday morning church bells” as a nostalgic 
invocation of a pastoral ideal, an idyllic reminder of a time when Christians literally had 
needed the sound of bells to remind them to pray.  But perhaps the changing conditions 
of modern life had rendered such auditory announcements unnecessary, “old” as in old-
fashioned or out-dated, relics of an imagined past.  In other words, not everyone heard the 
sounds of religious devotion in the same way.  Justice Black might have heard in the 
ringing of bells the root chords of religious freedom, but other Americans have simply 
heard noise, and unwelcome noise at that.  As religious sounds have spilled over into 
public spaces, many Americans have been moved not to pray, but to complain.   
 
This dissertation attends to complaints about religion as noise.  I draw on court 
records, archival sources, and oral histories to analyze three legal case studies in which 
neighbors complained about religious sounds spilling over into public space.  In chapter 
2, I analyze an 1877 court case about the volume of bells at an Episcopalian church in 
Philadelphia.  In chapter 3, I investigate a 1948 Supreme Court case about Jehovah’s 
Witnesses operating sound trucks in an upstate New York public park.  And in chapter 4, 
I listen in on a 2004 dispute about a mosque broadcasting the Islamic call to prayer in a 
historically Polish-Catholic Detroit neighborhood.  These case studies involved different 
religious communities at different historical moments, but in each, contestants debated 
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whether religious practice had become too loud.  I use these case studies to consider what 
it has meant for Americans to hear religion as noise.5
Noise has been defined most frequently as “unwanted sounds.”  Complaints about 
religion as noise can reflect genuine concerns about decibel level and volume, but they 
also can express underlying cultural values about what makes religion—or particular 
religious adherents—“unwanted.”  In my case studies, sound constituted the limit of what 
neighbors were willing to put up with, thus offering a concrete vehicle for analyzing the 
limits of religious toleration.  But for the purposes of this project, I have found even more 
useful the cultural historian Peter Bailey’s understanding of noise as “sounds out of 
place,” echoing anthropologist Mary Douglas’ discussion of dirt as “matter out of place.”  
According to such a definition, sounds become noise when they are heard as 
contravening an assumed social order or, to put it more simply, as disorderly.  Sounds are 
not noisy in and of themselves, but depend on the context in which they are heard.  A 
cough in a library might sound louder than a horn at a busy intersection, for example.  Or 
the sounds of religious devotion might seem appropriate in a church but not in a public 
park.  But such determinations are necessarily subjective, for what sounds out of place to 
some may be welcomed by others.6
Drawing on this understanding of noise as “sounds out of place,” I argue that 
through disputes about religious sounds, Americans have demarcated and contested the 
proper place of religion and religious adherents in the U.S. spatial and social order.  
                                                 
5I refer to these disputes as “cases” in an ethnographic sense, treating these discrete legal episodes as useful 
case studies.  I recognize that the Hamtramck dispute would not be considered a “case” in a strictly legal 
sense since it never ended up in court. 
6Peter Bailey, “Breaking the Sound Barrier,” in Popular Culture and Performance in the Victorian City 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 195; Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of 
Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (New York: Praeger, 1966), 35-6. 
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Scholarship on religion’s position in American public life has tended to approach 
pluralism as an abstract theological or philosophical problem.  But this dissertation 
examines how ordinary Americans have responded to the public sounds of religious 
others in order to call attention to the everyday material practices through which 
Americans have negotiated religious difference.  I find that attending to these noise 
disputes makes audible underlying assumptions about religion and its normative 
boundaries—about where Americans have expected to find or listen to religion, about 
how they have expected religious adherents to behave, and about why they have regarded 
religion as out of place in particular social, historical, and legal contexts. 
Recent scholarship in religious studies has established a link between the projects 
of defining religion and constructing social order.  For example, Robert Orsi has argued 
that “it seems to be virtually impossible to study religion without attempting to 
distinguish between its good and bad expressions.”  According to Orsi, early American 
scholars of religion “contributed to social order” by legitimating as “civilized” or 
“modern” those religious forms which they regarded as most tolerable or as most 
compatible with American democratic principles.  “Good” religion was expected to be 
unobtrusive, unemotional, and restrained, a “domesticated modern civic Protestantism.”  
Scholars pursued this project by constructing an analytical vocabulary that demarcated 
“unacceptable forms of religious behavior and emotion,” or what Orsi describes as “a 
scientific nomenclature of containment.”  In this project, I turn my attention beyond the 
confines of academic scholarship to consider how the indeterminate legal category of 
noise similarly has offered a mechanism for containing religion and circumscribing its 
boundaries.  “Good” religion, I find, frequently has been expected to keep quiet.  As 
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Thomas Paine once wrote, “Religion does not unite itself to show and noise.  True 
religion is without either.”7
But despite these expectations, many religious devotees have chosen not to keep 
quiet.  Practicing religion out loud has pushed against these popular conceptions of 
religion as properly private, believed, and freely chosen.  Religious noisemakers have 
implicitly advanced alternative understandings of religion and its place in the social and 
spatial order.  And their publicly produced sounds have mediated contact among 
diversely religious Americans who have responded in different ways.  In my case studies, 
complainants frequently tried to circumscribe religion’s boundaries by drawing clear 
lines between public and private, among diverse religious communities, and between 
religion and non-religion.  But, as I propose in chapter 5, the contested sounds also 
crossed and collapsed these symbolically significant and pragmatically useful binary 
divides, complicating efforts to map religion’s borders.  Scholars of sound regularly have 
emphasized the dynamism of sonic worlds, and my analysis of these case studies calls 
attention to the shifting and permeable boundaries of American religious life.  Religious 
sounds have not always proven so easily contained.8
                                                 
7Robert A. Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth: The Religious Worlds People Make and the Scholars Who 
Study Them (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 186-7; Thomas Paine, “Worship and Church 
Bells,” in The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, ed. Philip S. Foner, 2 vols. (New York: Citadel, 1945), 
2: 758, 760, quoted in Leigh Eric Schmidt, Hearing Things: Religion, Illusion, and the American 
Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 69. 
8In different contexts, Robert A. Orsi and Thomas A. Tweed each have emphasized religion’s similarly 
dynamic qualities, as it crosses borders and blurs boundaries.  See Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth, 188; 
Thomas A. Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006).  In his study of religious toleration in early modern Europe, Divided by Faith: Religious 
Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2007), Benjamin J. Kaplan has argued that disputes frequently centered on how to draw lines 
between public and private, not on whether such lines should be drawn at all. 
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Moreover, not all publicly produced religious sounds have elicited complaint.  
While Americans have heard some sounds as inappropriately public, other sounds have 
unremarkably and unnoticeably faded into the background.  In fact, just as dominant 
groups have complained about and silenced the sounds of religious others, they also 
frequently have assumed their own right to make noise without censure.  And as religious 
dissenters and newcomers have produced sounds of their own, they have pushed against 
the limits set by American law, and they also have challenged the normative status of 
sounds such as Justice Black’s “old Sunday morning church bells.”  They have used 
public sounds to claim their own place in American society.  My analysis thus 
underscores the critical relationship between sound, space, and social power.  Defining 
religion as noise has offered an effective strategy for circumscribing religion’s place, but 
also for demarcating the place of particular religious groups.  By attending to these noise 
disputes, we can learn more about the processes through which certain sounds—and 
groups—have become normative while others have been contested as “out of place.”  We 
can learn more about the material practices through which Americans have managed and 
negotiated religious differences in public.  And we can learn to think differently about the 
construction of “secular” public spaces that regularly have been shaped by the sounds of 
certain religious groups and not others.  Through these disputes, participants debated 
whether the competing chords of religious variety signaled the potential for social 
harmony or the threat of cacophonous discord, whether religious differences were best 
kept quiet or practiced out loud.  Through these disputes, contestants have offered 
competing conceptions of religion and its place in American public life.9
                                                 
9On the relationship between noise and power, see especially Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy 
of Music, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985).  My discussion of 
9 
 In the chapters that follow, I delve into the gritty details of particular disputes, but 
in this chapter, I first step back to consider the broader significance of this project.  I 
sketch how this dissertation contributes to scholarship on religious auditory cultures, on 
American religious pluralism, and on religion and American law.  I suggest that attending 
to disputes about religious noise offers a means for analyzing normative debates about 
religion’s position in American public life from the ground up, and I locate these disputes 
within broader cultural discourses about noise and religion.  Finally, I explain the 
selection of my particular case studies and outline the chapters that follow. 
Over the last twenty years, scholars of American religions have paid increasing 
attention to the material and embodied dimensions of religious life, signaling a shift from 
the doctrinal, denominational, and intellectual histories that previously dominated the 
field.  Works such as Colleen McDannell’s wide-ranging volume, Material Christianity, 
and David Morgan and Sally Promey’s co-edited collection, The Visual Culture of 
American Religions, have highlighted the significance of the material and the visual in 
everyday religious life.  Yet Americanists have remained mostly deaf to the important 
role of sound and hearing practices.  Recent collections have begun to investigate the role 
of music within religious traditions, but scholars have been less tuned in to how the sonic 
world of religious devotion has mediated contact and conflict among diverse 
                                                                                                                                                 
power in this dissertation has been shaped especially by Attali and by Michel de Certeau, who emphasizes 
the ways that ordinary people live within structures of power in The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984). 
10 
communities.  They have been less attuned to how Americans have heard and responded 
to the sounds of religious others.10
In part, this disciplinary deafness can be attributed to dominant assumptions about 
the relationship between religion, hearing, and modernity.  Historians and philosophers of 
the senses have constructed a now standard account of how vision emerged as the 
preeminent sense in the modern West.  Efforts to classify the senses hierarchically go 
back at least as far as Aristotle, who ranked hearing second behind vision, which he 
valued most highly for its clarity and ability to discern difference.  But it was the 
European Enlightenment that is credited most strongly for having elevated the eye over 
the ear, as the acquisition of knowledge came to be associated with detached objectivity 
and the pursuit of illumination.  Enlightenment philosophers celebrated the distance 
afforded by vision, while they distrusted hearing because it threatened to collapse the gulf 
between subject and object.  “As evident in one of its meanings, that of heeding,” 
anthropologist Charles Hirschkind explains, “listening was understood to require a 
certain passivity on the part of the subject as a condition of receptivity, an act of self-
subordination to another of the kind that Immanuel Kant condemned as immaturity.”  
Enlightenment critics such as Kant deemed the act of listening itself “politically and 
epistemologically suspect,” for it threatened “the autonomy of the enlightened liberal 
subject.”  Nineteenth and twentieth century anthropologists also contributed to this 
narrative of vision’s ascendance by imagining—and excluding—African and other 
                                                 
10Colleen McDannell, Material Christianity: Religion and Popular Culture in America (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995); David Morgan and Sally M. Promey, eds., The Visual Culture of American 
Religions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).  For recent studies of American religious music, 
see Stephen A. Marini, Sacred Song in America: Religion, Music, and Public Culture (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 2003); Philip Bohlman, Edith Blumhofer, and Maria M. Chow, eds., Music in American 
Religious Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); David W. Stowe, How Sweet the Sound: 
Music in the Spiritual Lives of Americans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
11 
“primitive” oral cultures as “other” to the literate and print cultures of the West.  Sensory 
hierarchies thus mapped onto racialized dichotomies, further reinforcing the elevated 
status of the eye, even in accounts that nostalgically lamented modern hearing loss.  
Taken together, these presuppositions led to what Martin Jay has described as the 
“ocularcentrism” of Western philosophical traditions and have hindered efforts to tell the 
modern history of the ear.11
This ocularcentric narrative has not gone unchallenged, however.  Several 
scholars have begun to reestablish the central role of sound and hearing in constituting 
modern subjects.  They have not sought simply to replace the eye with the ear, however, 
but have constructed instead alternative histories of the senses that recapture modernity’s 
multisensorial complexity.  For example, cultural historian Alain Corbin has retold the 
story of nineteenth-century French rural life as a history of its “auditory landscape.”  By 
creatively reconstructing how French subjects listened to and understood the ringing of 
village bells, he charted shifts in the “culture of the senses” without re-inscribing vision 
at the center of his story.  Steven Connor similarly has questioned this ocularcentric 
narrative, though he turned his attention to the conditions of modern urban life.  Based on 
his imaginative re-readings of Joyce’s Ulysses and Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, Connor 
                                                 
11Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006), 13-14; Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in 
Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).  A vast literature has 
documented or called into question this narrative of vision’s ascendance.  See Schmidt, Hearing Things, 
especially 16-27; Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979).  Also significant has been the work of two anthropologists, Constance Classen and David 
Howes, who have been at the forefront of the “sensorial turn” in anthropological scholarship, though their 
work reaffirms the ocularcentric narrative as much as it complicates it by contrasting the visualism of the 
west with the different sensory hierarchies of other cultures.  For example, see Constance Classen, Worlds 
of Sense: Exploring the Senses in History and Across Cultures (London: Routledge, 1993); David Howes, 
Sensual Relations: Engaging the Senses in Culture and Social Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2003).  For a valuable introduction to recent scholarship on the senses, see David Howes, ed., 
Empire of the Senses: The Sensual Culture Reader (Oxford: Berg, 2005). 
12 
argues that urban inhabitants rely on a “vocal-auditory consciousness” to navigate their 
way through the aurally saturated spaces of the modern city.  And American historian 
Emily Thompson, in her history of early twentieth century acoustic science, also has 
suggested that modern culture was constituted, in part, through the production of new 
sounds and new ways of listening. Modernity had its own distinctive sound, she argues.12
While these works have signaled a renewed interest in sound studies among 
scholars from a range of disciplines, including social history, anthropology, and cultural 
geography, they have tended either to ignore religion or to assume its declining 
significance.  Even Corbin, for example, concludes his provocative account of 
nineteenth-century village bells with the “desacralization” of the auditory landscape.  In 
fact, American religious historian Leigh Eric Schmidt has argued that the narrative of 
modern hearing loss outlined above generally has also presumed religious absence or the 
gradual disenchantment of the world.  Moderns did not just lose the ability to hear, the 
story goes, but they lost the ability to hear God.13
Schmidt has complicated each of these meta-narratives in his highly original 
monograph, Hearing Things, which offers the most important recent study of American 
religious auditory cultures.  By charting how the American Enlightenment re-trained 
                                                 
12Alain Corbin, Village Bells: Sound and Meaning in the Nineteenth-Century French Countryside (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Steven Connor, “Sound and the Self,” in Hearing History: A 
Reader, ed. Mark M. Smith, 54-66 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 59; Emily Thompson, The 
Soundscape of Modernity: Architectural Acoustics and the Culture of Listening in America, 1900-1933 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). 
13Corbin, Village Bells, 282-3; Schmidt, Hearing Things, 28-37.  Schmidt traces the narratives of spiritual 
hearing loss and disenchantment through the works of several scholars, including the French social theorist 
Michel de Certeau, the anthropologist Walter Ong, and the Canadian composer R. Murray Schafer.  For 
valuable introductions to the most recent scholarship on sound, see Michael Bull and Les Back, The 
Auditory Culture Reader (Oxford: Berg, 2003); Mark M. Smith, ed., Hearing History: A Reader (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2004); Veit Erlmann, ed., Hearing Cultures: Essays on Sound, Listening, and 
Modernity (Oxford: Berg, 2004).  Also see Richard Cullen Rath, “Hearing American History,” Journal of 
American History 95, no. 2 (September 2008): 417-31. 
13 
Protestant ears, Schmidt aimed to “take measure of the religious complexity of modernity 
itself.”  He found that the new auditory technologies of the Enlightenment cast suspicion 
on “pre-modern” ways of hearing God, but at the same time gave rise to new spiritual 
hearing practices among some American Protestant communities.  He offers a narrative 
of modernity that is both about absence and presence, disenchantment and re-
enchantment, hearing loss and new ways of hearing.  He thus brilliantly recasts the 
Enlightenment critique of religion as an episode in the history of the senses, rather than as 
a series of abstract theological debates.  “The detachment of God’s voice from the 
world…demanded a range of performances and embodied regimens,” Schmidt contends.  
Absence had to be constructed.  Protestant ears had to be trained not to hear God.14
Schmidt demonstrates persuasively the relationship between new auditory 
practices and technologies, the constitution of modern secular subjects, and the historical 
repositioning of religion in the modern world.  Yet much of contemporary scholarship on 
the place of religion in American public life continues to follow the model that Schmidt 
critiques, reducing religious debates to intellectual abstractions.  For example, public 
sphere theorists such as Jurgen Habermas have focused almost exclusively on the extent 
to which religious beliefs should shape or inform democratic political deliberation.  
Habermas has questioned whether religious “truth claims” can be translated into the 
universally accessible arguments that he deems necessary for rational discourse.  Framing 
the issue in this way risks reducing religion to a set of abstract propositions or 
philosophical truths to which a religious subject merely chooses to give assent.  
Furthermore, by emphasizing the ability to participate in rational discourse as the 
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condition of entry into the public sphere, Habermas ignores the affective modes and 
embodied regimens that have shaped modern political and religious subjects.  
Demarcating religion’s place in the modern world is thus predicated on a constricted 
normative conception of religion and becomes simply a matter of abstract intellectual 
debate.15
The stakes become more evident in scholarship on religion and law, or what has 
traditionally been more narrowly conceived as “church-state studies.”  Debates in this 
field have tended to focus on constitutional discourses of religious freedom, and scholars 
have been particularly preoccupied of late with the question of whether religious 
practices warrant distinctive constitutional protection.  In other words, what makes 
religion different, and to what extent should religious practitioners be able to claim 
exemptions from generally applicable laws?  Legal scholars have tended to justify 
religious freedom on the basis of abstract claims related to religion’s social value.  For 
example, religious freedom advocates have argued that religion offers a unique source of 
moral and civic virtue, serving a socially integrative function, or that religious liberty is 
essential for guaranteeing personal autonomy from the state, or that state intervention in 
religious matters has proven particularly conducive to civil strife.  Each of these 
rationales assumes a constricted notion of religion, “properly” conceived as private, 
individualistic, freely chosen, and believed, implicitly privileging—and extending 
protection to—only those desirable or legitimate religious forms.  As Winnifred Fallers 
                                                 
15For his most recent statement on these matters, see Jurgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” 
European Journal of Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2006): 1-25.  As Jason Bivins notes, framing the question as 
whether to “allow” religion into the public sphere or into politics risks not only essentializing the religious 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7-8. 
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Sullivan has proposed, other religious forms, such as those which are communal, 
coercive, and enacted (or “that religion with which many religion scholars are most 
concerned”), have been regarded with suspicion, closely regulated, and “carefully and 
systematically excluded, both rhetorically and legally, from modern public space.”16
Normative philosophical debates among political and legal theorists about 
religion’s position in the modern world thus have tended to hinge on implicit distinctions 
between “good” and “bad” religion and to reduce religions to intellectual abstractions.  
They have not seemed to take into account the kinds of practices at issue in my case 
studies.  Schmidt’s approach in Hearing Things seems more useful for its careful 
attention to the particular disciplinary practices and technologies that have shaped 
modern religious subjectivities.  Schmidt’s project also has been extended productively 
by the work of anthropologist Charles Hirschkind, who has studied the circulation of 
Islamic cassette sermons in contemporary Cairo and the cultivation of ethical ways of 
hearing as a precondition for moral and political action.17
In this dissertation, I draw on these important works as valuable models.  In 
attending to legal disputes about religious noise, I similarly tune into how embodied 
                                                 
16Sullivan, Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 8.  For a recent anthology that gathers together several of 
the most influential articles by legal theorists on Free Exercise clause jurisprudence, see Thomas C. Berg, 
ed., The First Amendment: The Free Exercise of Religion Clause (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007).  
Several of these articles consider the justification for religious freedom, advocating the types of positions I 
identified in the text.  For a critique of these kinds of arguments, see Steven D. Smith, Foreordained 
Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995).  Smith argues, in part, that there can be no singular constitutional principle of religious 
freedom precisely because any such principle necessarily violates government neutrality by privileging a 
particular normative conception of religion based on its value for society.  Also relevant is the legal scholar 
Marci Hamilton’s provocative argument that debating religious freedom in the abstract has led to a 
“romantic attitude toward religious individuals and institutions” that ignores the harm committed in 
religion’s name.  Marci Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel: Religion and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3. 
17Hirschkind, Ethical Soundscape. 
16 
practices, affective sensibilities, and particular auditory technologies such as electro-
acoustic loudspeakers have shaped religious subjects.  Perhaps more significantly, I aim 
similarly to re-cast abstract debates about religion’s position in American public life as an 
episode in the history of the senses, emphasizing how ordinary Americans have 
negotiated and contested religion’s normative boundaries in relation to hearing particular 
devotional sounds.  But I also extend Schmidt and Hirschkind’s works in important ways 
by calling attention to how religious sounds and auditory cultures mediate contact and 
conflict in pluralistic societies.  Schmidt insists that “the history of the senses, like the 
history of the body, has to be written tradition by tradition, era by era.”  But such an 
assertion ignores the ways that Americans of various religious traditions have heard and 
responded to the sounds of religious others.  Or consider the opening of Hirschkind’s 
work, in which he relates an extended anecdote about sitting in a Cairo taxi as his driver 
listens to a cassette sermon.  Hirschkind focuses on the meaning of this practice for the 
Muslim taxi driver, but I want to attend to the non-Muslim passenger, or all of the other 
unintended audiences who might hear these sermons and respond to them in some way.18
In this project, I listen to how communities have responded when the sounds of 
religious devotion have crossed over into what is perceived as “secular” public space.  
Hirschkind argues that religious subjects learn how to hear within the context of 
particular moral communities.  But what about those unintended audiences who listen to 
the same sounds, yet do not hear them in the same way?  Sounds do not necessarily 
respect communal, spatial, or legal boundaries, after all.  As I suggested above, sounds 
have proven difficult to regulate and to contain precisely because they cross borders and 
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blur boundaries.  Listening forges an intersubjective relationship between subject and 
object, fostering an intimacy of sorts between self and other that hearers might welcome 
or resist.  In other words, sounds can attract, thereby constituting new communities, or 
repel, instigating conflict and contention.  While scholarship on religious auditory 
cultures has emphasized how sound and hearing practices shape identity within discrete 
bounded religious communities, this dissertation centers themes of contact and exchange.  
As the composer R. Murray Schafer put it, “Hearing is a way of touching at a distance.”  
But not everyone wants to be touched.  Denigrating religious sounds as noise has offered 
an effective means for circumscribing religion’s place.19
 
In her history of the modern soundscape, Emily Thompson argues that modern 
culture was not just “a matrix of disembodied ideas,” but instead was “built from the 
ground up.  It was constructed by the actions and through the experiences of ordinary 
individuals as they struggled to make sense of their world.”  Similarly, this dissertation 
offers a bottom-up approach for studying how Americans have contested and negotiated 
religion’s position in public life by attending to disputes about religious noise.  In so 
doing, it also offers a model for studying and theorizing American religious diversity.  As 
scholars of American religions have acknowledged the need to take better account of the 
remarkable diversity that has characterized much of U.S. history, they have tended to 
reject the classic Protestant consensus narratives that once dominated the field.  They 
have recognized the need to incorporate new characters and new settings, for continuing 
to tell a story of white mainline Protestants as “the” story of America’s past has seemed 
                                                 
19R. Murray Schafer, The Soundscape: Our Sonic Environment and the Tuning of the World (Rochester, 
VT: Destiny Books, 1993), 11. 
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woefully inadequate.  Yet the failure to agree on new models—or on whether models are 
even necessary at all—has by now been well-documented.20
Scholars have developed a number of approaches for telling new stories about 
American religious history.  For example, they have produced several valuable 
monographs studying previously neglected or overlooked traditions.  Such studies have 
proved critical for revising our understanding of the past, yet too often they treat 
particular religious communities in isolation from each other, obscuring the ways that 
groups have constructed identity in relation to others.  Another approach has been to 
incorporate previously neglected groups as “add-ons,” telling their stories without 
fundamentally altering the contours of the overall narrative.  A variation of this approach, 
exemplified by Catharine Albanese’s textbook America: Religion and Religions, has been 
to tell the story of the “many” and the “one,” the many groups that have built religious 
lives within the boundaries of the United States and the common themes that have 
characterized their stories.  But the “oneness” that Albanese emphasizes is mainly the 
story of a dominant “public Protestantism,” thus implicitly reaffirming a Protestant 
narrative at its core.21
In Religious Pluralism in America, William Hutchison adopts “pluralism” as an 
organizing motif.  According to Hutchison, the fact of religious diversity “happened” in 
the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century, but pluralism, defined as the 
                                                 
20Thompson, Soundscape of Modernity, 11.  For a valuable introduction to debates about narrating U.S. 
religious history, see Thomas A. Tweed, ed., Retelling U.S. Religious History (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997). 
21Catherine L. Albanese, America: Religions and Religion, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 
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“acceptance and encouragement of diversity,” was not adopted as a widespread value 
until the second half of the twentieth century.  Hutchison identifies three stages in the 
redefinition of pluralism: pluralism as toleration, according to which religious “others” 
were socially tolerated but only as outsiders to the dominant culture; pluralism as 
inclusion, according to which “outsiders” were accepted but only on certain terms; and 
pluralism as participation, according to which all groups demanded an equal “seat at the 
table” to shape “society’s agenda.”  Hutchison thus narrates a story of how a hegemonic 
Protestant center responded to a host of religious others, centering important themes of 
contact and public power.  He also calls critical attention to the social and moral 
challenges that religious diversity has posed throughout American religious history.22
At the same time, Hutchison’s work encounters many of the same problems that I 
identified in scholarship on religion in American public life.  Although he carefully 
historicizes the term, Hutchison implies toward the end of his narrative that pluralism, at 
its core, poses a theological challenge, an assumption shared by many scholars who have 
studied American religious pluralism.  In fact, he borrows the term “pluralism” from 
theologians, who have used it to describe the search for common ground on which 
varying religions might meet.  This project re-centers belief as a primary category of 
analysis, implicitly privileging certain normative ways of being religious.  And 
Hutchison’s primary players remain public intellectuals, theologians, and other cultural 
elites who frequently have thought about religious diversity in abstract terms. 
But Americans have not always wrestled with such questions in the abstract, for 
Americans rarely encounter other religions merely as intellectual abstractions.  In this 
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dissertation, I encourage attention to how particular public practices have mediated 
contact and conflict among communities on the ground, and how we might interpret 
responses to religious diversity at the level of everyday experience, or at the level of what 
the American historian David Hall has described as “lived religion.”  In an essay on 
urban religion, Robert Orsi has argued that “it has been by their religious practice as 
much as their politics that migrants and immigrants joined the national debate about 
pluralism, multiculturalism, and heterogeneity.”  Through this dissertation, I aim to offer 
a model that takes such a claim seriously, for Hutchison’s description of diverse groups 
claiming seats at a disembodied multicultural table to shape society’s agenda seems 
inadequate to the task.23
In part, I follow a model proposed by visual culture scholar Sally Promey.  
Promey studied public displays of religion and argued that the experience of seeing 
religious difference might broaden conceptions of who we are as Americans.  By 
centering visual displays as a particular medium of contact, Promey calls attention both to 
how American religious communities express themselves publicly through particular 
material forms and also to how such material forms might impact and shape religious 
others.  Yet, as I noted above, philosophers of the senses have historically associated 
sight with detachment and distance.  Seeing difference might reify it as much as 
complicate it.24
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In this project, I center sound as a particular medium of contact and conflict 
among diverse religious communities.  I attend to the different ways that Americans have 
heard and responded to the sounds of religious others, and I consider how, through their 
responses, they have negotiated religion’s place in actual geographic spaces.  Such an 
approach centers themes of embodiment and exchange and offers a vehicle for analyzing 
the concrete challenges posed by religious diversity without reducing them to intellectual 
abstractions.  Perhaps nothing could be as mundane (or potentially annoying) as noise, 
yet through the noise disputes that I analyze, Americans also have articulated important 
concerns about religious difference and about religion’s proper place.  The central actors 
in these stories are not philosophers, theologians, or even judges, but “ordinary” 
Americans, concerned for different reasons about what kind of sounds they would have to 
tolerate in their communities.  In these disputes, negotiating religion’s boundaries was a 
practice of everyday life, enmeshed within other aspects of social life, and shaped deeply 
by local context.  But such an approach to studying religious diversity is not deaf to 
social power, for, as will be discussed further below, these disputes often have hinged on 
the authority to define particular sounds as religion or as noise.25
 
Each of these disputes also was mediated in important ways by American law, yet 
perhaps not in the ways that legal scholars are accustomed to expect.  As noted above, the 
field of “church-state studies” has tended to focus on constitutional discourses of 
religious freedom.  In particular, scholars have concentrated on the origins and meaning 
of the First Amendment’s religion clauses, which state, “Congress shall make no law 
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22 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”  In this 
dissertation, however, I am not primarily concerned with tracing the development of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, nor do I normatively assess the disputes’ often ambiguous 
outcomes.  In fact, none of my three case studies were resolved with reference to either of 
the religion clauses, and one of the disputes never even made it to court.  Instead, this 
dissertation contributes to an expanding body of literature that encourages scholars to 
think more broadly about how American religion and law intersect. 
In this dissertation, I imagine American law as a “contact zone,” a social space of 
encounter and exchange between diversely religious Americans, shaped by imbalanced 
power relations.  Through legal disputes about noise, Americans have engaged each other 
as they have debated the limits of toleration.  In my analysis of these case studies, I listen 
to how participants articulated what they heard as at stake, how they elucidated the 
meaning of religious freedom, and how they demarcated religion’s place in their 
communities.  I try to avoid imagining what disputants were “really” thinking, but instead 
focus on the kinds of rhetorical strategies they employed, the types of arguments they 
advanced, and the ways that they articulated their own identities in relation to each other 
and to the disputed sounds.  Law provided a structure of sorts, within which contestants 
negotiated their own place and the place of religion.26
But these disputes also had implications for law, testing its capacity to mediate 
among competing conceptions of religion and of noise.  Regulating religious noise has 
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proven complicated precisely on account of the ways that both religions and sounds blur 
the kind of clear lines that legal discourse demands.  In the case of religion, for example, 
legal scholars have tended to treat it as a natural category that exists “out there” in the 
world, readily identifiable if not easily definable.  But recent religious studies scholarship 
has suggested otherwise, charting the particular historical processes through which 
“religion” was constructed as a discrete category, abstracted and differentiated from other 
social spheres.  As I noted above, this project had legal and social implications, for 
defining religion frequently has served to legitimate—and thus extend legal protection 
to—only certain religious forms.  Winnifred Fallers Sullivan has argued persuasively that 
it might in fact be impossible to define religion coherently for the purposes of law.  
“Modern law wants an essentialized religion,” she writes, a religion defined by clear 
boundaries, yet my case studies reveal that such boundaries have proven highly malleable 
and contested.27
In these disputes, opponents advanced competing conceptions of religion and of 
its normative boundaries.  They disagreed about religion’s proper place, about where and 
when religious practice belonged, and about how they expected religious adherents to 
behave.  Denigrating religious sounds as noise revealed implicit assumptions about the 
nature of religion itself.  Yet participants in these disputes also disagreed about how to 
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define noise, a legal category no clearer or more coherent, perhaps, than religion.  
Adjudicating laws with reference to religion or noise required stable definitions of both 
categories, yet each proved indeterminate, deployable to multiple strategic ends.  
Through these disputes, contestants negotiated the meanings of these contested categories 
in relation to each other, and this dissertation explores the tension that lies at that 
intersection.   
 
Efforts to define and regulate noise have a long history, which is worth briefly 
considering.  R. Murray Schafer, a Canadian composer who initiated the World 
Soundscape Project in the late 1960s, suggests that “the only truly effective piece of noise 
legislation ever devised was in the form of divine punishment.”  He quotes The Epic of 
Gilgamesh (c. 3000 B.C.E.): 
In those days the world teemed, the people multiplied, the world bellowed like a 
wild bull, and the great god was aroused by the clamour.  Enlil heard the clamour 
and he said to the gods in council, “the uproar of mankind is intolerable and sleep 
is no longer possible by reason of the babel.”  So the gods in their hearts were 
moved to let loose the deluge. 
 
Human complaints about noise probably go back at least as far.  Emily Thompson cites 
Buddhist scriptures dating from 500 B.C.E., which list “the ten noises in a great city,” 
including “elephants, horses, chariots, drums, tabors, lutes, song, cymbals, gongs, and 
people crying ‘Eat ye, and drink!’”  Legal regulations generally have targeted specific 
types of noises, such as a 44 B.C.E. Roman by-law that restricted the use of wagons and 
other wheeled vehicles or 13th century English laws that confined blacksmiths to 
25 
specially designated areas.  Wherever people have lived in close proximity, it seems, they 
have complained about—and tried to protect themselves from—the sounds of others.28
My interest in this project is not simply to catalogue what sounds have been 
demarcated as noise nor to evaluate the efficacy of noise regulations, as others have done, 
but instead to try to understand what it has meant for individuals to hear certain religious 
sounds as noise.  On the one hand, noise can be understood simply as “loud sound.”  
Medical science has documented the physiological effects of sustained exposure to 
intense sounds, including hearing loss, headaches, nausea, and fatigue.  Some anti-noise 
advocates, concerned that the world has simply become too loud, have sought to regulate 
the volume of all sounds, regardless of source or purpose.  As will be discussed further in 
chapter 3, engineers standardized the decibel as a unit for measuring sound in the 1920s 
and 30s, which made possible quantitative noise legislation.  Such ordinances tend to 
prohibit all sounds over a certain specified decibel limit.  In several noise disputes, judges 
have expressed a preference for such regulations, as they appear objective in application 
(although may not be).  But defining noise in this way ignores the qualitative differences 
between different types of sounds and different listening contexts.  Not all loud sounds 
sound the same, and sounds need not even be loud to elicit complaint.29
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Noise far more frequently has been defined subjectively, simply as “unwanted 
sound,” and this is the meaning reflected in qualitative legislation that targets particular 
types of sounds or those sounds which annoy others.  Sounds may annoy because they are 
loud, but sounds also annoy because of who makes them and in what context.  Cultural 
values shape how sounds are heard and which sounds are heard as noise.  Alain Corbin 
has argued that social historians should attend more closely to “shifting thresholds of 
tolerance,” and studying noise disputes offers a valuable means for heeding his call.  As 
Leigh Eric Schmidt has proposed, noise has functioned “as a social category as much as 
an aesthetic one,” and it is critical to attend to the cultural connotations and symbolic 
meanings that noise has conveyed, or what Emily Thompson has described as “the 
cultural meaning of noise.”30
In musical terms, noise is unpatterned or nonperiodic, lacking a discrete tone or 
pitch.  According to the French social theorist Jacques Attali, music might be understood 
accordingly as the ordering of noise according to normatively sanctioned rules.  Attali has 
traced the relationship between music and political economy and emphasizes the social 
implications of conceiving of noise in this way.  Noise threatens an established order, but 
also heralds the possibility for new orders, new ways of being.  Social and cultural 
historians similarly have linked complaints about noise to the fear of disorder and 
disruption.  Cacophony has signaled social chaos.  For example, Victorian Americans 
complained about the loudness of immigrants and the poor, and Europeans targeted 
itinerant street musicians.  American slaveholders prohibited slaves from using drums, 
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horns, and other loud instruments.  Critics complained about the noise emanating from 
evangelical revivals during the First and Second Great Awakenings.  In each of these 
cases, noise demarcated social differences, threats to the social order that had to be 
contained.  Sensory values expressed social hierarchies.  Noise constituted the limit of 
what could be tolerated.31
Noise has symbolized disorder, and it also has signaled waste and inefficiency, 
particularly in urban settings.  Emily Thompson has demonstrated how progressive urban 
reformers of the early twentieth century sought to eliminate all “unnecessary” noises that 
challenged their dreams of a rationally planned city.  Raymond Smilor and Karin 
Bijsterveld each have traced nineteenth and twentieth century debates about urban noise 
to broader cultural discourses about civilization and barbarism.  Noise was heard as 
uncivilized and as an obstacle to social progress.  Noise was primitive, incoherent, and 
meaningless.32
Yet noise as “loud sounds” also has been associated with power, and making 
public sounds has offered a means for affirming social order as much as disturbing it.  As 
will be discussed further in chapter 2, R. Murray Schafer coined the term “Sacred Noise” 
to refer to such sounds of power, differentiating them from sounds that constituted a 
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public nuisance.  He emphasized that producing the sacred noise was not always about 
producing the loudest sound, but about the authority to make noise without fear of 
censure.  For example, Benjamin Kaplan describes how early modern European churches 
established powerful public presences by building large bell-towers to ensure that only 
their bells could be heard.  Even in areas where Catholic or Protestant rulers permitted 
dissenters to build churches, they regularly prohibited rival confessions from ringing 
bells.  Alain Corbin similarly documents how French villages competed to construct the 
loudest chimes and how the volume of bells was perceived to correlate to the prestige of a 
parish or municipality.  In the United States, urban noise attracted little sustained 
opposition until the first half of the twentieth century because many Americans heard 
industrial noise as a necessary byproduct of progress.  Factories were loud, but were 
understood as essential to the advancement of modern civilization.  As Karin Bijsterveld 
has argued, noise thus bears a complicated, ambivalent cultural meaning, associated on 
the one hand with barbarism and disorder and on the other with civilization, power, and 
progress.33
As recent scholarship on sound has established, public sounds mark spatial 
boundaries, regulate the rhythms of daily life, and orient people in time and space.  But 
such sounds also are contested because they cannot easily be avoided.  Not all listeners 
hear them in the same way.  Public sounds affirm order and threaten to dissolve it.  They 
define communal boundaries and demarcate difference.  Leigh Schmidt describes how 
the sounds of evangelical revivals horrified their opponents but attracted potential 
converts, who could hear them from miles away.  Shane and Graham White have argued 
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that white eavesdroppers heard the noises of African-American slave religion as 
incoherent, frenzied, and meaningless, while blacks understood their own services as 
flexibly structured, suggestive, and expressive of deeply shared cultural values.  Public 
sounds can attract and repel, dominate and deafen others, or be forcibly silenced.  
Disputes about noise thus center as much on authority and social power as on volume and 
decibel level.  Who decides which sounds should be permitted and which prohibited?  
Who decides which sounds are legitimate and which merely constitute noise?  
Furthermore, perceptions of sound change over time, as what once annoyed grows 
familiar, or what once went unnoticed comes to be resented.  For example, Alain Corbin 
argues that French villagers did not hear church bells as noise until the shared meaning of 
the bells had faded.  Complaints about bells as noise demonstrated how the rhythms of 
everyday life had become more individualized.34   
Defining noise is thus a highly subjective determination, based on and expressive 
of a range of cultural values and presuppositions.  Noise’s unstable meaning complicates 
legislative efforts to regulate it, but also offers a valuable site for exploring competitions 
over public power and public order.  As I indicated above, noise seems best understood, 
therefore, as “sounds out of place,” drawing on Peter Bailey’s work.  Attending to noise 
disputes makes audible underlying assumptions about social order—about what belongs 
where—and about the authorizing processes that legitimate that order.35
                                                 
34Schmidt, Hearing Things, 66-9; Shane White and Graham White, “‘At Intervals I Was Nearly Stunned by 
the Noise He Made’: Listening to African American Religious Sound in the Era of Slavery,” American 
Nineteenth Century History1 (Spring 2000): 34-61; Corbin, Village Bells, 305-8. 
35Bailey, “Breaking the Sound Barrier,” 195. 
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Although scholars have paid increasing attention of late to the cultural meaning of 
noise, there has been little sustained attention to how religion fits into this conversation, 
yet it is striking how discourses about noise have paralleled discourses about religion.  As 
I noted above, defining religion also has been related to constructing social order, and the 
discourses of civility and barbarity that have attended noise disputes also have figured 
prominently in the history of religious studies.  My case studies raise critical questions 
about how the categories of religion and noise have intersected and been negotiated in 
relation to each other.  For example, have religious sounds been associated with modern 
civilization, progress, and power, or imagined as signs of barbarism, primitivism, and 
disorder?  Are religious sounds different from other offending noises, protected by 
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom, or are loud sounds noisy regardless of 
source?  How have complaints about religion as noise marked the limits of tolerable or 
legitimate religious practice?36
For the most part, these questions have gone unaddressed.  Instead, religion 
generally appears in scholarship on noise either as something that used to make noise or 
as something to be protected from noise.  The examples that I cited above—including the 
ringing of church bells in early modern Europe and the sounds of evangelical revivals and 
slave religion—are drawn from earlier periods of American and European history, prior 
to postbellum industrialization and urbanization.  When religion appears in scholarship 
on twentieth-century anti-noise movements, which is rare, it is usually in the context of 
regulations that carved out special “zones of quiet” around churches, particularly on 
Sundays.  Modern religion either appears as something quiet, set off from the rest of 
                                                 
36For example, see Timothy Fitzgerald, Discourse on Civility and Barbarity: A Critical History of Religion 
and Related Categories (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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social life, or as something so dignified and elevated that its sounds could never 
constitute noise.  Indeed, the phrase “religious noise” itself seems somehow incongruous, 
inappropriate; it jars and startles the ear.37
Yet American religious communities have continued to practice religion out loud, 
and neighbors have continued to complain.  There is a more recent history of complaints 
about religion as noise that warrants a closer hearing.  Scholars of American 
Pentecostalism have probably been most attuned to such disputes, as Pentecostal services 
frequently have been cited in violation of municipal ordinances.  Like disputes about 
evangelical and African-American religion, these cases have centered on exuberant 
worship styles.  But the case studies that I analyze in this dissertation involve other types 
of sounds, as well, including church bells, prayer calls, and street preaching—other ways 
that religious practice has spilled over onto public spaces and city streets.  And through 
these disputes we can learn more about how the “secular” character of these public spaces 
has been constructed, about how public religious differences have been managed, and 
about religion’s shifting boundaries amidst changing social conditions.  By attending to 
these case studies, we can listen in on what has made religion sound “out of place.”38
 
                                                 
37There is a history to regulations protecting religion from noise.  For example, the British historian Emily 
Cockayne found numerous cases brought to early modern English ecclesiastical courts related to “the 
noises made in the church or churchyard during divine service.”  In one case, a woman was tried for 
bringing “a most unquiet child to the church to great offence of the whole congregacion.” See Hubbub, 
116.  Such regulations apparently were not without reason.  Richard Cullen Rath tells of an 18th century 
Philadelphia church that fell into disuse because of the loud street traffic outside in How Early America 
Sounded, 116. 
38For a discussion of Pentecostal disputes, see Wacker, Heaven Below, 187-9.  Also see United Pentecostal 
Church v. 59th District Judge, 51 Mich. App. 323 (App. Ct. Mich., 1974). 
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Through disputes about noise, Americans have negotiated religion’s proper place, 
but they have done so within particular historical, religious, and legal contexts.  Particular 
social dynamics have prompted the re-negotiation of religion’s normative boundaries that 
we find in these conflicts.  For this reason, I have found it most useful for the purposes of 
this project to delve into a few selected case studies, to burrow into the particulars of 
these disputes in order to understand the concerns that animated them and the reasons 
why religion was heard as in its place or out of place.  I study normative debates about 
religion’s place in American life from the ground up by investigating how ordinary 
Americans have used sounds to make place for themselves within American society and 
how others have responded to these sounds spilling over into public space. 
In many cases, neighbors have complained when they have happened to overhear 
the sounds of religious devotion emanating from within a church or other house of 
worship.  But for the purposes of this dissertation, I have selected case studies in which 
religious groups expressly intended for their sounds to spill beyond the confines of such 
buildings, cases in which noisemakers explicitly targeted a broader public outside their 
institutional walls.  These cases have made particularly audible competing conceptions of 
religion’s proper place.  Noise also appears frequently as a peripheral complaint in legal 
disputes about religion, such as when neighbors of a proposed church, temple, or mosque 
complain about the possibility of increased traffic problems.  In such cases, noise 
typically is cited as one in a long list of concerns, and the sounds in question are ancillary 
to the purpose of the proposed building.  In my case studies, however, noise appeared as 
the principal cause of complaint, and noisemakers contended that they performed the 
particular sounds in question as part of normatively sanctioned religious practice.  These 
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case studies thus bring to the fore definitional questions about whether disputed sounds 
constitute religion or noise.  They also make audible the contests over authority that 
attend such definitional disputes.  In fact, I selected these three case studies because they 
each feature different configurations of public power and of pluralism at different 
moments in American religious history.  They also exemplify different types of legal 
events, featuring different regulatory strategies for dealing with the problem of religious 
noise that reflect these changing social dynamics.39
In chapter 2, I listen to a dispute about the sounds of power.  When Philadelphia’s 
St. Mark’s Protestant Episcopal Church installed bells in June 1876, the church’s leaders 
never imagined that anyone might complain.  Yet the church’s neighbors, most of whom 
were themselves members of Philadelphia’s Episcopalian elite, sought a preliminary 
injunction from a city court that would restrain the bells from ringing.  This primarily 
intra-denominational dispute transpired within a rapidly diversifying and industrializing 
urban setting, a context in which Protestant dominance could not necessarily be taken for 
granted, and this chapter considers what it meant to describe church bells as a nuisance in 
such a context.  Drawing on court records, newspaper accounts, personal memoirs, and 
other archival sources, my analysis attends especially to how the complainants and 
defendants situated church bells differently within broader cultural discourses about 
noise.  The neighbors insisted that civilized religion did not need such auditory 
announcements; it did not need to make noise.  But the church’s leaders heard in the 
neighbors’ demands a challenge to their public authority, for complaints about the bells’ 
                                                 
39These cases are not exactly representative, but nor are they unique.  In fact, as I note in the following 
chapters, there have been several similar disputes throughout American history involving sounds such as 
church bells, prayer calls, and public preaching. 
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volume dislodged them from their status as background noise, as unnoticed, or as normal.  
When the city court found for the complainants and issued the injunction, the church’s 
leaders learned that they could not take for granted their right to make noise publicly.  
The court went out of its way to affirm a continued public place for Protestantism, but its 
decision (as well as that of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on appeal) circumscribed 
that place, demarcating and delimiting its boundaries.  This intra-denominational dispute 
thus made audible competing conceptions of religion’s place and power in the industrial 
city.40
In chapter 3, I listen to the sounds of religious dissent.  In 1946, police officers 
arrested Samuel Saia, a Jehovah’s Witness minister, for broadcasting sermons over 
electro-acoustic loudspeakers in a Lockport, New York, public park.  Saia had violated a 
municipal anti-noise ordinance, the product of early twentieth century regulatory efforts 
to abate urban noise problems that had not considered potential implications for religious 
practice.  New acoustic technologies, such as the loudspeaker, offered unpopular 
minorities an important means for making their voices heard, for amplifying religious 
difference, but they also offered unprecedented opportunities for dominating space with 
sound.  In this chapter, I consult court records, newspaper accounts, local histories, and 
interviews with Saia’s children and other local residents in order to explore how the Saia 
case exemplified this tension.  Saia justified his actions in the name of religious freedom, 
but picnickers complained that the lectures interfered with their enjoyment of the park 
and constituted a public nuisance.  Against the background of an emerging postwar spirit 
of interfaith harmony and ecumenical cooperation, Saia and other Jehovah’s Witnesses 
                                                 
40Harrrison, et. al. v. Rector, Church Wardens, and Vestry of St. Mark’s Church, 12 Phila 259 (1877). 
35 
tested the limits of religious toleration.  After a Lockport police court convicted him, Saia 
eventually appealed his case to the U.S. Supreme Court, which was asked to consider for 
the first time whether religious freedom might entail a right to make noise.  Saia was one 
of a series of Witness-related cases during the 1940s that resulted in the Court radically 
expanding First Amendment protections, illustrating a shift toward settling religious free 
exercise cases in the federal courts.  But though the Court found for the Witnesses, it 
notably did so without reference to the First Amendment’s religion clauses, thus treating 
the sounds of all unpopular dissenters the same, whether religious or not.  In critical 
ways, the decision underscored the unstable meanings of both religion and noise.41
In chapter 4, I listen to the sounds of religious newcomers.  I attend to how the 
meaning of traditional religious sounds has changed as immigrants have introduced them 
into new social contexts.  In 2004, only a few years after the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks, controversy erupted in Hamtramck, Michigan, when a mosque petitioned 
the city council for permission to broadcast the azan, or call to prayer, over loudspeakers.  
A historically Polish-Catholic enclave, Hamtramck recently has received an influx of 
Muslim immigrants.  Hamtramck Muslims used the sound of the azan, in part, to place 
themselves in their new community, but many long-time residents heard the azan as 
signaling their own displacement.  Despite numerous complaints, the Hamtramck 
Common Council went out of its way to accommodate this Muslim practice by passing 
an amendment to the municipal noise ordinance that exempted the azan, differentiating 
this case study from many other religious noise disputes.  But my analysis focuses 
especially on how this public religious sound mediated contact among diverse religious 
                                                 
41Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). 
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communities.  Drawing on city council records, video recordings of public hearings, 
newspaper accounts, personal correspondences, and interviews, I consider how multiple, 
heterogeneous audiences, both willing and unwilling, listened and responded to the 
azan’s call in different ways.  I attend to how the azan blurred religious borders, calling 
everyone to pray, but also to how many complainants tried to re-fortify boundaries by 
demarcating the azan’s sound as distinctly out of place.  They asserted a right to choose 
the extent to which they would have to hear religious others.  Hamtramck residents 
eventually voted to affirm the Council’s legislative action, thereby guaranteeing the 
mosque’s right to broadcast the call.  This resolution through political processes, rather 
than by judicial intervention, reflected broader trends since the Supreme Court’s 1990 
Oregon v. Smith decision, which had suggested that religious exemptions were best left to 
legislative arenas rather than treat them as constitutionally mandated.  This case study 
thus offers a particular opportunity for listening to how ordinary Americans negotiated 
the place of religion—and religious adherents—in their rapidly changing community.42
After delving into each of these case studies, I conclude in chapter 5 by stepping 
back to reflect on some of their important common themes and broader implications.  I 
argue that participants in each of these disputes demarcated religion’s place by trying to 
draw clear lines between public and private, among diverse religious communities, and 
                                                 
42In Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court upheld Oregon’s decision to deny 
unemployment compensation to two members of the Native American Church who had been fired by a 
drug rehabilitation organization for their sacramental use of peyote.  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
rejected the argument that an individual’s religious beliefs could excuse him from complying with 
otherwise valid laws unless the state could prove a “compelling interest.”  Scalia suggested that religious 
exemptions were best left to political and legislative arenas.  Although there is no evidence that the 
Hamtramck dispute played out in this way as a direct consequence of the Smith decision, it is illustrative of 
post-Smith trends.  Because the Hamtramck dispute never went to court, there is no record of court 
documents.  Contestants debated their differences through forums such as city council meetings, newspaper 
editorials, and letter-writing campaigns. 
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between religion and non-religion.  But at the same time, the disputed sounds crossed and 
collapsed these symbolically significant and pragmatically useful boundaries.  In 
particular, I consider how complainants conceived of religion as private and voluntary 
while these case studies offer a conception of legitimate religion as in fact public and 
involuntary.  I examine how participants constructed collective identity in relation to the 
disputed sounds while these sounds also blurred communal boundaries.  And I explore 
how contestants differentiated religion from non-religion and how they negotiated 
religion’s meaning in relation to the similarly indeterminate category of noise.  In the 
end, I find that these case studies offer a concrete vehicle for analyzing the particular 
processes through which communities have negotiated difference and managed conflict.  
Mapping the shifting boundaries of American religious life therefore will require scholars 
to become more attuned to the sounds of religious difference.  In debates about whether 
religion should be practiced quietly or out loud, I suggest, we hear competing 
conceptions of religion’s place in the modern world. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
REDUCING BACKGROUND NOISE: 
CHURCH BELLS IN THE INDUSTRIAL CITY 
 
Anthony and Luana Impellizerri were fed up.  In 1979, they went to court to 
restrain a nearby church from playing its carillon.  They could not tolerate the clamor of 
church bells any longer, which they complained was exacerbating their son’s 
neurological condition and aggravating Luana’s migraine headaches.  But Judge John R. 
Tenney of New York’s Supreme Court cursorily dismissed their case.  “Bells in one form 
or another are a tradition throughout the world,” Tenney wrote, “There is little question 
that the sound is often deafening when these bells start to ring, but for the general 
enjoyment of the public, it is considered acceptable.”  Tenney found it difficult to believe 
that the sound of church bells might constitute a public nuisance.  Other U.S. judges have 
agreed.  For example, in at least two other cases, courts struck down municipal anti-noise 
ordinances as overly broad because, “among many other [sounds] normally heard on city 
streets,” they would have prohibited church bells.  Other courts have upheld ordinances 
that specifically exempted church bells, as in a 1991 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision that described bells as “a traditional and generally unobtrusive aspect of a 
tranquil environment.”   Each of these opinions treated church bells as normal features of 
  
 American soundscapes.  While bells might be loud, certainly no one would consider them 
“noise.”  Certainly no one would deem chimes unwanted or out of place.1
Or perhaps someone would.  In this chapter, I analyze a nineteenth-century legal 
dispute that might have surprised these twentieth-century courts, for it treated church 
bells as anything but background noise.  In 1876, several distinguished denizens of 
Philadelphia’s upper-class Rittenhouse Square neighborhood went to court, seeking an 
injunction that would restrain the highly fashionable St. Mark’s Protestant Episcopal 
Church from ringing its bells.  Philadelphia churches had rung bells since before the 
Revolution, and St. Mark’s leaders never imagined that anyone might complain.  Yet the 
neighbors, most of whom themselves were Episcopalians, described the bells as harsh, 
loud, and discordant and alleged that they constituted a distinct nuisance.  The ensuing 
case created a furor.  “Philadelphia society was rent in twain,” a later account would 
relate, “Matrons had to select dinner guests, all of whom either favored or opposed the 
bells of St. Mark’s. The Centennial Exposition and the Pennsylvania-Princeton football 
game were nearly eclipsed.”  Philadelphia newspapers rushed to make light of the fracas 
(“grim-visaged war has invaded the peaceful precincts of Rittenhouse Square,” reported 
the Philadelphia Times), but St. Mark’s rector and vestrymen were not amused when a 
judge sided with the complainants.  In an 1877 decision, Philadelphia’s Court of 
Common Pleas prohibited the ringing of St. Mark’s bells.  As one Philadelphia resident 
                                                 
1Impellizerri v. Jamesville Federated Church, 428 N.Y.S.2d 550, 551 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Fetsch et al. v. 
Sands Point, 169 N.Y.S.2d 326 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957); Mister Softee v. Chicago, 192 N.E.2d 424, 426 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1963); Stokes v. Madison, 930 F.2d 1163, 1171 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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later would recall, the neighbors successfully persuaded the court “to have the 
ecclesiastical zeal kept within bounds.” 2
Ostensibly, this case was about nothing more than noise and the hyper-
sensitivities of Victorian Americans.  Yet the dispute raised critical questions about 
Protestantism’s place in the industrial city.  The complaints about St. Mark’s bells 
dislodged them from their status as background noise.  Suddenly church bells were 
noticed and paid attention to, and their continued public presence in a rapidly changing 
society became an open question.  Their acoustic dominance could not be taken for 
granted. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore what it meant to hear church bells as 
noise, as “out of place,” at a historical moment when Protestant dominance also could not 
be taken for granted.  Just as church bells traditionally announced the transformative 
sacrament of the Eucharist, the 1870s heralded a period of rapid transition in American 
history.  A mid-nineteenth century mainline Protestant consensus faced numerous 
assaults from forces such as urbanization, industrialization, and immigration.  Between 
1860 and 1910, the American urban population increased sevenfold, rising from 19.8 to 
45.7 percent of the country’s total population.  Fueled both by internal migration and 
foreign immigration, the urban population also grew increasingly diverse.  Between 1840 
and 1890, “7.5 million Irish and German immigrants arrived in the United States, 5.5 
                                                 
2Harrrison, et. al. v. Rector, Church Wardens, and Vestry of St. Mark’s Church, 12 Phila 259 (1877); 
Claude Gilkyson, St. Mark’s: One Hundred Years on Locust Street (Philadelphia: St. Mark’s Church, 
1948), 28; “Society Bells,” Philadelphia Times, November 20, 1876; Mary Cadwalader Jones, Lantern 
Slides (Philadelphia: Privately Printed, 1937), 106.  One of the attorneys for the complainants gathered the 
court records into a single volume, published as Report of [George L.] Harrison et al. vs. St. Mark’s 
Church, Philadelphia: A bill to restrain the ringing of bells so as to cause a nuisance to the occupants of 
the dwellings in the immediate vicinity of the Church: In the Court of Common Pleas, no. 2. In Equity. 
Before Hare, PJ, and Mitchell, Associate J. (Philadelphia, 1877) (hereinafter Harrison v. St. Mark’s). 
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million of them Catholics.”  The industrial city challenged dominant conceptions of what 
it meant to be ethnically and religiously American and threatened Protestant hegemony.  
When advocates pushed for a “Christian Amendment” to the U.S. Constitution during the 
1870s, the Episcopalian minister Ansom Phelps Stokes dismissed it as “unnecessary,” but 
others interpreted it as an implicit acknowledgment that Protestant dominance could no 
longer be taken for granted.  The St. Mark’s bells dispute transpired against the backdrop 
of these challenges to Protestant power and privilege.3
As I discussed in chapter 1, scholars such as Alain Corbin, Leigh Schmidt, and 
Charles Hirschkind have demonstrated how contests over religion’s place in the modern 
world might be recast productively as episodes in the history of the senses rather than as 
abstract intellectual debates.  Similarly, I consider in this chapter how disputants 
advanced competing conceptions of religion and its place in the industrial city through 
their different responses to St. Mark’s bells.  In particular, I examine how the disputants 
situated these religious sounds differently within broader cultural discourses about noise.  
As I outlined in the preceding chapter, loud sounds regularly have been evaluated 
negatively, as unwanted, disorderly, and barbaric.  But they also have been evaluated 
positively, as signaling power, strength, and prosperity.  The St. Mark’s complainants, 
who tended more low-church in religious sensibility, defined noise primarily in terms of 
                                                 
3Urbanization and immigration statistics are taken from John F. Kasson, Rudeness and Civility: Manners in 
Nineteenth-Century Urban America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990), 72; Robert A. Orsi, ed. Gods of the 
City: Religion and the American Urban Landscape (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 16.  For 
an invaluable introduction to religion in American cities, see Orsi’s introductory essay in Gods of the City.  
On the drive for a Christian amendment and Stokes’ response, see William R. Hutchison, Religious 
Pluralism in America: The Contentious History of a Founding Ideal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2003), 82.  Especially in medieval Europe, churches rang bells not only to announce the beginning of 
services, but also to announce the different stages of the service (especially the Eucharist) to those who 
were unable to attend due to health or old age.  See Percival Price, Bells and Man (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 107-110; H.B. Walters, Church Bells (London: A. R. Mowbray & Co., 1908). 
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volume, emphasizing the physiological risks associated with exposure to loud sounds.  
But they also argued that religious sounds were “uncivilized” and “unnecessary,” 
implying that modern religion, properly conceived, had no need for such public 
pronouncements.  On the other hand, the high-church leaders of St. Mark’s associated 
loud sounds with power and influence.  Citing the long history of Christian bell-ringing 
practices, they presumed a right to make noise without censure, and they heard in the 
neighbors’ objections a challenge to their public authority.  They argued that making 
noise publicly was necessary in order to compete (or perhaps to harmonize?) with 
modern industry, whose sounds went uncontested.4
This intra-denominational dispute centered on the sounds of power and thus 
differs significantly from many other noise cases.  In other chapters, I consider case 
studies involving the sounds of unpopular dissenters and religious newcomers.  As 
historians and anthropologists of sound have documented, noise complaints generally 
have targeted groups or classes that threaten the prevailing social order, such as slaves, 
immigrants, or the poor.  “Noise” has offered a useful category for circumscribing the 
place of these social deviants.  In fact, Victorian Americans regularly complained about 
“the loudness of new immigrants and the threatening cacophony of the cities,” and they 
constructed racial, ethnic, and religious hierarchies in terms of auditory and olfactory 
difference.  Religious “others” were too noisy.  Or, in the famous words of George 
                                                 
4Alain Corbin, Village Bells: Sound and Meaning in the Nineteenth-Century French Countryside (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Leigh Eric Schmidt, Hearing Things: Religion, Illusion, and the 
American Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Charles Hirschkind, The 
Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006). 
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Orwell, the “real secret of class distinctions in the West” could be “summed up in four 
frightful words”: “The lower classes smell.”5
In subtle ways, these sensory hierarchies shaped the St. Mark’s case, as disputants 
on both sides linked the enjoyment of bell-ringing to the sensibilities of lower-class, 
Irish-Catholic immigrants who lived in and around the church’s neighborhood.  But for 
the most part, this was decidedly a case about the sounds of power, the sounds of the 
socially dominant, not deviant.  St. Mark’s Church drew its congregation primarily from 
among Philadelphia’s upper class, and the complaining neighbors, most of whom also 
were Episcopalian, occupied a similar social position.  While perhaps not great in 
numbers, these Episcopalian elites dominated the city’s economic and cultural 
institutions.  They differed dramatically from the disputants who I consider in the 
following chapters.  Yet as this case demonstrates, even the sounds of power have not 
gone unchallenged. 
In the first section of this chapter, I consider how Philadelphia’s Episcopalian 
elites were consolidating class identity during the 1870s while also contesting internal 
differences related to devotional style.  In fact, the St. Mark’s disputants all agreed that 
Protestantism should retain a privileged place in the industrial city, but they differed as to 
the forms that Protestant practice should take.  In the next section, I review briefly the 
                                                 
5Schmidt, Hearing Things, 67.  Also see Mark M. Smith, Listening to Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Mark M. Smith, How Race is Made: Slavery, Segregation, 
and the Senses (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Shane White and Graham White, 
“‘At Intervals I Was Nearly Stunned by the Noise He Made’: Listening to African American Religious 
Sound in the Era of Slavery,” American Nineteenth Century History 1 (Spring 2000): 34-61; Emily 
Cockayne, Hubbub: Filth, Noise, and Stench in England, 1600-1770 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007), 121-127.  For more on olfactory and auditory hierarchies, see Constance Classen, Worlds of Sense: 
Exploring the Senses in History and across Cultures (London: Routledge, 1993); David Howes, Sensual 
Relations: Engaging the Senses in Culture and Social Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2003).  Stephen R. Prothero discusses how nineteenth-century Americans regarded immigrants as 
pollutants to the social body in Purified by Fire: A History of Cremation in America (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2001), 99. 
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history of Christian bell-ringing practices, emphasizing how they have called worshippers 
to pray, but also how they have marked communal boundaries and have announced 
Christian presence to religious others.  I find that the St. Mark’s dispute was not as 
unprecedented as some participants might have presumed. 
I then turn to the details of the St. Mark’s case.  I explore how the complaints 
about St. Mark’s bells made them the subject of public scrutiny and debate.  As I proceed 
to analyze a range of arguments that participants advanced during the dispute, I attend 
especially to how contestants located these religious sounds differently within broader 
cultural discourses about noise.  Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debates about 
noise focused especially on defining which sounds were necessary for urban life.  I trace 
how questions of necessity shaped the St. Mark’s case in at least three ways.  First, I 
listen in on debates about whether modern religion needed to make noise.  Second, I tune 
in to debates about whether cities needed auditory announcements of religious presence 
as much as they needed the sounds of modern industry.  Third, I attend to debates about 
whether certain social classes might need noise more than others.  Through these various 
debates, I propose, we hear competing conceptions of the nature of religion, of its 
relationship to modern industry, and of its place in American cities. 
Finally, I analyze the court’s decision in Harrison v. St. Mark’s and how it later 
was modified by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to permit bell-ringing but only at 
specified times.  The complaints about St. Mark’s bells had dislodged them from their 
status as background noise.  As soon as they were noticed, as soon as attention was paid 
to them, the chimes became problematic, a threat to public peace and order.  The 
Pennsylvania courts went out of their way to affirm Protestantism’s continued public 
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place in the industrial city, but their injunctions circumscribed that place, demarcating 
and delimiting its boundaries.  Once religion became noise, it seems, it had to be 
contained.  The St. Mark’s dispute thus offers a valuable case study for considering how 
nineteenth-century Americans negotiated religion’s place in the industrial city in relation 
to particular auditory expressions. 
 
An Urban Episcopalian Establishment 
Philadelphians inaugurated America’s centennial year of 1876 with noise.  On 
New Year’s Eve, December 31, 1875, they rang bells, blew whistles, lit firecrackers, and 
played musical instruments in the streets.  One visitor to the city described the celebration 
as the “most extraordinary noise ever heard.”  On May 10, 1876, every bell in the city 
rang again to signal the opening of the Centennial Exposition, a world’s fair that would 
attract over ten million visitors during the next seven months and was the first of its kind 
on American soil.  The Exposition showcased American invention and ingenuity for the 
world, but it also brought the world to Philadelphia.  With foreigners suddenly 
“rampant,” as one Philadelphia resident recalled, “The Centennial came as one 
comprehensive revelation—overwhelming evidence that the Philadelphia way was not 
the only way.”6
Some observers found much to admire about the visitors.  “We have been brought 
face to face with older civilizations than that of America and Europe,” the editors of the 
                                                 
6Dorothy Gondos Beers, “The Centennial City: 1865-1876,” in Philadelphia: A 300 Year History, ed. 
Russell F. Weigley, 417-70 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 459; Elizabeth Robins Pennell, Our 
Philadelphia (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1914), 227.  For more on the Centennial Exposition, see John 
Henry Hepp, The Middle-Class City: Transforming Space and Time in Philadelphia, 1876-1926 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Beers, “The Centennial City”; Gary B. Nash, First 
City: Philadelphia and the Forging of Historical Memory (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2006), 262-283. 
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Philadelphia Catholic Standard declared at the Centennial’s close, “We have met the 
Tartar and the Turk, the Saracen and the worshipper of Buddha.  We have seen that they 
had industry greater than our own, and skill in execution not inferior.”  But the 
newspaper remained convinced of American superiority and located the source of the 
nation’s strength in its religious faith: “Yet we have walked through the Exposition with 
blinded eyes if we have not learned that this power, the power which has made us 
superior to the Chinaman, the Hindoo, and the Turk has its source and spring mainly in 
religion.  That it is to Christianity that we owe forces…that carry us forward in a course 
of progress.”7
Other religious leaders worried about the effects that exposure to global variety 
might have on religious faith.  As Bishop William Bacon Stevens of the Episcopal 
Diocese of Philadelphia warned the 1876 diocesan convention, “Owing to the fact that 
every one of our family circles will be swelled by the presence of visitors to the 
Exhibition, many of whom will come from foreign lands, bringing with them thoughts 
and practices alien to our own, here will result a danger of relaxing our stronghold on the 
importance of Church-going, and there will be a temptation to yield to influences around 
us, and give up too much the services of the Sanctuary and the Ordinances of grace.”  
Despite his concerns, Stevens was happy to report the following year that Philadelphia 
Episcopalians had acquitted themselves well: “We have by this Exposition not only 
benefited ourselves in several ways, secular, social, mental, and moral, but have done 
good to others, especially to foreigners, by showing as a community, certain great ethical 
                                                 
7“The Close of the Exhibition,” Philadelphia Catholic Standard, November 18, 1876. 
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principles which are necessarily elevating and beneficial to all who come under their 
influence.”8
If these observers saw both perils and opportunities in the Centennial’s 
cosmopolitanism, then perhaps they also were responding to Philadelphia’s demographic 
and economic shifts, apart from the Exposition.  Pennsylvania’s Quaker legacy had long 
made Philadelphia one of the nation’s most religiously diverse cities.  In addition to its 
strong Quaker presence, “Philadelphia was the seat of the mother diocese of the 
Episcopal Church, the site of the first Presbytery organized in the United States, home to 
one of the nation’s oldest Jewish communities, the first place in the colonies where 
Catholics could worship openly, the cradle of American Methodism, the birthplace of the 
African Methodist Episcopal Church, and a haven for a number of other religious 
minorities.”  But in 1876, Philadelphia was in the midst of an industrial revolution that 
would transform the city into a major economic center and would diversify its population 
even more significantly.   Iron, steel, coal, and rail companies fueled Philadelphia’s 
growth and also made it significantly noisier.  Steam engines, factory whistles, and 
streetcars transformed the city’s soundscape.  Philadelphia’s population grew 
exponentially as domestic migrants and foreign immigrants poured into the city.  An 
1850 population of 121,376 expanded to 565,529 by 1860, making Philadelphia the 
second largest city in the United States, ranking behind only New York.  By 1876, the 
population had grown to over 817,000.  Many of the newcomers emigrated from Ireland 
and Germany, and they would be joined by migrants from southern and eastern Europe 
                                                 
8Journal of the Proceedings of the Ninety-Second Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church, in the 
Diocese of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1876), 40; Journal of the Proceedings of the Ninety-Third 
Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church, in the Diocese of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1877), 14. 
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over the next several decades.  Philadelphia’s increasing ethnic heterogeneity contributed 
to its religious variety.  An 1876 report boasted 575 churches, or “religious societies with 
‘distinct places of worship,’” which included 359 Protestant Episcopal, Methodist 
Episcopal, Baptist, or Presbyterian churches, forty-three Roman Catholic churches, 
fourteen Quaker meetinghouses, and nine Jewish synagogues.  By the turn of the century, 
Philadelphians remained mostly of English, Irish, or German descent, but Catholics 
constituted the largest religious group in the city.9
As in other nineteenth century American cities, Philadelphia grew heterogeneous 
yet fragmented, a “divided metropolis.”  Immigration fueled ethnic and religious 
tensions, and industrialization sharpened social divisions and class distinctions.  Class 
differences, in particular, separated Philadelphians from each other socially and spatially, 
as different groups tended to live in different parts of the city.  What several scholars 
have described as a singular, seemingly homogenous upper class emerged, “aloof and 
apart from the rapidly developing heterogeneity of the rest of American society.”  
Members of this insulated and isolated class tended to emphasize social stability in the 
face of disorienting change, and they shared Victorian values of conformity, domesticity, 
and respectability.  They lived in discreet neighborhoods, many of them moving 
westward across the city during the 1840s, 50s, and 60s, to settle around Philadelphia’s 
                                                 
9Thomas F. Rzeznik, “Spiritual Capital: Religion, Wealth, and Social Status in Industrial Era Philadelphia” 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2006), 15.  On religious diversity in Philadelphia, see 
Roger W. Moss, Historic Sacred Places of Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2005).  On noise as one of the costs of the industrial revolution, see Elizabeth M. Geffen, “Industrial 
Development and Social Crisis: 1841-1854,” in Philadelphia: A 300 Year History, ed. Russell F. Weigley, 
307-62 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 307.  On manufacturing and industry in Philadelphia, see 
Nathaniel Burt and Wallace E. Davies, “The Iron Age: 1876-1905,” in Philadelphia: A 300 Year History, 
ed. Russell F. Weigley, 471-523 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 474-87; Rzeznik, “Spiritual Capital,” 
13-4.  Population statistics are from Geffen, “Industrial Development,” 309; Russell F. Weigley, “The 
Border City in Civil War: 1854-65,” in Philadelphia: A 300 Year History, ed. Russell F. Weigley, 363-416 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 363; Beers, “The Centennial City,” 419; Burt and Davies, “The Iron 
Age,” 487-94.  The 1876 report on Philadelphia churches is cited in Beers, “The Centennial City,” 443. 
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Rittenhouse Square.  There, they lived close together in beautifully designed row houses, 
and they built important social networks by attending the same schools, clubs, and 
churches.  While these elites may not have been great in numbers, they wielded 
tremendous social power and dominated Philadelphia’s commercial, cultural, and 
religious institutions, constituting what the sociologist E. Digby Baltzell described as a 
Protestant Establishment.10
Philadelphia’s social and spatial stratification mapped its religious geography.  
While upper-class establishments would emerge in other religious communities, as well, 
the Rittenhouse Square elites gravitated predominantly toward the Protestant Episcopal 
Church, many of them converts from the Society of Friends.  By 1860, one study found 
three times as many Methodist, Lutheran, and Baptist congregations in Philadelphia than 
Episcopalian.  But in the Rittenhouse Square neighborhood, Episcopal churches 
outnumbered those of the other denominations combined by a margin of seven to three.  
                                                 
10E. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1971), 188.  For two important works on the Protestant Establishment, see E. Digby Baltzell, The 
Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America (New York: Random House, 1964); William 
R. Hutchison, ed. Between the Times: The Travail of the Protestant Establishment in America, 1900-1960 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).  For classic studies of the Philadelphia upper class, see 
Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen; Nathaniel Burt, The Perennial Philadelphians: The Anatomy of an 
American Aristocracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).  For a more recent study, see 
Rzeznik, “Spiritual Capital.”  On Philadelphia as a “divided metropolis,” see William W. Cutler and 
Howard Gillette, eds., The Divided Metropolis: Social and Spatial Dimensions of Philadelphia, 1800-1975 
(Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1980).  On Victorian values, see Daniel Walker Howe, “Victorian 
Culture in America,” in Victorian America, ed. Daniel Walker Hower, 3-28 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1976); Burt and Davies, “The Iron Age”; Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, 187-91.  
On spatial and social differentiation, see Theodore Hershberg, ed., Philadelphia: Work, Space, Family, and 
Group Experience in the Nineteenth Century: Essays Toward an Interdisciplinary History of the City (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1981).  Sam Bass Warner also describes “mild to pronounced segregation 
by income and ethnicity” in Philadelphia between 1860-1930 in The Private City: Philadelphia in Three 
Periods of its Growth (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 169.  But it also is important 
to emphasize that the Rittenhouse Square neighborhood was never as homogenous as its residents imagined 
it, for most families employed Irish maids and housekeepers, many of whom came from the nearby Irish 
Catholic “Ramcat” neighborhood.  See Dennis Clark, “‘Ramcat’ and Rittenhouse Square: Related 
Communities,” in The Divided Metropolis: Social and Spatial Dimensions of Philadelphia, 1800-1975, ed. 
William W. Cutler and Howard Gillette, 125-40 (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1980). 
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As in industrializing cities throughout the northeast, the Protestant Episcopal Church was 
evolving “into a denomination of the urban establishment.”11
The Episcopal Church did not experience the same kind of rapid institutional 
growth as other American Protestant denominations during the first half of the nineteenth 
century.  Its association with the Anglican Church garnered distrust in the decades 
following the Revolutionary War among those who suspected Episcopalians of harboring 
lingering loyalist sentiments.  Episcopalian emphasis on hierarchy and order seemed out 
of step with the cultural climate of the Second Great Awakening, and the denomination 
found relatively little success in evangelizing the western frontier.  But the “urban 
frontier” of the second half of the nineteenth-century offered fertile ground, and the 
Episcopal Church flourished, particularly among members of the upper class who were 
“accustomed to quiet, order, decorum, and dignity.”  While it is important not to attribute 
its appeal only to its social function, the denomination proved central to consolidating a 
common upper-class identity.  The construction of the National Cathedral in Washington, 
D.C., in the early twentieth-century came to symbolize how the Episcopal Church had 
become culturally, if not legally, established as the religion of America’s dominant 
elite.12
                                                 
11David Hein and Gardiner H. Shattuck, The Episcopalians (Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 2004), ix.  
The study of social and religious stratification comes from George E. Thomas, “Architectural Patronage 
and Social Stratification in Philadelphia between 1840 and 1920,” in The Divided Metropolis: Social and 
Spatial Dimensions of Philadelphia, 1800-1975, ed. William W. Cutler and Howard Gillette, 85-123 
(Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1980).  On the “Quaker-turned-Episcopal gentry,” see Baltzell, 
Philadelphia Gentlemen.  Rzeznik argues in “Spiritual Capital” that we should not assume members of the 
upper-class converted exclusively for social reasons.  He suggests we should take seriously their claims of 
sincere belief. 
12Theodore Myers Riley, S.T.D., A Memorial Biography of the Very Reverend Eugene Augustus Hoffman, 
D.D., Late Dean of the General Theological Seminary (New York: Privately Printed, 1904), 486.  For an 
account of Episcopal growth, see Hein and Shattuck, The Episcopalians.  On the conversion of 
Philadelphia elites to the Episcopal church, also see Baltzell Philadelphia Gentlemen; Rzeznik, “Spiritual 
Capital.”  On the symbolic significance of the National Cathedral, see Thomas A. Tweed, “America’s 
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The Episcopal Church’s established status had to be achieved, however, and its 
construction should not be regarded as inevitable.  In addition to overcoming the 
problems associated with its loyalist past, the denomination confronted serious internal 
divisions during the mid-nineteenth century.  While other Protestant sects would fight 
about doctrine and Biblical interpretation, Episcopalians divided over matters of worship 
and devotional style.  Evangelical and high church Episcopalians clashed throughout the 
nineteenth century about the relationship between piety and practice, most prominently 
during the “Ritualist controversies” of the 1860s and 70s.  Several “Anglo-Catholic” 
congregations introduced ornate ritual forms, including bowing, genuflections, vestments, 
candles, and incense.  Evangelicals dismissed these practices as “Romanish” and sought 
to have offending congregations censured, while their defenders argued that such 
practices lent beauty to worship and tapped into a Romantic aesthetic sensibility.  These 
disputes mostly played out at annual General Conventions, but they occasionally ended 
up in civil court.  In 1871, for example, a Philadelphia court issued a preliminary 
injunction restraining St. Clement’s Church’s vestrymen from dismissing their rector 
after he had introduced Anglo-Catholic practices.13
                                                                                                                                                 
Church: Roman Catholicism and Civic Space in the Nation’s Capital,” in The Visual Culture of American 
Religions, ed. David Morgan and Sally M. Promey, 68-86 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).  
On Protestant success in the late-nineteenth century city, see Jon Butler, “Protestant Success in the New 
American City, 1870-1920: The Anxious Secrets of Rev. Walter Laidlaw, Ph.D.,” in New Directions in 
American Religious History, ed. Harry S. Stout and D. G. Hart, 296-333 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997). 
13On the Ritualist controversy and nineteenth-century intra-Episcopalian divisions, see Hein and Shattuck, 
The Episcopalians; Rzeznik, “Spiritual Capital”; Clowes E. Chorley, Men and Movements in the American 
Episcopal Church (New York: Scribner, 1946); John Wesley Twelves, A History of the Diocese of 
Pennsylvania of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S.A., 1784-1968 (Philadelphia: Diocese of 
Pennsylvania, 1969).  On the St. Clement’s case, see May Lilly, The Story of St. Clement’s Church, 
Philadelphia, 1864-1964 (Philadelphia: St. Clement’s Church, 1964); St. Clement's Church Case: A 
Complete Account of the Proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas for the County of Philadelphia; in 
Equity before the Honorable James R. Ludlow, One of the Judges of Said Court, to Restrain the Vestry of 
St. Clement's Church from Dismissing the Rector and Assistant Minister without a Trial and against the 
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The emerging urban upper-class of the late-nineteenth century was perhaps not as 
homogenous as it seemed on the surface, therefore, for liturgical and theological 
differences divided even those members who belonged to the same religious communion.  
In 1876, when St. Mark’s Church first installed bells and rang them to announce 
America’s centennial anniversary, the upper-class Episcopalians of Rittenhouse Square 
were consolidating class identity and social power in a city transformed by 
industrialization and immigration.  But they also were contesting internal differences 
related to devotional style, and the disputants in the St. Mark’s bells case occupied 
opposing sides of this divide. 
 
Investing Bells with Meaning and Power 
Founded in 1847, St. Mark’s was one of the first churches that Episcopalian elites 
built as they moved into the Rittenhouse Square neighborhood.  Designed in the Gothic 
style by the prominent Philadelphia architect John Notman, its cornerstone was laid in 
1848 on Locust Street between Sixteenth and Seventeenth Streets.  St. Mark’s was “one 
of the first churches in Philadelphia and the United States erected with the deliberate 
purpose of bringing Tractarian principles to fruition.”  Its high church founders were 
influenced by the Oxford movement, which originated in England in the 1830s and 
sought to restore Roman Catholic theological and devotional principles to the Anglican 
Church.  The Oxford Tractarians emphasized apostolic succession and the sacramental 
system, and their teachings sparked the Gothic Revival in mid-nineteenth century 
American architecture, which took the medieval English parish church as its model.  At 
                                                                                                                                                 
Protest of the Congregation of Said Church, Together with an Appendix Containing Statements of Similar 
Cases in New Jersey, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Maryland (Philadelphia: Bourquin & Welsh, 1871). 
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St. Mark’s, liturgy, architecture, and ornament all reflected the Oxford movement’s high 
church aesthetics.14
By 1852, builders had completed St. Mark’s spire, but the tower remained empty 
for over twenty years.  The Vestry had run out of money and could not afford the 
intended bells.  But when Dr. Eugene A. Hoffman assumed his duties as rector in 1869, 
he immediately began to solicit contributions for a bells fund.  A high church ritualist, 
Hoffman had installed bells at his previous congregation in Burlington, New Jersey, and 
desired them for St. Mark’s, as well.  In October 1875, he placed an order with the 
prestigious Whitechapel Bell Foundry of London for a set of four bells, half of a 
complete peal.  The bells arrived in Philadelphia the following June and were rung for the 
first time on Sunday morning, June 25, 1876.  According to one newspaper account, the 
bells had a “peculiarly rich, musical tone” and would “doubtless prove to be the best now 
in our city.”15
Hoffman offered little justification for installing bells at St. Mark’s, as he 
apparently felt that such a decision required no explanation.  According to court 
documents filed in January 1877, Hoffman regarded bell-ringing as a widespread practice 
                                                 
14Gilkyson, St. Mark’s, 9.  On the history of St. Mark’s Church and of the Oxford Movement, also see Rev. 
Alfred Mortimer, D.D., St. Mark’s Church, Philadelphia, and its Lady Chapel (New York: Privately 
Printed, 1909); Phoebe B. Stanton, The Gothic Revival and American Church Architecture: An Episode in 
Taste, 1840-1856 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968); Chorley, Men and Movements; Hein and 
Shattuck, The Episcopalians.  For more on the architect Notman, see Thomas, “Architectural Patronage,” 
90-99.  On Anglo-Catholicism in the American Episcopal Church, also see T. J. Jackson Lears, No Place of 
Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994).  Lears treats this trend as an aesthetic pursuit with symbolic value for class identity.  
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elsewhere) reflected Anglophilia among members of the upper class, rather than an embrace of Romanish 
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15“St. Mark’s P.E. Church,” Philadelphia Inquirer, June 24, 1876.  On Hoffman’s installation of bells at St. 
Mary’s Church in Burlington, New Jersey, see Riley, Eugene Augustus Hoffman, 495.  Hoffman faced no 
recorded resistance in Burlington.  In “Spiritual Capital,” Rzeznik notes that nineteenth century churches 
frequently constructed buildings first and then worked on their beautification later. 
54 
of Christian churches, consistent with “ancient modes of announcing divine worship,” 
and presumed the church’s right to use its tower for that purpose.  He did not imagine that 
anyone might object.  Indeed, European and American soundscapes long have featured 
prominently the chimes of church bells.  For at least one thousand years, Christian 
churches have used bells to announce services publicly, calling those within earshot to 
join in communal prayer.  Bells have celebrated significant life-cycle events, such as 
weddings, funerals, and confirmations.  In earlier periods, Christians rang bells to ward 
off evil spirits, and many churches would even baptize their bells, a practice that 
Protestant sects tended to disavow.  Parish bells often were used for civic purposes, as 
well, such as announcing curfews or alerting neighbors to potential danger.  European 
colonists brought these traditions with them to the New World and used bells to regulate 
social order and map geographic space.  Religious and civic boundaries frequently 
overlapped.  For example, several Virginia and New England towns required residents to 
live within earshot of the church, for the sounds of its bells defined the limits of safe 
passage.  In all of these ways, church bells marked communal boundaries, regulated the 
rhythms of daily life, and oriented Christians in relation to each other and to God.  In fact, 
the composer R. Murray Schafer described parishes as “acoustic communities,” 
constituted by those within auditory range of its church bells, its boundaries mapped 
aurally rather than visually.16
                                                 
16R. Murray Schafer, The Soundscape: Our Sonic Environment and the Tuning of the World (Rochester, 
VT: Destiny Books, 1993), 215.  For Hoffman’s statement, see Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 19.  On the history 
of church bells, see Price, Bells and Man; Walters, Church Bells.  On their various uses, see Schafer, The 
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At the same time, Christian churches only have announced services publicly when 
safe to do so.  In the early church, when Roman authorities suppressed Christian practice, 
Christians would spread news about meetings by word of mouth.  Publicly calling 
attention to their gatherings surely would have invited persecution.  Not until after the 
Edict of Constantine did Christian communities regularly begin to announce services 
publicly, but they employed a variety of means, including trumpets, pieces of wood 
knocked together, and the human voice.  While the earliest evidence of church bells 
appears to date from the sixth century, they spread only gradually from monasteries to 
cathedrals to large churches to country parishes.  One historian argues that “it was not 
until the end of the tenth century or the beginning of the eleventh that country churches 
everywhere had bells.”  Eastern Christianity never developed a strong bell-ringing 
tradition because Muslim leaders frequently prohibited bells in areas under their rule.  
They did not want Christian churches to compete acoustically with the Islamic call to 
prayer.  Similarly, in the centuries following the Reformation, Catholic and Protestant 
rulers routinely banned the bells of their sectarian rivals.  All of this is merely to point out 
that Dr. Hoffman’s confident assumption that St. Mark’s was incomplete without bells 
and that ringing them necessarily conformed to ancient custom ignored the ways that 
bell-ringing practices always have been invested both with meaning and power.  Only 
certain groups have been able to announce their services publicly, or to make noise 
                                                                                                                                                 
For example, a 1934 Texas court questioned the validity of common-law marriages that were “claimed to 
have been contracted in the shadow of the county clerk’s office and within the sound of church bells.”  
McChesney v. Johnson, 79 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). 
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without censure, and regulating bell-ringing frequently has offered an effective means for 
muting dissent.17
Hoffman did not imagine that anyone might object to St. Mark’s ringing its bells.  
Citing history and tradition, he presumed the church’s right to announce its services 
publicly.  In other words, Hoffman regarded church bells as “Sacred Noise.”  In his study 
of the modern sonic environment, R. Murray Schafer coined the term “Sacred Noise” to 
describe sounds of power that were exempt from social proscription.  “To have the 
Sacred Noise,” Schafer wrote, “is not merely to make the biggest noise; rather it is a 
matter of having the authority to make it without censure.  Wherever Noise is granted 
immunity from human intervention, there will be found a seat of power.”  Indeed, 
Hoffman assumed the church’s right to make noise without censure.  Surely no one 
would contest the right of Protestant churches to ring bells.  Yet Hoffman did not 
recognize how bell-ringing always had been invested with power as well as meaning.  As 
the historical record suggests, church bells have been uncontroversial only when their 
sound has reached a willing audience of like-minded believers or when the church’s 
power over its surrounding area has been secure, its authority unquestioned.  But in 
heterogeneous settings, or situations where the church’s authority was in doubt, bells 
have been resisted, for their sound can both attract and repel, call people together and 
push them apart.  Much to Hoffman’s surprise, such proved to be the case in his own 
neighborhood, even though it was inhabited mostly by members of the same religious 
                                                 
17Price, Bells and Man, 78-106 (quote on 91).  For examples of Catholic and Protestant leaders prohibiting 
rival confessions from ringing bells in the centuries following the Reformation, see Benjamin J. Kaplan, 
Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 
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denomination.  When nearby residents complained about St. Mark’s bells, Hoffman 
discovered that he could no longer take for granted their status as background noise.18
When St. Mark’s was built in 1848, there were few other buildings on its block.  
By 1876, however, upper-class Philadelphians had moved to the area in great numbers 
and had surrounded St. Mark’s with their elegant row houses, many of whose top stories 
reached nearly as high as St. Mark’s tower (and many of them also designed by architect 
John Notman).  St. Mark’s had become one of Philadelphia’s most fashionable churches 
and drew most of its members from the Rittenhouse Square set, yet few of them lived 
directly next to the church.  Instead, most of St. Mark’s closest neighbors were low-
church or broad-church Episcopalians who attended other nearby churches.  They 
claimed to appreciate St. Mark’s visual appearance and agreed that it enhanced the 
neighborhood’s property values.  But they preferred St. Mark’s to remain seen and not 
heard.  They did not want the peace and quiet of their neighborhood disrupted.  They did 
not find the newly installed bells to be rich in tone, but discordant, and so they 
complained to the church’s authorities.  Soon after St. Mark’s began tolling its bells in 
June 1876, its vestrymen discovered that their power was not as unfettered as they 
presumed.  Their bells were not merely background noise.19
 
                                                 
18Schafer, Soundscape, 76.  For examples of disputes about church bells in early modern England, see 
Cockayne, Hubbub, 113-114.  For examples of disputes about church bells in nineteenth-century France, 
see Corbin, Village Bells.  For a provocative account of the relationship between sound and power, see 
Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985). 
19Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 2-3, 10-11; Gilkyson, St. Mark’s, 28-35.  Nicholas Biddle Wainwright describes 
St. Mark’s neighbors as “low church” in “The Bells of St. Mark’s: An Address Delivered to the Athanaeum 
of Philadelphia,” 1958, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.  George E. Thomas describes the homes 
designed by Notman as “within earshot of the chimes of one or more of St. Mark’s, St. Clement’s, or Holy 
Trinity.”  See “Architectural Patronage,” 93. 
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A Public Nuisance? 
St. Mark’s neighbors complained about the bells before they even arrived in 
Philadelphia.  On January 4, 1876, twenty Locust Street residents, most of whom were 
Episcopalians, signed a letter to the church’s rector, wardens, and vestry in which they 
expressed their “profound regret” to learn of the decision to “erect a chime of bells.”  The 
neighbors asserted that they had been drawn to the area precisely on account of its 
quietness and its “exemption from the ordinary noises even of all the leading streets” of 
Philadelphia.  While they briefly noted that bell-ringing might impact their property 
values negatively, they emphasized more strongly the threat that bell-ringing posed to 
their physical well-being.  “The health of many of the residents…,” they declared, 
“requires that their nervous systems should not be shocked by the sharp, sudden and loud 
noises inevitably issuing from a chime of bells when rung.”  They hoped that the 
vestrymen might change their mind.  But the church’s leaders proved unsympathetic.  In 
a brief correspondence dated January 7, the vestry expressed “regret that owners of 
property in the neighborhood should consider themselves aggrieved,” but they insisted 
that St. Mark’s tower always had been intended to hold bells, that the bells already had 
been ordered, and that they were “confident that the annoyance will not be so serious as 
seems to be anticipated.”20
On June 26, the day after St. Mark’s rang its bells for the first time, the vestry 
received another letter.  MacGregor J. Mitcheson, a neighbor and an attorney, wrote to 
complain about the early morning bell.  St. Mark’s held four Sunday services, the earliest 
of which began at seven o’clock.  Bells rang to announce each service, so they began as 
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early as six-thirty in the morning.  “Upon Sunday last,” Mitcheson wrote, this early bell 
“startled some persons from sound sleep, bringing on violent headache, utterly preventing 
religious observance of the day by them at least.”  Bell-ringing actually disrupted proper 
observance of the Sabbath, Mitcheson alleged.  Noise impeded worship, rather than aided 
it.  But Mitcheson received no response from the church, nor should he probably have 
expected one.  Most of Philadelphia’s upper-class elites traveled to the country during the 
summer months in order to escape the city’s brutal heat.  Few of them remained to hear 
the bells—or to respond to complaints about them.21
By November 1876, St. Mark’s neighbors had returned to town, and they took up 
the issue with renewed vigor.  On November 4, Dr. S. Weir Mitchell sent Dr. Hoffman a 
letter on behalf of his patients.  Mitchell lived two blocks from St. Mark’s and was one of 
Philadelphia’s most prominent physicians.  He had built the first clinic in the nation for 
nervous diseases and had invented the “rest-cure” for treating patients diagnosed with 
neurasthenia.   “Some of my unlucky nervous patients are driven wild by the early bells 
of St. Mark’s,” Mitchell wrote, “Pray help us to get rid of this annoyance.”  Dr. Hoffman 
responded sympathetically and agreed to discontinue the early morning bell temporarily.  
But he concluded his note by wishing “that our neighbors, under your skillful care, may 
soon recover.”  His words angered the aggrieved neighbors even more, who assumed that 
Hoffman sought their speedy recovery only so that he could resume afflicting them with 
Sunday morning bells.22
                                                 
21Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 36.  According to Alain Corbin, French city dwellers increasingly complained 
about early morning bells during the 1860s.  Corbin argues that the determination “to lay claim to one’s 
morning’s sleep” signaled the de-standardization of daily rhythms.  A bell-ringing schedule inspired by 
monastic life proved less appropriate for the changed conditions of French urban life.  Village Bells, 302. 
22Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 36-7.  For more on S. Weir Mitchell, see “Autobiography of Dr. S. Weir 
Mitchell,” 1943, Diaries and Letterbooks, [1658] -1939, n.d., MS Collection 1995, Historical Society of 
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Unappeased by, or perhaps unaware of, the Rector’s prompt response to Dr. 
Mitchell, forty eight neighbors submitted a petition to St. Mark’s vestry on November 6, 
requesting the suspension of the early morning bell and “a reduction of the time given to 
bell-ringing at the other services.”  Again, the neighbors emphasized the chimes’ health 
risks.  While they acknowledged that they might have to put up with those sounds 
associated with “necessary…secular works,” they questioned the need for religious noise.  
Churches had sounded bells in American cities for a long time, they admitted, but did 
such auditory announcements truly remain necessary?  St. Mark’s neighbors proposed a 
right to quiet.23
The vestry convened a special meeting on November 6 to consider the neighbors’ 
petition and swiftly drafted a response.  “Resolved,” the vestry members declared, “That 
while the vestry entirely denies the right of the residents in the vicinity to regulate in any 
way the manner or the time of ringing the bells of St. Mark’s Church, they feel confident 
that the corporation, through the rector of the parish, will always be ready, as the rector 
has already been, to hear and consider any special appeal that may be made for stopping 
the ringing of the bells in any specified case of illness.”  In the neighbors’ complaints, St. 
Mark’s vestrymen appear to have heard a challenge to their public power.  They would 
consider any specific appeals of distress and would suspend the early morning bell 
temporarily in cases of illness.  But they denied their neighbors any authority to regulate 
the bell-ringing generally.  They asserted a right to make noise without censure.24   
                                                                                                                                                 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Tom Lutz, American Nervousness, 1903: An Anecdotal History (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991). 
23Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 38-42. 
24Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 42; Minutes of the Vestry of St. Mark’s Church, Vol. 3, 1876-1885, 6 November 
1876, St. Mark’s Church, Philadelphia (hereafter cited as Minutes, St. Mark’s Church). 
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For their part, the complainants insisted that they had not intended to challenge 
the church’s authority, but that they had presented “a respectful appeal to the vestry of the 
church to exercise their own authority in the premises.”  Frustrated by the church’s 
response, the neighbors took their case to the public.  They leaked the correspondences to 
the press, and Philadelphia’s newspapers quickly weighed in on the dispute.  Many 
journalists seemed amused by the spectacle of fashionable Philadelphians fighting each 
other over bell-ringing, and they rushed to poke fun at the contestants.  “Grim-visaged 
war has invaded the peaceful precincts of Rittenhouse Square,” the Philadelphia Times 
announced, “There is noise and turbulence where stillness reigned, and the calm surface 
of the best society is ruffled by a storm…the trouble here is that the clergy of St. Mark’s 
are among those absurd people who think that a church is to be used.”  Striking a similar 
tone, the Sunday Dispatch informed its readers that “a curious tintinnabulatory difficulty 
has arisen in the most fashionable part of this city.  Even in this Centennial year, during 
which an entire population has been going crazy over an old bell—and a cracked bell at 
that—there are to be found people with so little music in their souls that they cannot 
appreciate the sounds which the poet has sweetly denominated the ‘music of the 
chimes.’”25
                                                 
25Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 43; “Society Bells,” Philadelphia Times, November 20, 1876; “Silence that 
Dreadful Bell,” Philadelphia Sunday Dispatch, November 19, 1876.  The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
criticized the neighbors for leaking the conflict to the press.  “The subject of the church-bell evil,” its 
editors wrote, “frequently discussed before, is again brought before the public by the bad taste and breach 
of trust of an individual who has given to the press of the city a correspondence between a number of 
citizens residing in the vicinity of St. Mark’s Episcopal Church, in this city, and the vestry of that church.  
The correspondence was printed and furnished to those uniting in it with the express understanding that it 
was only for private information; but the gentlemen interested in the matter were so unfortunate as to 
associate with themselves a person who has proved unworthy of their confidence, and a matter intended to 
be conducted privately has thus been made the subject of public comment.”  Of course, this “breach of 
trust” did not inhibit the newspaper editors from entering fully into the public debate.  See “The Church 
Bell Question,” Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, November 20, 1876. 
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But most Philadelphia newspapers proved sympathetic to the neighbors.  
According to the North American, the church’s leaders resembled “children with new 
toys.”  Bells were unnecessary in modern cities, the Public Ledger insisted, for who 
needed to be told when to go to church?  “The hours for church service are more 
universally known than the times fixed for any other purpose and should not require any 
such warning, in cities at least.”  Several newspapers emphasized the distinction between 
rural and urban settings.  “In a rural district,” wrote the editors of the Evening Bulletin, 
“with a scattered population and usually without any common public standard of time, 
the church bell is a convenience, if not an absolute necessity; but in the densely populated 
neighborhoods of large cities, there is no pretext that can be urged with any show of 
plausibility that justifies the invasion of personal right and domestic comfort by the clang 
of church bells.”  The Philadelphia Press also emphasized that urban density altered the 
sound of church bells: “While the remote echoes of the ‘church-going bell’ may be 
delightfully romantic among the hills, their resonant pealing at your very door on all 
occasions speedily dispels every sentiment of beauty.”  The conditions of modern urban 
life had transformed the meaning and purpose of this religious ritual, these observers 
suggested.  Bell-ringing had no place in the industrialized city.26   
These critics reserved particular scorn for the vestrymen’s arrogance.  Not only 
did the church’s response to the complainants “lack something of Christian grace,” 
according to the Philadelphia Inquirer, but it also undermined the church’s moral 
                                                 
26“The Question of Church Bells,” North American, November 20, 1876; “The Church Bell 
Correspondence,” Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 21, 1876; “The Church Bell Question,” 
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, November 20, 1876; “Editorial,” Philadelphia Press, November 24, 1876.  
Alain Corbin describes French complaints about bells as “a venerable urban tradition,” but suggests that 
such complaints were uncommon in rural villages (Village Bells, 299).  According to Robert Orsi, many 
nineteenth century Americans assumed that “the contrast between city and country was morally significant” 
(Gods of the City, 19). 
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authority.  St. Mark’s leaders “might perhaps profitably remember,” wrote the Evening 
Bulletin, “that a Christian church does not exactly fulfill its functions if it irritates the 
nerves of a sick man to such an extent as to fill him with a longing desire to punch the 
heads of the vestrymen.”  Fighting for its right to make noise might distract the church 
from its true purpose.  The Philadelphia Inquirer explicitly articulated the competing 
conceptions of religion at stake: “We have only further to add that if religion consists in 
the ringing of bells then the Vestry was right in replying as [it did]; but, if religion 
consists in gentleness, in courtesy, in respect for the feelings of others, in a gracious 
following of the spirit of these lessons of charity taught by the Saviour of Men, then the 
reply of the Vestry was about as wrong as it could well be.”  True religion consisted not 
in the aural domination of public space, but in living a life of charity modeled on the 
example of Christ, especially in an urban context where residents lived so closely 
together.  Fighting for the right to make noise only would distract the church from its true 
spiritual mission, these critics implied.  Properly conceived, religion had no need for 
noise.27
Finally, some newspapers criticized the hypocrisy of churches that expected their 
peace preserved, but would not respect the peace of others.  For several decades, 
Philadelphians had been debating Sunday closing laws, which were thought to protect the 
sanctity of Sabbath worship.  Courts had prohibited the use of streetcars on Sundays, and 
many religious leaders wanted the Centennial Exposition closed on that day, as well.  But 
critics maintained that churches should not claim a privileged position.  If they wanted 
their neighbors to keep quiet, then they should relinquish their own right to make noise, 
                                                 
27“The Situation This Morning,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 20, 1876; “Editorial,” Philadelphia 
Evening Bulletin, January 4, 1877; “The Bells,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 21, 1876. 
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too.  “Vestries and trustees of churches do not hesitate to appeal to the law whenever 
anybody interferes with their supposed rights or ceremonies,” the Sunday Dispatch 
pointed out, “but they generally do not take into account the noise and annoyance which 
some people find in the continual clanging of church-bells, or the roaring of the 
Bosnerges in the pulpits, or the heavy thunders of a blatant chorus, or the screaming and 
shouting of Methodist meetings.”  This writer situated bell-ringing within a broader sonic 
world of religious devotion, within a history of religion practiced out loud.  He 
recognized that religion was not just something to be protected from noise, but also 
something that produced public sounds of its own.  Yet he denigrated these sounds as 
noise and criticized churches for infringing on the rights of others.  Noise marked the 
limit of free worship, he suggested.28
The complaints about St. Mark’s bells had dislodged them from their status as 
background noise.  Dr. Hoffman had not anticipated any objections, for he regarded 
                                                 
28“Silence that Dreadful Bell,” Philadelphia Sunday Dispatch, November 19. 1876.  One of St. Mark’s 
founders even had ensured that the church’s building should be constructed without undue noise, so that 
construction workers might engage in their task with proper reverence.  “Let it not be profaned by lightness 
of speech,” Henry Reed had ordered, “much less by unseemly noise, or words of quarreling and anger.  
Remember in what holy quietness Solomon’s holy temple was built” (Gilkyson, St. Mark’s, 10).  On 
Sunday closing law debates and the  injunction against streetcars, see Weigley “The Border City in Civil 
War,” 381.  For articles on the Centennial Exposition Sunday closing debates, see “A Plea for the Proper 
and Christian Observance of the Lord’s Day,” Philadelphia Public Ledger, June 3, 1876; “Is It Wise?” 
Philadelphia Public Ledger, June 10, 1876; “Opening the Exhibition on Sunday,” Philadelphia Public 
Ledger, June 24, 1876.  Many critics of Philadelphia’s Sunday laws argued that they were intended 
explicitly to target immigrant Catholic religious practices and to privilege Protestantism.  For example, see 
“General Hawley and the Sunday Question,” Philadelphia Catholic Standard, July 1, 1876.  One of St. 
Mark’s neighbors had particular cause for resenting Philadelphia churches’ presumptions of privilege.  On 
Sunday mornings, Philadelphia churches frequently would block off surrounding streets in order to prevent 
the noise of traffic from disrupting Sabbath services.  On one such morning, George L. Harrison, founder of 
a successful sugar refining company and father of a future provost of the University of Pennsylvania, had 
driven downtown to obtain the services of a physician for family members.  On attempting to return home, 
Harrison found street after street closed, “and much precious time was consequently lost.”  Harrison, 
though an Episcopalian himself, subsequently persuaded the Pennsylvania Senate to revoke an Act of 
Assembly that had sanctioned the street closings.  When Harrison went on to lead the fight against St. 
Mark’s bells, it was not the first time that he had sought to deprive churches of special privileges.  See 
Mary Harrison, Annals of the Ancestry of Charles Custis Harrison and Ellen Waln Harrison (Philadelphia: 
Printed for private circulation by J.B. Lippincott Co., 1932), 22. 
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church bells as normal features of the American soundscape.  But the growing dispute 
had made chimes the subject of public scrutiny and public debate.  Their place in the 
industrialized city had become an open question.  In the neighbors’ complaints, the 
church’s leaders seemed to have heard a challenge to their public power and authority.  
And these concerns only intensified when the neighbors took their case to court, asking a 
civil body to intervene in the escalating dispute. 
 
Defining Church Bells as Noise 
On January 5, 1877, seventeen of St. Mark’s neighbors filed a bill in 
Philadelphia’s Court of Common Pleas, No. 2.  They sought an injunction that would 
restrain the church from ringing its bells, or, at the very least, would restrict when and for 
how long they could be rung.  Both sides spent the next month canvassing the city to 
collect evidence that would bolster their cases.  By February, they had presented the court 
with over three hundred affidavits, which offered hundreds of pages of testimony from 
neighbors, physicians, acousticians, real estate experts, clergy members, bell-ringers, 
architects, Sunday school teachers, theology professors, and city surveyors.  Experts on 
both sides disputed the injurious effects of noise on health and property values, and they 
impugned each other’s credibility, with one witness dismissed both as “deaf” and as a 
“Presbyterian.”  The parties commissioned competing maps of the neighborhood, which 
disagreed on fundamental points, such as the respective heights of St. Mark’s tower and 
the roofs of the surrounding homes and their proximity to each other.  A carpenter 
constructed an equally contested three-dimensional model of the church.  The ongoing 
dispute also continued to attract public attention.  Newspapers covered the proceedings.  
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Retail businesses tried to take advantage, as in one newspaper advertisement that 
announced, “If the Chimes of St. Mark’s Church Give you the Headache, Palpitation of 
the Heart or any Nervous Affection, use Montgomery’s Nervine.  For sale at 131 North 
Ninth Street and all druggists.”  And amused spectators even printed and circulated a set 
of satiric briefs for a fictionalized case, M. Anthony Turveydrop v. Augustus Hyphen-
Smith, which involved excessively loud piano playing in the “genteel” neighborhood of 
“Humdrum Row.”29
In February 1877, Judges Hare and Mitchell heard the case of Harrison v. St. 
Mark’s.  Spectators packed the courtroom on four successive Saturday afternoons to 
listen to the oral arguments.  The attorneys did not disappoint, offering biting sarcasm, 
hyperbolic rhetoric, and literary references that ranged from Shakespeare (“Macbeth doth 
murder sleep”) to Cowper (“how soft the music of those village bells”) to Longfellow 
(“And I thought how like these chimes/Are the poet’s airy rhymes”).  Two of 
Philadelphia’s most eminent attorneys represented the disputants: William Henry Rawle 
for the complainants and George Washington Biddle for the church.  The two were close 
friends outside the courtroom but frequently faced off as adversaries inside it.  Rawle 
descended from a long line of distinguished Philadelphia lawyers.  A man of delicate 
appearance, he wore thin glasses, sported long, dangling sideburns, and was renowned for 
his breadth of legal knowledge and rhetorical dexterity.  Classically trained, Biddle was 
“the acknowledged leader of the Philadelphia Bar,” but had ruined his political ambitions 
                                                 
29One of the attorneys for the complainants gathered the affidavits together in a single volume that also 
includes the lawyers’ arguments.  For the Complainants’ Bill, see Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 1-8.  For the 
newspaper advertisement, see Philadelphia Public Ledger, January 5, 1877.  For the satiric brief, see 
“Turveydrop v. Hyphen-Smith,” Legal Documents in Connection with Bell Ringing, Harrison v. St. Mark’s 
Church, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.  Nicholas B. Wainwright also refers to this fake 
brief in “The Bells of St. Mark’s.” 
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by siding with the Democrats during the Civil War.  Within a year of the St. Mark’s 
dispute, Biddle would defend the unpopular Mormon polygamist George Reynolds in 
Reynolds v. United States, a Supreme Court case that again would test the limits of free 
religious practice.30
The legal principles in the St. Mark’s case were relatively straightforward.  Few 
nineteenth-century American cities had ordinances that specifically targeted noise, so the 
neighbors pursued their case under the more general law of nuisances.  One legal 
authority at the time defined nuisances as including “that class of wrongs that arise from 
the unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlawful use by a person of his own property, real or 
personal, or from his own improper, indecent, or unlawful personal conduct, working an 
obstruction of or an injury to a right of another or of the public, and producing such 
material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort or hurt, that the law will presume a 
consequent damage,” or, to put it more simply (yet perhaps no less ambiguously), as 
“whatever unlawfully annoys or does damage to another.”  While there were a few 
precedents for considering church bells a nuisance, some observers seemed 
uncomfortable about asking a civic body to intervene in religious matters in this way.  As 
the Sunday Dispatch noted, “It will be something queer for an American court to regulate 
the ringing of church bells, and to declare at what time it is proper to summon sinners to 
matins or vespers.  We will venture to say that nothing of the kind was ever before asked 
                                                 
30Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).  For more on the lives and careers of Rawle and Biddle, 
see Wainwright, “The Bells of St. Mark’s”; “In Memoriam: George W. Biddle,” Proceedings of the Bar of 
Philadelphia, 1897, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Report of Proceedings at the Meeting 
of the Philadelphia Bar Held April 27, 1889 Upon the Occasion of the Death of William Henry Rawle, 
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involvement in the Reynolds case, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and 
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of a court of justice in this country…The idea that there is no connection between Church 
and State cannot prevail in the minds of these petitioners.”31
Asking U.S. courts to intervene in religious matters was not as unprecedented as 
these newspaper editors presumed.  In fact, Americans called on courts to resolve intra-
church property disputes throughout the nineteenth century, which frequently required 
judges to adjudicate between competing interpretations of church doctrine and authority.  
In 1871, a Presbyterian dispute had even reached the U.S. Supreme Court.  And that same 
year, Philadelphia’s Court of Common Pleas had intervened in a clash between the rector 
and vestry of St. Clement’s Church.  While these cases differed in many ways from the 
St. Mark’s dispute, they raised similar questions about the relationship between religion 
and state in a society with no established church.  Yet none of the cases, with the 
exception of Reynolds, were settled with reference to the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, which was not applied against the states until the 1940s.  Each of these 
cases centered on property rights.  The St. Mark’s contestants asked the court to mediate 
between the church’s right to use its property in manners consistent with its institutional 
purpose and the rights of the neighbors not to be disturbed in their enjoyment of their 
own property.  The extent to which it made a difference that St. Mark’s claimed to be 
using the bells to fulfill a religious purpose was itself a matter of contention.32
                                                 
31On the legal definitions of nuisance, see George Tucker Bispham, Notes of Prof. Bispham’s Lectures on 
Practice and Pleading at Law (Philadelphia: Privately Printed, 1889), 11-14; also see William H. Lloyd, 
“Noise as a Nuisance,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 82, no. 6 
(1934): 567-82. 
32For examples of cases, see Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); St. Clement’s Church Case.  For an 
insightful discussion of nineteenth century church property disputes, see Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden 
and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1965), 32-90.  In chapter 3, I discuss the Supreme Court’s doctrine of incorporation, 
according to which it applied the First Amendment’s protections against the states. 
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In their bill, the complainants emphasized their opposition to noise, not religion.  
They appreciated St. Mark’s visual appearance, acknowledging that “the beauty of [St. 
Mark’s] architecture and the care with which its grounds were kept were justly 
considered to render the neighborhood more attractive.”  But they objected to the sound 
of the bells, which they described as “harsh, loud, high, sharp, clanging, discordant, 
and…a nuisance which is intolerable.”  In great detail, the complainants documented the 
myriad ways that the daily peal disturbed the neighborhood, ranging from disrupting 
conversations to interrupting sleep to harming physically those with “delicately 
organized…nervous systems.”  “The vibration [of the bells] is most disagreeable,” 
George Harrison wrote in his affidavit, “resembling at all times the effect of a continuous 
electrical current throughout the system, or the whirr of a circular-saw-mill.”  A mother 
complained, “My baby starts up out of his sleep at the sound of the bells, and it is 
impossible to put him to sleep again.”  While the neighbors mostly focused their 
complaints only on St. Mark’s bells, over twenty physicians submitted affidavits attesting 
to bells’ injurious health effects in general.  For example, Dr. Samuel Gross, professor of 
surgery at Philadelphia’s Jefferson Medical Hospital, suggested that many sounds might 
disrupt a neighbor’s slumber, including “the sound of the street organ, the harsh and 
discordant clatter of the parrot, the barking of a dog…the sound of my neighbor’s 
piano…even the chirping of sparrows at the early dawn of a summer’s morning.”  But 
Dr. Gross regarded “none of these as at all comparable to the nuisance caused by the 
ringing of church-bells, if long continued and frequently repeated.”  Church bells 
constituted a distinct threat to public health, he maintained.33
                                                 
33Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 2-3, 49, 73, 113.  For the physicians’ affidavits, see Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 97-
124. 
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In these statements, the complainants defined noise primarily in terms of volume.  
They denied that the source or purpose of the disputed sounds made any difference, 
emphasizing instead the physiological risks associated with exposure to loud sounds.  In 
fact, they went out of their way to express their “attachment” to the church’s “form of 
worship and to the members of its vestry, their regard for the rector, and above all, their 
respect for the institution of divine worship.”  Many of the complainants also were 
Episcopalians, though few of them attended St. Mark’s, and they denied any animus 
toward the church or its forms of worship.  But when the sounds of the bells had spilled 
outside the walls of the church, onto city streets and into private homes, they had 
disturbed the public peace and had come to constitute a distinct nuisance.  They had 
become noise.34
Not surprisingly, the defendants heard the sound of the bells differently.  They 
described the chimes as “musical, mellow, soft, well-pitched, sweet and harmonious.”  At 
the very least, they contended, the bells constituted no more of a nuisance than any other 
features of the urban soundscape.  Philadelphia’s other churches, “schools, factories, 
workshops and other buildings” all rang bells, and “the chiming of St. Mark’s bells is far 
less calculated to disturb, annoy, distress or injure the complainants or any others than the 
noises of cars, wagons, steam-whistles, many other church-bells and other sounds to 
which said residents are and have for a long time been subject to, and of which they never 
have complained.”  Cities were loud, the defense asserted, and there was no qualitative 
                                                 
34Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 5. 
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difference between the chimes of St. Mark’s and the other sounds of modern urban life.  
City residents were hardly entitled to absolute peace and quiet.35
If the complainants conceptualized noise in terms of volume, then the church 
leaders interpreted noise complaints differently.  As I discussed in chapter 1, noise has 
most frequently been defined as “unwanted sounds,” and the defendants seem to have had 
this meaning in mind.  They denied that the bells constituted a distinct or unusual 
nuisance.  In fact, they implied that this case had little to do with noise at all.  Instead, 
they argued that their opponents were motivated by specific animus toward St. Mark’s 
high church ritualism, maintaining that “the kind of church the bells are on sometimes 
has more influence upon the likes or dislikes of some neighbors than either the height or 
the weight of the bells which are rung.”  Noise complaints targeted particular producers 
of sound, the defense alleged, not the quality of the sounds themselves.  They reframed 
the case as about religion, not noise, as an intra-denominational dispute about particular 
ritual forms.36
If the St. Mark’s disputants advanced competing conceptions of noise, then they 
also situated religion differently within broader cultural discourses about noise.  As I 
outlined in chapter 1, noise has borne a complicated, ambivalent set of cultural meanings.  
On the one hand, loud sounds evaluated positively have been associated with civilization, 
power, and material prosperity.  On the other hand, when evaluated negatively or as 
unwanted, loud sounds have been associated with disorder, inefficiency, and barbarism.  
                                                 
35Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 14, 19. 
36Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 323.  To bolster their argument that this case was motivated solely by animus 
against the church, St. Mark’s leaders repeatedly implied that George L. Harrison had instigated the case on 
his own.  Several of the complainants went out of their way to deny this charge.  See Harrison v. St. 
Mark’s, 273, 277-80.  As discussed above (see note 27), Harrison previously had sought to revoke other 
church privileges. 
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Debates about urban noise historically have focused on which sounds were deemed 
necessary for urban life, which sounds were conducive to social order and which 
threatened to overturn it.  For example, historian Emily Thompson has argued that “most 
nineteenth-century Americans celebrated the hum of industry as an unambivalent symbol 
of material progress.”  Noise nuisance lawsuits rarely succeeded, therefore, “as it was 
only necessary ‘for lawyers in such cases to establish as a defense against a plaintiff that 
the noise was a part of the very necessary industrial processes and that the industry was a 
very necessary part of the community and therefore the noise had to be tolerated as a 
necessary evil.’”  But if nineteenth-century Americans celebrated industrial sounds as 
signals of progress and prosperity, as necessary hazards of modern urban life, then they 
seem to have valued religious sounds more ambivalently.  Were religious sounds 
similarly necessary for the vitality of American cities, or were they uncivilized, 
unnecessary, and unwanted?  The St. Mark’s dispute offers a useful case study for 
considering how religion fit into these broader cultural discourses about noise.37
 
Religion, Noise, and Necessity 
Debates about urban noise focused on defining which sounds were necessary for 
urban life.  As I turn now to consider a range of arguments advanced in the St. Mark’s 
case, I attend to how disputants contested whether and for whom religious sounds might 
be deemed necessary.  In particular, what would it mean to describe church bells as 
                                                 
37Emily Thompson, The Soundscape of Modernity: Architectural Acoustics and the Culture of Listening in 
America, 1900-1933 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 120, quoting “The Elimination of Harmful 
Noise,” National Safety News 15 (April 1927), 58.  Also see Raymond W. Smilor, “Personal Boundaries in 
the Urban Environment: The Legal Attack on Noise, 1865-1930,” Environmental Review3, no. 3 (Spring 
1979): 24-36; Karin Bijsterveld, “The Diabolical Symphony of the Mechanical Age: Technology and 
Symbolism of Sound in European and North American Noise Abatement Campaigns, 1900-40,” Social 
Studies of Science 31, no. 1 (February 2001): 37-70. 
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necessary?  As I proceed, I listen especially to how contestants debated whether modern 
religion needed noise, whether religious sounds were as necessary for urban life as 
industrial sounds, and whether the enjoyment of noise might be linked to differing class 
sensibilities. Through these differences, I suggest, disputants advanced competing 
conceptions of the nature of religion, of its relationship to modern industry, and of its 
place in American cities. 
First, the disputants contested whether modern religion required auditory 
expression.  The church leaders justified their practice by citing history and custom and 
by appealing to the authority of their denominational institutions.  Bell-ringing was a long 
standing-religious tradition, they maintained, that was in ”reasonable, decent and proper 
compliance with the ancient modes of announcing divine worship, practiced by churches 
of the communion to which the defendants belong, and practiced in this city for more 
than one hundred years.”  Dr. Hoffman solicited affidavits from rectors of several other 
high church congregations—from Philadelphia, but also from New York, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and New Jersey—who attested to the widespread use of bells by 
Episcopalian churches.  But it was not only these churches that rang bells.  St. Mark’s 
practices were “in accordance with the customs of churches of all denominations 
whatsoever in which bells are used throughout the civilized world.”  Church bells were 
customary features of the American soundscape, Hoffman asserted.  When St. Mark’s 
neighbors moved into their homes, they should have assumed that the church would 
install bells in its tower, for such a use was consistent with its institutional purpose.  In 
fact, what could seem more normal than a Christian church ringing its bells to announce 
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services and to call congregants to worship?  Surely bell-ringing could not constitute a 
nuisance.  Surely St. Mark’s had a right to make noise without censure.38
The complainants disagreed, of course, and maintained that, despite what may 
have been true in the past, church bells no longer were a necessary part of Christian 
worship.  And they cited denominational authorities of their own.  In one lengthy 
affidavit, for example, a Professor of Systematic Philosophy at Philadelphia’s Episcopal 
Divinity School, Reverend Daniel R. Goodwin, asserted that bell-ringing had become 
“comparatively useless” and perhaps even a modern “inconvenience.”  Goodwin 
described bells not as normatively prescribed, but as reflecting “mere sentiment,” and he 
insisted that “the gratification of no man’s mere sentiment…should be allowed to weigh 
for one moment against great practical inconvenience to others.”  If chimes infringed on 
the rights of others, if they disturbed public peace and order, then they should be silenced, 
not specially protected.  Several of St. Mark’s neighbors described in affidavits how the 
clamor of the bells had invaded the sanctity of their homes and had in fact disrupted their 
enjoyment of the Sabbath.  The bells were not conducive to religious observance, they 
maintained, but impeded it.  They were unnecessary and undesirable.  But above all, the 
complainants insisted that technological advancements had rendered church bells useless 
as a practical matter.  Clocks and watches could announce service times just as 
effectively, and it could not be “truthfully averred that noises of this kind are needed by 
the usages or rules of that body of Christians to which the defendants belong.”39
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In his oral arguments, the attorney for the complainants, William Henry Rawle, 
dismissed the need for church bells even more stridently.  Rawle mocked St. Mark’s high 
church ritualism, but suggested that even those practices were more useful than bell-
ringing.  “I am even tolerant as to many things which some good people look upon as 
anathema maranatha,” he declared, and then listed such high church embellishments as 
“processions, and bowings, and candles, and incense, and vestments, and the like, which 
seem more appropriate on the stage than in the sanctuary.”  He put up with such practices 
because he thought it “better to worship God with a little nonsense, than to have more 
wisdom and not worship at all.”  But, he concluded, “this bell-ringing is no part of divine 
service.”  Modern religion had no need for such auditory announcements.  Noise 
constituted the limit of what neighbors should have to tolerate.40
The parties to the St. Mark’s case thus engaged in a dispute about “proper” 
Episcopalian practice.  What were the demands of the religious communion to which 
most of them belonged, and who had the authority to determine normative practice?  
Were sounds necessary for religion in the same way that noise might be necessary for 
industry?  But the complainants went further and argued that it would make no difference 
even if bells were deemed necessary.  “No one is permitted,” they maintained, “upon any 
such ground, to do an act which is unlawful in itself, nor does the law of the land tolerate 
injuries to person or property because of any persuasion on the part of the wrong-doer 
that the act is necessary as a fulfillment of a duty on his part, even though it be a religious 
duty.”  Religious obligation did not justify nor excuse any infringement on the rights of 
others, the neighbors insisted.  As soon as the sounds of the bells spilled outside the walls 
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of the church, as soon as they disturbed the peace of the neighborhood, as soon as they 
became noise, they could be muted, whether religiously necessary or not.41
Again, Rawle made this point even more emphatically during his oral arguments.  
“No custom, rite, or belief of privilege ever justifies a violation of law,” Rawle argued.  
Drawing rather startling analogies, Rawle compared bell-ringing to what he deemed to be 
other patently illegal offenses: “If a Thug were, on his trial for murder in a court in India 
in which our Anglo-Saxon law is administered, to set up as his defense for having 
strangled another, that it was part of his religious belief to do, what justification would 
that be deemed?  Or if a man should say to his wife, ‘I have been reading such a 
charming book about Utah, and Brigham Young must have such a lovely time, and I 
quite agree with him, and see!  I have just married all these ladies, and I hope you will be 
so happy together!’ your Honors would simply send him to the penitentiary.”  In a less 
than subtle jab at his legal adversary, Rawle anticipated the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Reynolds that upheld the Mormon defendant’s conviction under an anti-
polygamy statute.  Claiming religious duty did not excuse polygamy, Rawle contended, it 
did not excuse murder, and it certainly did not excuse bell-ringing.42
Indeed, two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court would agree with Rawle about 
polygamy, although its estimation of bell-ringing remained less clear perhaps.  In 
Reynolds, the Court famously distinguished religious belief from conduct, holding that 
the First Amendment protected only the right to the former absolutely.  In fact, the legal 
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historian Sarah Gordon has argued that one important product of the nineteenth-century 
polygamy cases was to enshrine in the First Amendment religion clauses a particular 
conception of religion as properly individualistic, voluntary, and believed.  Free religion 
often has meant the right to be religious only in certain ways, ways that did not 
necessarily make space for the publicly performed, communally-directed auditory 
practices at issue in the St. Mark’s case.43
But the Reynolds case tested a law that was generally applicable, for no one was 
permitted to practice polygamy, whether they justified it on religious or secular grounds.  
Noise disputes seemed different, for the meaning of noise was determined subjectively, 
and complainants targeted only certain sounds.  As St. Mark’s leaders pointed out, the 
neighbors complained about church bells, but they ignored other urban sounds, such as 
those produced by factories.  While they objected to religious sounds, they seemed 
willing to put up with the sounds of industry.  But was religion any less important for the 
vitality of American cities?  Disputants debated whether religions needed auditory 
expressions, but they also debated whether cities required certain noises in general.  
Through their efforts to situate religious sounds in relation to industrial sounds, 
disputants advanced competing conceptions of religion’s place in the city, and this is the 
second point of contention to which I want to call attention. 
The church’s attorney, George Washington Biddle, recognized that most of his 
contemporaries associated industrial noise with material prosperity, so he tried to 
persuade the court that silencing St. Mark’s bells might instigate a broader crusade on 
urban noise.  In other words, this case was not “just” about church bells.  Biddle noted 
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that several of the complainants’ physicians had issued general warnings about the 
growing din of industrial cities.  “The multiplication of needless noises in modern life is 
beginning to attract scientific attention in Europe as a cause of discomfort,” Dr. S. Weir 
Mitchell had written in his affidavit, for example.  These physicians seemed not to be 
singling out St. Mark’s bells, but to be targeting urban noise more generally.  And Biddle 
expressed concern for the future of a city that might eliminate noise merely to placate its 
more respectable citizens.  Such a course of action might bear dire consequences for the 
city’s prosperity, he warned.  While reducing urban noise “might make [the city] a 
habitation for people of highly organized temperament…,” Biddle explained to the court, 
“it would make it a city of the dead.  When the hum of traffic and the noise of business 
cease to be heard throughout Philadelphia, it will have to look to God alone for its 
preservation.”44
The complainants went out of their way to differentiate church bells from the 
sounds of industry, however.  Like Biddle and many of their contemporaries, they also 
regarded certain noises as necessary components of urban life.  As I discussed above, 
nineteenth century noise nuisance lawsuits generally failed precisely because industrial 
sounds were heard as signaling material progress and prosperity.  Few urban residents 
bothered to complain about them.  Indeed, St. Mark’s neighbors assured the court that 
they would not protest against those sounds that were “part of the necessary apparatus or 
machinery by which a great city has its wants supplied.”  But this did not include church 
bells, they maintained, for bells served no practical function.  They offered cities no 
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utilitarian value.  Bell-ringing was unnecessary, they concluded, and therefore could be 
muted with little broader consequence.45
Not surprisingly, St. Mark’s leaders disagreed.  What message would be sent by 
silencing churches but not factories, they wondered.  If all engines of progress made 
noise, then should not churches be included in that category?  Was not religion integral to 
the life and vitality of the city?  “They must bear in mind,” Biddle urged the court, “that 
from the first firm establishment of Christianity in this world of ours, [bells] have always 
been associated in the hearts and minds of worshippers with the service of the church.”  
Bells announced Christian presence, Biddle maintained.  Dislodging them from their 
position of public prominence, from their status as background noise, would be to 
question Christianity’s continued place in the industrial city.46
Biddle disputed the narrowly pragmatic sense according to which the 
complainants defined necessity.  They excluded religion from the “necessary apparatus or 
machinery by which a great city has its wants supplied,” Biddle lamented, “as if there 
were none but physical wants in this world of ours.”  But bells spoke to the spiritual 
needs of men otherwise engaged in commercial pursuits and reminded them to set aside 
time for religious worship.  Cities needed church bells just as much as they needed 
factory whistles, therefore.  As the rector of a New York City congregation explained in 
his affidavit, “[Bell-ringing] was inaugurated in my church because it was believed that 
the ringing of a chime of bells above the most thronged and crowded of American 
thoroughfares would be a means of recalling many, to whom such thoughts had been 
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unwonted, to thoughts of public worship and all that the church of God and its 
ministrations stand for.”  In other words, the bells’ advocates maintained, churches 
needed bells to vie with industry for city dwellers’ attention.  Bells were necessary if 
churches were to compete with the other distractions of modern urban life.  In fact, urban 
conditions had made bell-ringing more vital than ever, for without them, religion might 
be drowned out by industrial cacophony.47
Auditory reminders were particularly powerful, Biddle continued, for they could 
attract worshippers who otherwise might not choose to attend church at all.  “As the spire 
points heavenward,” he explained to the court, “in the direction which it is supposed we 
ought to strive to reach, the bells are admonitions to us at all seasons, not only on 
Sundays, but on every day.  I do not know anything more touching or more thoughtful 
than that arrestation, even for a moment, which a man will involuntarily make when he 
hears these bells, reminding him that the Saviour took upon him our flesh for our 
advantage.”  Sounding a theme that will recur in each of the cases that I consider in other 
chapters, Biddle suggested that passersby would have no choice but to hear church bells 
and respond to their call as their sounds spilled over onto city streets.  Their chimes 
would reach multiple audiences, both intended and unintended, constituting an acoustic 
community comprised of those within range.  Neighbors complained that they could not 
shut out the ringing of St. Mark’s bells, but Biddle implied that that was precisely what 
made them effective.   They publicly pronounced Christian presence amidst the general 
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din of urban life.  Their sounds did not challenge social order, therefore, but rather were 
conducive to it.  In short, bells were anything but noise.48
Biddle insisted that church bells should resound on city streets “not only on 
Sundays, but on every day,” their sounds fully integrated into urban life.  He seemed to 
imagine a polyphonic modern city, in which the chords of religious devotion would 
compete, or perhaps even harmonize, with the hum of mechanical industry, in which 
churches and factories each would make noise without censure.  But by insisting that 
church bells should be rung every day, Biddle again was subtly reframing the St. Mark’s 
case as an intra-denominational dispute about proper ritual practice.  The Anglo-Catholic 
movement in America had reinstituted daily worship as opposed to Sunday services 
alone, and St. Mark’s accordingly rang its chimes each day, a practice that many other 
Episcopalians found objectionable.  William Henry Rawle emphasized this point in his 
oral arguments.  “Although at that church, to which I have the happiness to belong,” the 
Episcopalian Rawle retorted, “we think that we are sufficiently high-church for most 
purposes of getting to heaven, we have not yet tried the experiment of planting Jacob’s 
ladder on week-days upon the business community which swarms around us.”  Religious 
practice should not interfere with the commercial activities of daily life, Rawle implied.  
He rhetorically circumscribed religion’s normative boundaries, suggesting that its 
observance was properly confined to particular times and places.49   
Biddle and Rawle thus offered competing conceptions of sacred time, and through 
these differences, they offered competing conceptions of religion’s place in the city and 
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of its relation to industry.  The church’s advocates maintained that church bells should 
ring every day, resounding alongside the sounds of factories.  But the complainants 
suggested that religion was best kept apart from commercial life, set off and separate, so 
that it might offer welcome relief from urban cacophony.  Cities needed religion, they 
agreed, but not religious noise.  Dr. S. Weir Mitchell urged the court not to permit bell-
ringing to disrupt the Sabbath peace, for “a large class of God-fearing Christians” 
required Sunday rest in order to resist “the pressures of modern social life.”  Professor 
Goodwin maintained that bell-ringing might harm Christianity’s standing in the 
community should it “come to be associated with the greatest discomfort and nuisance of 
our daily civil life.”  And at least one of St. Mark’s neighbors agreed, stating that “the 
efforts of a professedly Christian church to maintain its rights to intensify the mental and 
physical sufferings of a sick man must be an edifying spectacle to the world that it 
professes to convert.”50
Again, Rawle emphasized this point even more exaggeratedly.  He criticized the 
hypocrisy of a church that would claim to bring spiritual relief while inflicting physical 
torture.  He compared Dr. Hoffman to a grand inquisitor, describing in vivid detail a 
painting he had seen in which “a prisoner lay stretched upon the rack and with a brazier 
of fire at his feet, while the man of God, with the bare feet, the tonsure, the frock and the 
knotted cord, bent over him, and while with the one hand he motioned to the executioner 
to give the rack’s lever yet another turn, with the other he held high the Cross of God, so 
that when the soul should depart through the torture inflicted by the one, the pain might 
be taken away by the consolation imparted by the other.”  Hoffman lacked compassion 
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for his suffering neighbors, Rawle continued, which exemplified “the intolerance of those 
who for near two thousand years have preached the Gospel of Peace,” but have “given 
nerve to the arm and point to the sword of those who have fought against it.”  Such 
intolerance on the part of professedly religious men had “furnished to such pens as those 
of Hume and Gibbon in the past, and of Lecky, and Stephen, and Matthew Arnold in the 
present, their most terrible arguments.”  By insisting on its right to make noise publicly, 
by insisting on its power to infringe on the rights of others, St. Mark’s actually was 
damaging Christianity’s public standing, Rawle insisted.  “Good” religion should respect 
its bounds.51
The St. Mark’s disputants thus debated whether city residents needed aural 
reminders of religious presence.  Did religion need to make noise in order to compete 
with industry for public attention, or should churches instead offer relief from the 
cacophonous pressures of modern urban life?  But the disputants also debated whether 
urban noise affected all city residents in the same way, for St. Mark’s neighbors 
suggested that noise harmed certain classes of people more than others.  If the church 
maintained that public religious sounds might be necessary, then for whom were they 
necessary?  This constituted a third point of contention through which disputants situated 
religious sounds within broader cultural discourses about noise.  Noise functioned as a 
key index of class identity in late-Victorian America and England.  Nineteenth century 
noise complaints generally targeted immigrants, the poor, and other groups that 
threatened social order.  Contests over noise were cast as part of a broader struggle 
between civilization and barbarism.  Indeed, St. Mark’s neighbors insisted that upper 
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class elites maintained a particular right to quiet.  But St. Mark’s advocates generally 
occupied the same social position, and they assumed their own right to make noise 
without censure.  As historian Karin Bijsterveld has proposed, “The right to make 
noise…has long been the privilege of the powerful” (although such a presumption of 
privilege also could be interpreted as arrogant disregard for the rights of others, as Rawle 
alleged in the passage cited above).  Disputants thus offered competing conceptions of 
the relationship between public sounds and social power.  They debated whether class 
privilege entailed a right to make noise or a right to quiet.52
   St. Mark’s neighbors presumed their right to be free from noise.  From the start 
of the dispute, they had insisted that the Rittenhouse Square neighborhood had attracted 
them precisely because it was quiet.  Locust Street notably was exempt “from the 
ordinary noises even of all the leading streets” of Philadelphia, they claimed, for they 
previously had fought successfully to keep streetcars off of it.  And despite all the 
rhetoric about industrial noise, there certainly were no nearby factories.  Noise seemed 
particularly “out of place” in this upper-class residential neighborhood.  In fact, several 
real estate experts submitted affidavits in which they argued that the church’s 
neighborhood “most nearly [approached] perfection as to immunity from nuisances.”  
Noise would depreciate home values significantly, therefore, for “being possessed of 
wealth,” the neighbors could “at any time avoid an inconvenience by moving 
elsewhere.”53
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The neighbors also argued that the bells did them particular harm because they 
suffered more acutely from nervous conditions.  As Dr. S. Weir Mitchell explained in his 
affidavit, “the multiplication of needless noises in modern life” necessarily produced, 
“especially among professional men, a degree of brain-tire, of loss of power to use the 
brain, of which the results are terribly alike, beginning with insomnia, irritability, nervous 
excitement, cerebral derangement, and running the gamut of mischief down to paralysis 
and death.”  Dr. J. M. Da Costa similarly warned about noise’s effects on “the most 
thoughtful professional men, the original thinker and writer in science, the higher order of 
men of letters.”  Noise produced more injurious effects on the professional classes, these 
physicians maintained.  They appropriated a dominant late-Victorian discourse that 
interpreted neurasthenia as a “mark of distinction, of class, of status, of refinement,” a 
condition brought on in the upper and middle classes “by simple exposure to the hectic 
pace and excessive stimuli of modern life.”  According to leading contemporary theorists 
of neurasthenia, such as Mitchell and George Beard, the disease indicated social 
advancement, and its prevalence among the upper class offered “proof that America was 
the highest civilization that had ever existed.”   But at the same time, it rendered patients 
particularly susceptible to the dangers associated with urban noise.  Perhaps working 
class residents could endure the clamor of St. Mark’s bells, but the more “civilized” 
neighbors should not have to put up with it.54
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For their part, St. Mark’s leaders assumed a right to make noise.  In fact, they 
regarded bell-ringing not as “noise” but as a long-established public prerogative of 
Protestant churches.  In response to the initial complaints, the vestrymen had agreed to 
consider individual petitions in cases of illness, but they utterly denied “the right of the 
residents in the vicinity to regulate in any way the manner or the time of ringing the bells 
of St. Mark’s Church.”  They appear to have heard in the complaints a challenge to their 
public power and authority.  Following the conclusion of the legal proceedings, the 
vestrymen continued for a time to refuse to consent to any regulations that might “bind 
this Corporation and its successors.”  They resolved not to drop the case until they had 
“secure[d] to the Church the unrestricted right to ring bells.”  The Protestant Episcopal 
Church was the denomination of the urban establishment, and surely its churches had the 
right to ring bells.  But Dr. Hoffman also solicited affidavits from several Roman 
Catholic priests, who described bell-ringing practices at their own churches.  At the very 
least, Hoffman maintained, “Episcopal churches have certainly as much right to the 
customary use of bells as Roman Catholic churches.”55
But at the same time as St. Mark’s leaders defended their right to ring bells, they, 
too, associated noise with Philadelphia’s working class residents.  Like the complainants, 
they subtly reinforced noise’s status as an index of class identity and difference.  They 
did this in at least two ways.  First, they maintained that it was the city’s poor who 
especially needed the bells to announce service times.  Clocks and watches had not 
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rendered bell-ringing obsolete.  Instead, many Philadelphia church-goers continued to 
rely on chimes, “and this [was] especially so among the poorer classes who cannot afford 
the luxuries of well-furnished residences.”  In fact, St. Mark’s reached out extensively to 
the city’s working class, and the church housed what Dr. Hoffman described in 1870 as 
“two distinct congregations,” distinguished by class differences.  The church charged 
pew rental and ownership fees for two of its four regular Sunday services.  But the other 
two services, which included the early Sunday morning one, were free and frequently 
attracted a different type of worshipper.  Suspending the early morning bell actually 
might have affected poorer residents disproportionately, therefore.56
One Philadelphia newspaper even suggested explicitly that St. Mark’s bells upset 
the neighbors because of the type of worshipper that the chimes were attracting.  St. 
Mark’s vestrymen, the Philadelphia Times noted sarcastically, “should have 
considered…that the church on Rittenhouse Square has no need of a bell to summon its 
select congregation of Sunday worshippers, and that a church which throws open its pew-
doors to a miscellaneous congregation in the early morning offends sufficiently against 
the dignity of the neighborhood without the added injury of chiming bells.”  St. Mark’s 
vestrymen insisted that they needed chimes to carry out their work among the poor.  But 
by linking bell-ringing to the needs of the working class, the bells’ advocates continued 
to construct noise as a marker of class difference.  Even the sounds of power, the noise 
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emanating from one of Philadelphia’s most fashionable churches, might signal disorder, a 
threat to social order and to civilized society.57
Dr. Hoffman associated bell-ringing with lower class sensibilities in another way, 
as well.  After the complainants filed their bill in court, Hoffman canvassed the 
neighborhood, collecting affidavits from poor, working-class, mostly Irish Catholic 
residents who lived nearby—or, as one account later would describe them, from “obscure 
people living on side streets and alleys which were not in the bells’ direct line of fire.”  
These neighbors, many of whom signed their affidavits with an “X,” claimed to enjoy the 
sound of bells.  They did not find them to be a nuisance.  But by putting forth their 
testimony, Hoffman further implied that only the city’s working class residents required 
auditory religious announcements, that only they did not mind noise.58
Indeed, the complainants rushed to trivialize this testimony.  The sound of the 
bells caused “great annoyance to everyone in the neighborhood with the exception of 
certain residents of Irish birth who could neither read nor write,” George Harrison’s 
grandson later would recall.  During oral arguments, William Henry Rawle was even 
more dismissive of the Irish neighbors’ statements.  “I shall not contrast the affidavits of 
Harrison, and Cadwalader, and Coffin, and Norris, and Dulles,” Rawle announced, citing 
the names of complainants who hailed from some of Philadelphia’s most prominent 
families, “with those of Michael Fitzgerald, and Catharine Harkins, and Adeline Blizzard, 
and Patrick Maloney, many of whom cannot even read or write.”  While the latter might 
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claim not to mind the bells, Rawle continued, they clearly belonged to “a class having 
placid lymphatic temperaments, with which is usually combined a lower degree of 
intellectual development.”  Rawle introduced here an evolutionary scheme that associated 
tolerance for noise with lower levels of civilization.  As I noted above, Victorian 
Americans regularly constructed racial, ethnic, and religious hierarchies in terms of 
auditory and olfactory differences.  But surely, Rawle implied, the court could not 
privilege the sensibilities of ethnic and religious “others.”59
Arguing for the defense, George Washington Biddle indeed urged the court to 
listen more attentively to the Irish neighbors’ testimony.  “A Mr. Fitzgerald or a Mr. 
Tobin or a Mr. McDevitt has quite as high a title to relief as any of the highly respectable 
plaintiffs named in this bill,” Biddle stated.  Moreover, he continued, “these are the 
affidavits of people who really dwell in their houses.”  The affluent complainants 
regularly escaped to the country during the hot summer months, and they could always 
choose to move elsewhere.  “There is no restriction on them,” Biddle explained, “Let 
them cross the Schuylkill or go farther West; let them follow Horace Greeley’s advice.”  
But these options were not available to the neighborhood’s poor.  “They cannot retire 
from the city when the torrid sun is scorching us all,” Biddle insisted, “They must remain 
there.  They are not annoyed.”  So why should they be deprived “this daily little pleasure 
in their lives of hard toil and privation?”  Biddle did not dispute that bell-ringing might 
have been enjoyed especially by Philadelphia’s working-class residents.  But he saw no 
reason to silence the chimes on that account.60
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Like the complainants, St. Mark’s leaders thus subtly constructed noise as an 
index of class difference.  The complainants argued that noise exacerbated their already 
frayed nervous conditions, challenged regularly by the pressures of modern urban life.  
Upper-class sensibilities could not tolerate any more unnecessary noise.  And the church 
responded, in part, by suggesting that its noise indeed might be intended for the city’s 
working classes.  Perhaps it was the poor who most needed and enjoyed St. Mark’s bells 
(although they were not the only ones who did so).  But the disputants drew different 
implications from this possibility.  The complainants presumed that their class privilege 
entailed a right to quiet.  St. Mark’s, however, continued to assume that American 
churches had a right to ring bells.  It continued to assert its authority to make noise 
without censure. 
The St. Mark’s disputants thus debated whether religious sounds might be 
considered necessary.  Did religions require noise?  Did cities require auditory 
announcements of religious presence alongside the sounds of industry?  And did certain 
classes of listeners need public aural expressions more than others?  Through their 
differences, the disputants situated religious sounds differently within broader cultural 
discourses about noise.  Were St. Mark’s bells the sounds of power, signals of progress 
and prosperity, normative and necessary features of the American urban soundscape?  Or 
were they disorderly, a threat to civilized society, unnecessary byproducts of earlier 
religious sensibilities, unwanted noise amidst already cacophonous modern cities?  How 
disputants heard the chimes implied competing conceptions of the nature of religion, of 
its relation to industry, and of its place in the modern city.  And these differences also 
bore real implications for how the chimes would be regulated.  St. Mark’s continued to 
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assert its unfettered authority to ring bells, its right to make noise.  But the neighbors 
presumed a corresponding right to quiet.  They turned to the court to prohibit St. Mark’s 
chimes from sounding any longer. 
 
Circumscribing Religion’s Place 
On February 24, 1877, Presiding Judge Hare of Philadelphia’s Court of Common 
Pleas, No. 2, issued his opinion in Harrison v. St. Mark’s.  He broke the case down into 
two questions.  First, was there a real injury?  Hare expressed little surprise that the 
affidavits should reflect varying opinions on this question, for sound affected different 
people differently, depending on health, temperament, and geographical position.  He 
claimed not to care about family name or social class.  Instead, Hare found it reasonable 
to expect that Locust Street residents might despise the bells while residents of side 
streets might enjoy them, for they likely would experience different intensities of sound.  
All that mattered was whether the complainants could claim real injury, and he was 
“unable to escape the conclusion…that the sound of the bells does cause annoyance and 
suffering, which is not imaginary or only felt by the hyper-sensitive, but is real and 
substantial.”  Hare emphasized the potential physiological harm brought about by 
exposure to loud sounds, ignoring the church’s contention that intra-denominational 
differences had prompted the complaints.  The bells “really” seem to have been too loud, 
he suggested.61
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Second, Hare asked, was the injury caused “in pursuance of a right that cannot be 
questioned or restrained?”  In answering this question, Hare sidestepped the issue of 
religious necessity altogether.  He did not address whether religions required aural 
expression or whether religious duty might excuse practitioners from obeying the law.  
Instead, Hare focused his attention more narrowly on property rights.  Could the court 
restrain the church’s right to use its property as it saw fit?  To answer this question, Hare 
considered the particular properties of sound that differentiated it from other land uses.  
Although “a man may do ordinarily what he will with his ground…,” Hare wrote, “he has 
no such dominion over…the air that floats over it.”  Sound was different, Hare 
maintained, for it crossed legal boundaries between properties as it traveled through the 
air, spilling over onto city streets and into private homes.  And noise was particularly 
prone to produce “injurious consequences” because it could not easily be avoided.  “Light 
may be shut out,” Hare wrote, “and odors measurably excluded, but sound is all-
pervading.”  George Washington Biddle had praised church bells because they 
involuntarily directed city dwellers’ attention to God, but Hare maintained that they were 
problematic precisely for that reason.  Passersby could not choose whether to hear them.  
Therefore, if the bells disturbed the peace of the neighborhood, then they could be 
silenced.  St. Mark’s Church had no right to make noise that caused injury to its 
neighbors.62
“What, then…is bell-ringing forbidden?” Hare rhetorically asked.  What of the 
defense’s contention that silencing St. Mark’s bells might mute Christianity’s public 
voice, limiting its capacity to attract attention amidst the cacophonous conditions of 
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urban life?  As Hare concluded his decision, he went out of his way to emphasize that 
religion need not necessarily keep quiet.  “Sunday,” he explained, “as observed by the 
English-speaking races, teaches in the street as well as in the church; and the church-bells 
should lend grace and gladness to a lesson that might otherwise seem too austere.”  Hare 
affirmed that Christian practice belonged in public, that religious devotion need not be 
contained by church walls.  The sounds of Christian worship should spill over onto city 
streets, he maintained.  But St. Mark’s chimes constituted a special case.  Although bell-
ringing was not necessarily a nuisance, these particular bells were unusually and 
intolerably annoying.  These particular bells were too loud.  And when religion became a 
nuisance, when its sounds became noticed and the subject of complaint, then it could and 
should be muted.  Judge Hare issued a preliminary injunction, therefore, “restraining the 
defendants from ringing the bells of St. Mark’s Church.”  The church’s bells no longer 
constituted “Sacred Noise,” to borrow R. Murray Schafer’s term.  The church no longer 
could make noise without censure.63
Reactions to Judge Hare’s decision predictably varied.  Several newspaper 
editorials praised the decision as moderate for applying only to these particular bells and 
not to bells in general.  They interpreted the dispute as about nothing more than noise and 
saw no broader principles at stake.  As when the dispute first went public, other 
newspapers made light of the whole matter, poking fun at the sensitive temperaments of 
Rittenhouse Square’s fashionable residents.  The Sunday Disptach even published a five-
stanza satirical poem that feigned relief for “the brownstone folk/Who live in St. Mark’s 
square.”  And the Commonwealth dismissed the complainants as members of the 
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“nouveau riche” and as “aspirants for ‘social position’” who resented their exclusion 
from the “blue-blood” St. Mark’s.64
But other responses continued to express the same types of concerns that had been 
voiced in court.  Some commentators worried about the decision’s implications for the 
city’s vitality.  They feared that the decision had gone too far, clearing the way for 
litigation against all sources of urban noise, whether religious or secular.  “If the spirit of 
the decision is carried out,” one newspaper noted, ignoring Judge Hare’s assurances to 
the contrary, “every church bell in the city will have to be muffled, and the whistles and 
fog-horns of certain factories must be silenced.”  The courts might muffle the city’s rattle 
and hum, which signaled power, progress, and material prosperity.  Other commentators 
expressed concern about the case’s implications for religion.  For example, the high 
church Episcopal Register published a poem that interpreted the dispute as a clash 
between scientific and religious authority.  In the poem, physicians attended to the bells 
as a sick patient, convinced of their impending death.  The poet implied that the doctors 
who offered testimony in the St. Mark’s case similarly rushed to pronounce religion’s 
demise.  Yet in the deafening clang of the bells, the doctors discovered religion’s 
surprising vitality and departed quickly to escape contagion.  “When the melody ceased,” 
the poem ambiguously concludes, “ev’ry Doctor had fled,/and seemed to forget that St. 
Mark’s was not dead.”  Religion had revived, the newspaper suggested, but perhaps only 
temporarily.  What effect would silencing the bells have on the church’s health?65
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Judge Hare’s decision infuriated the leaders of St. Mark’s Church, of course, who 
interpreted it as an assault on their public power and privilege.  In a letter to the New York 
Times, Dr. Hoffman hyperbolically (and inaccurately) described the situation as “the first 
time in the history of Christendom that a church has been enjoined for availing itself of 
its ancient and time-honored custom of announcing its services by the ringing of bells.”  
Hoffman seemed incredulous that an American court should prevent a Protestant church 
from calling people to pray.  The injunction was “an invasion of [the church’s] legal 
rights” and signaled “the beginning of a crusade against all church bells.”  Hoffman felt 
that he had no choice but to appeal Hare’s decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  
The right of churches to pursue their institutional missions could not be left subject to the 
dictates of “some nervous or evil-disposed neighbor.”  Hoffman even rejected an 
invitation from some of the complainants to discuss a compromise that might avoid 
further litigation.  The rector seemed unwilling to concede to the neighbors any authority 
over the church’s practices.66
On June 16, 1877, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled on St. Mark’s appeal.  
In a brief  per curium opinion, the Court upheld the injunction but modified it slightly, 
permitting St. Mark’s to ring its bells on Sundays, for no longer than two minutes, but 
only before “the usual three divine services on that day—forenoon, afternoon, and 
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evening—and not to any early morning services.”  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a 
state institution, thus regulated the precise times at which St. Mark’s could ring its bells.  
Perhaps unwittingly, the judges intervened directly in intra-Episcopalian debates about 
proper ritual practice, sanctioning a particular worship schedule as normative.  St. Mark’s 
could resume announcing the “usual” Sunday services, but not the early morning service, 
which especially attracted Philadelphia’s poor, nor the daily mass that it and several other 
Anglo-Catholic congregations had instituted.  The Pennsylvania Court restored St. 
Mark’s right to ring its bells but only within certain state-imposed limits.67
The Sunday Dispatch described the Court’s distinction between Sunday and 
weekday services as “queer,” and St. Mark’s vestrymen agreed.  In a resolution dated 
June 21, they argued that if the bells were tolerable on Sundays, then they certainly 
should be tolerable on weekdays and festivals, as well, “when their sound would be 
partially drowned by that of the noise of secular business.”  In other words, they implied, 
the Court’s decision seemed less about noise and more about demarcating religion’s 
proper time and place.  The decision seemed to imply that church bells belonged only on 
Sunday afternoons and that they sounded “out of place” at other times.  “Are we not to be 
permitted to ring the bells at funerals, on Christmas and other movable festivals, nor on 
the Fourth of July and other great holidays?” Dr. Hoffman inquired.  The church’s vestry 
decided that it would respect the Court’s decree but “under protest.”  On Sunday, June 
24, St. Mark’s bells rang to announce three Sunday services.  And in January 1878, 
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despite the injunction, St. Mark’s completed its chimes by installing a set of four 
additional bells.68
The church continued to press its case, and on January 18, 1878, the Supreme 
Court further modified the injunction.  The Court again regulated the precise days and 
times on which St. Mark’s could ring its bells, but this time the judges endorsed 
Hoffman’s sacred calendar that included both Christian and American holidays.  In 
addition to Sundays, the church could ring its bells on “New Year’s Day; Epiphany; 
Washington’s Birthday; Fourth of July; Ash Wednesday; Good Friday; Ascension Day; 
All Saints’ Day; Thanksgiving Day; Christmas Day; also at Weddings and Funeral 
Services.”  But the ban on weekday bell-ringing and on the early Sunday morning bell 
would remain.  St. Mark’s could ring its bells but only at those times authorized by the 
Court.  It could not take for granted its right to make noise.69
As the St. Mark’s case worked its way through the Pennsylvania courts, it thus 
became less focused on noise and more on time, less focused on the bells’ volume and 
more on when they could be rung.  According to the Supreme Court, it seems, St. Mark’s 
bells constituted a nuisance only on particular days of the year.  And as I proposed above, 
these competing conceptions of sacred time also implied competing conceptions of 
religion’s place in the industrial city.  The church’s leaders had demanded the right to 
ring bells every day of the week, so that their chimes might resound alongside the sounds 
of industry.  Churches needed to make noise in order to compete for public attention, they 
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insisted.  Urban residents needed auditory reminders of religious presence.  Following 
Judge Hare’s decision, Dr. Hoffman had protested that his church at least should be 
allowed to ring bells for funerals, on Christmas, and on the Fourth of July.  His choice of 
examples seems significant, suggesting that bells played a vital role in the life of 
individuals, in the life of the church, and in the life of the nation.  If all vital engines of 
progress made noise, Hoffman implied, then surely this must include the city’s religious 
institutions.  Silencing church bells might mute Protestantism’s public voice. 
In their decisions, the Pennsylvania courts went out of their way to affirm 
Protestantism’s continued public place, but their injunctions also circumscribed that 
place, demarcating and delimiting its boundaries.  St. Mark’s bells would not be a part of 
everyday life, integrated into the city’s usual soundscape, but would be set off as separate 
and apart.  The bells would not resound alongside factory whistles, but would signal 
industry’s silence at particular times sanctioned by the state.  The bells would signal the 
interruption of the ordinary.  The complaints about St. Mark’s bells had drawn attention 
to them and had rendered problematic their public and quotidian character.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally had restored St. Mark’s right to ring bells.  But the 
manner in which it did so had redefined their place in the industrial city.70
 
Conclusion 
For many observers, the Court’s plan seemed to offer a fair compromise and a 
welcome resolution to the bells dispute, although it “probably satisfied neither side,” 
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William Henry Rawle’s daughter later would recall.  Indeed, the dispute dragged on for at 
least the next six years as neighbors continued to complain about the bells while St. 
Mark’s vestry continued to seek the injunction’s removal.  The church’s leaders gradually 
came to accept the legal limits that the courts had imposed, however.  “We do not want to 
ring the bells any more than at present,” St. Mark’s new rector, Dr. Isaac Nicholson, 
informed Episcopal Bishop Stevens in 1884.  (Dr. Hoffman left St. Mark’s to become the 
dean of General Theological Seminary in 1879.)  Nicholson’s willingness to compromise 
appears to have kept the case from returning to court, for St. Mark’s no longer asserted its 
right to make noise as it pleased.  The church continued to ring its bells, but only 
according to the terms that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had set.  State intervention 
had transformed its practice.71
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Moreover, there is limited evidence to suggest that the St. Mark’s case instigated 
a campaign against other Philadelphia bells, as well.  In 1884, Dr. S. Weir Mitchell 
asserted “that in this city I have heard more complaints within a year or two about church 
bells than ever before.”  Neighbors of Philadelphia’s St. Patrick’s Roman Catholic 
Church even persuaded its pastor to stop ringing bells by threatening him with an 
injunction.  It seems that the St. Mark’s case had demonstrated that nuisance lawsuits 
against churches could succeed.  Bells could constitute noise. 72
The discord soon faded, however, with perhaps a few exceptions.  Sixty years 
later, George L. Harrison’s grandson would recall that “the rancor engendered [by the 
case] was apparently handed down by the choir boys of that time to their successors.  For 
twenty-five years afterwards insulting remarks would be chalked on our house from time 
to time and when, in the late ‘Eighties, the front window was changed, the noses of the 
figures carved in the stone were damaged.”  But aside from petty acts of vandalism, the 
“animosities soon subsided, and the teapot tempest became a thing of the past,” as a later 
account put it.  Rittenhouse Square matrons no longer had to choose their dinner guests 
quite so carefully.  The Penn-Princeton football game did not have to compete for 
attention.  Church bells no longer dominated polite conversation.73
Over the next thirty years, Philadelphia’s Episcopalian establishment would 
continue to consolidate class identity and social power.  Describing the period between 
1876 and 1905, two Philadelphia historians have argued that “never before or afterward 
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was the position of [the city’s] upper class more secure or its influence more pervasive.”  
But the 1880s also marked the peak of Rittenhouse Square’s identity as home to 
Philadelphia’s elite.  Over the next several decades, the fashionable denizens of 
Rittenhouse Square increasingly moved to the suburbs to construct Philadelphia’s famous 
Main Line.  As Biddle had encouraged them in his oral arguments, St. Mark’s neighbors 
indeed moved west.  Few of them remained behind to listen to—or to complain about—
St. Mark’s chimes.  Although the Supreme Court’s injunction technically remained in 
effect, the church increasingly seems to have disregarded it.  On November 11, 1918, for 
example, St. Mark’s rang its bells to announce the signing of the Armistice.  But no one 
complained, reports one parish history, for “most of our former ‘neighbors’ by now were 
sleeping peacefully in the suburbs.”  As industrialization and immigration continued to 
transform Philadelphia, St. Mark’s chimes again faded into the background.74
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Although ostensibly about nothing more than the disruption of domestic comfort 
by an intolerable acoustic annoyance, the St. Mark’s case had raised critical questions 
about religion’s place in the industrial city.  The church had assumed its right to make 
noise, but the neighbors’ complaints had dislodged the bells from their status as 
background noise.  Even if it only lasted temporarily, Philadelphians suddenly noticed 
and paid close attention to the chimes’ call.  The dispute had made the bells’ continued 
acoustic dominance an open question at the same time that Protestant hegemony also was 
beginning to face challenges from industrialization, urbanization, and immigration.  Even 
a church’s right to ring bells could not be taken for granted, it seems.  In relation to these 
particular public sounds, disputants negotiated Protestantism’s place in an industrializing 
city and a diversifying nation. 
In other chapters, I listen to the sounds of religious dissenters and newcomers, but 
this chapter has attended to the sounds of power.  The St. Mark’s case also took shape, in 
part, as an intra-denominational dispute about devotional style.  Although the 
Episcopalian disputants all appear to have agreed that Protestantism should retain a 
strong public presence, they debated what form that public presence should take.  St. 
Mark’s leaders argued that churches needed bells in order to attract worshippers and to 
announce presence.  They needed bells to compete acoustically with the sounds of 
industry, to assert their continued place in the industrial city.  But the neighbors insisted 
that modern religion had no need for bells, though chimes might bear sentimental value.  
In fact, they suggested, churches might pursue their institutional missions more 
effectively by keeping quiet, by respecting their neighbors’ peace, and by offering 
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welcome relief from the pressures and cacophony of modern urban life.  In other words, 
if bells became a nuisance, then they could and should be muted. 
Disputants thus debated whether religious sounds were necessary—for religion, 
for the city, and for certain classes of people.  And through these differences, I have 
proposed, they situated religious sounds differently within broader cultural discourses 
about noise.  Scholarship on noise has paid little attention to religious sounds, but the St. 
Mark’s dispute offers a useful case study for considering how religion may have fit into 
nineteenth-century debates.  The church’s leaders evaluated their chimes positively, 
associating their sounds with strength, power, and prosperity.  Churches, like factories, 
constituted a vital engine of progress.  But religious sounds also were different.  
Appealing to tradition and custom, the church presumed its right to make noise without 
censure and interpreted the complaints as a challenge to its public authority.  On the other 
hand, the neighbors described noise as uncivilized and disorderly, as unnecessary and 
unwanted.  They heard it as a threat to public order, and they saw no reason to regulate 
religious sounds differently.  In fact, they suggested, religious sounds were easier to 
contain precisely because they were not needed.  The St. Mark’s disputants thus 
advanced competing conceptions of the relationship between religious sound and social 
power.  The church asserted its right to make noise while the neighbors assumed their 
own right to manufacture quiet. 
In their decisions, the Pennsylvania courts affirmed Protestantism’s continued 
public place, but circumscribed that place, limiting its aural expression to particular days 
and times.  Through their regulation of St. Mark’s chimes, the courts implicitly 
demarcated when religious practice was appropriate and when it sounded “out of place,” 
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when it constituted noise.  Judge Hare significantly explained the need to regulate noise 
by appealing to sound’s particular physical properties.  Sound traveled through the air, 
traversing legal boundaries, and spilling over onto city streets and into private homes.  
Public sounds such as church bells could not be shut out, Hare maintained.  Individuals 
could not choose whether to listen—or respond—to their call.  Regulating which sounds 
would be permissible on city streets thus became a matter of defining whose sounds 
would be made unavoidable.  As I explain further in chapter 5, we find here hints of an 
important relationship between public sound and social legitimacy.  Judge Hare did not 
mute all church bells, but only these particular bells.  Certain sounds would continue to 
dominate Philadelphia’s acoustic space, while others would be silenced.  Philadelphians 
would have no choice but to hear certain noisemakers and not others. 
Judge Hare clearly did not intend to mute Protestantism’s public influence, nor 
did his decision in fact have that broader effect.  He even went out of his way to 
emphasize the importance of public religious practice.  “Sunday,” Hare wrote, “as 
observed by the English-speaking races, teaches in the street as well as in the church.”  
But Hare’s reference to “the English-speaking races” seems suggestive.  It is not clear 
whether Hare presumed a public place for all religious practitioners or only for 
Protestants.  Did he imagine polyphonic public places, resounding with the sounds of 
religious variety, or monophonic city streets, dominated by the sounds of a de facto 
religious establishment?  As religious newcomers continued to arrive in Philadelphia, 
they would contribute further to the city’s already diverse religious soundscape.  But 
whose sounds would be deemed legitimate?  Whose would be rendered publicly 
permissible and thus unavoidable?  Did Hare’s reference to the “English-speaking races” 
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include the devotional practices of Catholics, who would soon be numerically dominant 
in Philadelphia?  Did his generosity extend to Jews, two of whom were arrested in June 
1876 for engaging in “worldly employment” on the Christian Sabbath after the noise of 
their labor had disturbed their neighbors?  Could Hare put up with Chinese gongs, used 
by street hawkers but also by Buddhists, yet explicitly targeted by a Kansas City anti-
noise ordinance in 1913?  Should the Islamic call to prayer echo through American cities, 
as it first did in New York City in 1893?  In short, could only certain religions be publicly 
sounded?75
Over the next several decades, these questions about the right to make noise 
publicly would become even more pressing.  As we will find in the next chapter, early 
twentieth-century campaigns increasingly targeted all unnecessary sources of urban 
noise, including the sounds of industry.  At the same time, religious dissenters 
increasingly came to claim a public place in American life.  American churches always 
had rung bells, St. Mark’s leaders had contended.  But might other religious groups 
similarly assert a right to make noise?  In the next chapter, I consider a case involving 
Jehovah’s Witnesses who used loudspeakers to make their voices heard.  New 
amplification technologies offered new opportunities for dominating space with sound.  
They also would raise new questions about the right to practice religion out loud. 
 
                                                 
75Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 490.  On the arrest of the Jews for creating a nuisance on the Sabbath, see “The 
Sunday Law,” Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, June 24, 1876.  On the Kansas City anti-gong ordinance, see 
Anti-Noise Ordinances of Various Cities, Compiled for the Committee on Health of the Chicago City 
Council, Dr. Willis O. Nance, Chairman, by the Municipal Reference Library, Chicago, 1913, 1-36.  On the 
Islamic call to prayer in New York City, see “New-York’s First Muezzin Call,” New York Times, 
December 11, 1893. 
106 
 CHAPTER 3 
AMPLIFYING RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE: 
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES, LOUDSPEAKERS, AND THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD 
 
Daniel P. Falsioni, Police Court Judge of Lockport, New York, was confused.  At 
a 1946 trial testing a Jehovah’s Witness minister’s right to operate loudspeakers, the 
defense attorney had noted the volume of local church bells.  And Falsioni did not follow 
the analogy.  “I don’t think there is any connection between church bells and a 
loudspeaker,” he explained.  Falsioni differentiated a religious dissenter’s use of 
relatively new amplifying technologies from the more traditional sounds of bell-ringing.  
But he might have been surprised to discover that many churches were starting to use 
loudspeakers, too.  For example, the Lockport Union-Sun & Journal reported on January 
2, 1945, that “the tower of the [Middleport] Methodist Church has been wired with an 
amplifier and plans have been made to broadcast the Chimes every day at noon.  The 
music can be heard for several miles around and [the church’s pastor] said that it should 
remind all who hear them to pray for loved ones far from home.”  Electronic 
amplification enabled this church to expand its acoustic reach, to call more listeners to 
pray.  In chapter 2, St. Mark’s neighbors suggested that new technologies, such as clocks 
and wristwatches, had rendered church bells unnecessary.  But it seems that other 
technological innovations, such as loudspeakers, actually could enhance churches’ means 
for attracting worshippers.  Some critics objected to amplified chimes on aesthetic 
 grounds, but complaints about their volume (as in the St. Mark’s case) proved relatively 
uncommon.  However, the use of amplifying devices by unpopular religious dissenters 
did not always go as uncontested.  As the Lockport case made clear, not all groups could 
expand their acoustic range without protest.1
In this chapter, I examine this 1946 Lockport dispute, which began when a group 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses used amplification equipment to broadcast religious sermons in a 
public park.  Lockport police arrested the loudspeaker’s owner, Samuel Saia, for 
violating the city’s anti-noise ordinance, which prohibited operating sound equipment 
without a permit.  Some Lockport residents complained that the noise emanating from 
Saia’s loudspeaker interfered with their enjoyment of the park.  But Saia described his 
practice as religious worship and maintained that the U.S. Constitution’s First 
Amendment protected his right to broadcast.  Saia eventually appealed his case to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, where he called on the Justices to consider for the first time whether 
religious freedom might entail a right to make noise.2
                                                 
1Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), Transcript of Record, 165 (hereinafter I refer to the record of the 
testimony at trial as “Transcript”); “Methodist Chimes Play at Noon,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, 
January 2, 1945.  For a discussion of complaints about amplified chimes on aesthetic grounds, see Thomas 
F. Rzeznik, “Spiritual Capital: Religion, Wealth, and Social Status in Industrial Era Philadelphia” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2006), 169.  Rzeznik cites a 1930 editorial from Church News that 
asked, “How will Churches retain their distinctiveness [when any church] can put a record of the Bok 
Carrillon on its little victrola and amplify it out of a broken second-story window, [thinking it will sound] 
just as sweet and rich [as] real Belgian chimes?”  As we will see, the fact that loudspeakers and phonograph 
players rendered religious sounds portable and reproducible was precisely the source of their appeal for 
many Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
2As will be discussed, the Supreme Court already had decided a number of cases related to Witness 
proselytizing activities, but Saia was the first case to frame the issue explicitly as about noise, testing the 
validity of an anti-noise ordinance.  I should emphasize that the Court did not rule on this question as I have 
framed it, although Saia and his attorneys did put this question before the Court.  Saia argued that his 
freedoms of worship and speech were at stake, although the Court decided the case exclusively on free 
speech grounds.  For important studies of the Witnesses’ legal battles, especially during the 1940s, see 
William Shepard McAninch, “A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law: Jehovah’s Witnesses in 
the Supreme Court,” University of Cincinnati Law Review 55 (1987): 997-1077; Merlin Owen Newton, 
Armed with the Constitution: Jehovah’s Witnesses in Alabama and the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1946 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1995); Eric Michael Mazur, The Americanization of Religious 
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The early twentieth-century “electric revolution” introduced new mechanical 
sounds into American cities and intensified debates about urban noise.  Perhaps no 
sounds were as contested as the amplified noises of electro-acoustic loudspeakers.  
Loudspeakers offered invaluable means for extending acoustic space, but also offered 
unprecedented opportunities for dominating space with sound and for drowning out the 
sounds of others.  The loudspeaker “allows one to impose one’s own noise and to silence 
others,” the cultural theorist Jacques Attali has argued.  “The loudspeaker was…invented 
by an imperialist,” composer R. Murray Schafer similarly has contended, “for it 
responded to the desire to dominate others with one’s own sound.”  As if to prove 
Schafer’s point, no less an imperialist than Adolph Hitler claimed in 1938 that “without 
the loudspeaker, we would never have conquered Germany.”  Indeed, scholars of 
auditory culture have tended to focus on the loudspeaker almost exclusively as a vehicle 
of power, enabling “aural aggressors” to infringe on the rights of others by imposing their 
sounds on unwilling listeners.3
But at the same time, loudspeakers also have functioned as vehicles of dissent, 
allowing religious and political “others” to compete acoustically with the sounds of 
power.  Loudspeakers have provided unpopular minorities with a critical means for 
making their voices heard.  In fact, their portability has made them especially well-suited 
                                                                                                                                                 
Minorities: Confronting the Constitutional Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); 
Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights 
Revolution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). 
3Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985), 87; R. Murray Schafer, The Soundscape: Our Sonic Environment and the Tuning 
of the World (Rochester, VT: Destiny Books, 1993).  On the “electric revolution,” see Schafer, The 
Soundscape, 88-102.  On the transformation of the American soundscape by electronic and mechanical 
sounds, see Emily Thompson, The Soundscape of Modernity: Architectural Acoustics and the Culture of 
Listening in America, 1900-1933 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).  I borrow the phrase “aural 
aggression” from Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Saia, 334 U.S. at 563-4 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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for speakers who have lacked access to other channels of power.  In chapter 2, I noted 
that Christian churches regularly have assumed a right to make noise without censure.  
Church bells frequently have faded into the background, their chimes taken for granted as 
customary acoustic features of daily life.  But, as we find both in this chapter and in 
chapter 4, religious dissenters have used loudspeakers to introduce their own sounds into 
the auditory environment, to assert their own right to make noise.  And by diversifying 
the American religious soundscape, they have de-naturalized the status of those sounds 
that previously went unnoticed.  In other words, loudspeakers have functioned as vehicles 
of power, but they also have been used to amplify difference. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how the Saia case exemplified this 
tension between competing conceptions of sound and power.  On the one hand, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses used loudspeakers to make their voices heard.  They used loudspeakers to 
render religion portable, to expand the boundaries of religious space, and to enlarge the 
acoustic community constituted by their preaching.  Loudspeakers enabled these religious 
dissenters to amplify their presence to neighbors who might have preferred not to hear 
them.  But at the same time, the Witnesses caused a public nuisance, disturbed the peace, 
and infringed on the rights of unwilling listeners.  Critics complained that the Witnesses 
were not defining space with their sounds, but were dominating it.  They argued that at 
stake was not the Witnesses’ right to worship, but rather their own right to peace and 
quiet.  Participants in the Lockport dispute thus debated whether this case centered on 
concerns about religion or about noise, about discrimination against an unpopular 
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religious minority or about preserving the public peace.  Through this dispute, contestants 
debated the limits of religious freedom and toleration.4
The Saia case called on the Supreme Court to adjudicate for the first time a 
dispute about religious noise, and I briefly examine the Court’s decision in the final 
section of this chapter.  The Court overturned Saia’s conviction, though it did so in a way 
that sidestepped the religious issue almost entirely, settling the case instead on free 
speech grounds.  The Court thus affirmed Saia’s right to make his voice heard, but it 
avoided determining whether religious freedom might entail a right to make noise.  It did 
not make space for religious sounds defined as such.  My primary interest in this chapter 
is not to consider Saia’s implications for First Amendment jurisprudence, however, but to 
attend to how Lockport residents heard and framed what they understood as at stake.  As 
in other chapters, I consider how disputants contested religion’s place in their 
community’s public life.5
In the first section of this chapter, I briefly narrate a history of Lockport’s 
Christian institutions, focusing on their vitality and their variety.  Jehovah’s Witnesses 
tested the limits of Lockport’s postwar ecumenical spirit, I suggest.  In the next section, I 
                                                 
4In his discussion of loudspeakers’ effects on acoustic space, Paul Rodaway differentiates between 
“defining space by sound” and “dominating space with sound.”  Sensuous Geographies: Body, Sense, and 
Place (London: Routledge, 1994), 108.  I should emphasize that discrimination was not as overt in the Saia 
case as it was in many other cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses from the 1940s.  The Lockport Witnesses 
faced no violent attacks, and park-goers denied having paid any attention to the content of the Witnesses’ 
lectures. 
5My approach thus differs from works such as McAninch, “Catalyst”; Philip B. Kurland, “The Right to 
Proselyte,” chap. 6 in Religion and the Law: Of Church and State and the Supreme Court (Chicago: Aldine 
Pub. Co., 1962), 50-74; Newton, Armed with the Constitution; Mazur, The Americanization of Religious 
Minorities; and Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses.  McAninch, Kurland, Newton, and Peters each focus 
more on the implications of Witness-related cases for First Amendment jurisprudence.  Mazur concentrates 
on how the interaction of Witnesses with the American constitutional order shaped both Witness traditions 
and the legal order.  At times in this chapter, I consider how this case related to other Witness-related cases, 
but I am more interested in situating this case within a history of religious noise disputes, rather than within 
a history of disputes about Witness practices. 
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argue that Jehovah’s Witnesses used new acoustic technologies to expand the boundaries 
of religious space and of communal membership.  But I also consider the ways that these 
auditory practices infringed on the rights of others, accounting, only in part, for the 
widespread hostility that Witnesses encountered during the 1940s.  I then situate the 
Lockport dispute within a brief history of twentieth-century noise legislation.  The Saia 
case emerged as an unintended consequence of regulatory efforts that had not considered 
potential implications for American religious life—for religion practiced out loud.  
Municipal anti-noise ordinances aimed to protect the public from unwanted sounds, but 
they tended to target particular classes of noisemakers who threatened social order.  They 
could be used to produce city streets on which only certain types of sounds would be 
tolerated. 
As I then turn to the arguments advanced at Saia’s trials, I focus on how 
participants contested whether this case centered on religion or noise.  I attend especially 
to three themes through which disputants debated whether Jehovah’s Witnesses were 
amplifying difference or dominating space with sound.  First, I listen to debates about 
whether civil law or religious law authorized the Witnesses to make noise.  Through this 
disagreement, disputants contested whether religious sounds essentially were different 
from non-religious sounds.  Second, I listen to debates about whether noise complaints 
targeted loud sounds or unwanted messages.  Park-goers denied paying any attention to 
the content of the Witnesses’ lectures, but the Witnesses noted the other religious sounds 
that dominated Lockport’s acoustic space and alleged discrimination against the sounds 
of religious dissent.  Finally, I listen to debates about whether the Witnesses’ intended 
audience included willing or unwilling listeners.  Disputants disagreed about whether 
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they should be able to choose which sounds they would have to hear in public.  Through 
each of these debates, disputants contested whether the Witnesses’ loudspeakers 
amplified difference or dominated space with sound.  They debated whether the 
Witnesses’ public preaching constituted religion or noise.  And through these differences, 
I propose, they advanced competing conceptions of religion and of its normative 
boundaries.  They contested where and when religion belonged and what made it sound 
out of place.   
 
A Christian Enterprise of “Vast Proportions” 
The Lockport Public Library local history collection includes a mid-twentieth 
century drawing titled “Church Steeples of Lockport.”  In the sketch, the artist has 
depicted nine local church steeples, which represented the town’s denominational and 
architectural variety and which served as its most prominent visual markers.  Located in 
the northwest corner of New York, approximately twenty miles from Niagara Falls and 
thirty miles from Buffalo, the small city of Lockport has housed a myriad of religious 
institutions nearly since its inception.  In 1934, the Reverend Harry A. Bergen of 
Lockport’s Plymouth Congregational Church highlighted the town’s denominational 
diversity as a source of its civic identity and strength.  “Do you know that there are at 
least thirteen denominational groups functioning in the city of Lockport at the present 
time?” Bergen inquired rhetorically, “That in our city of approximately 25,000 
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population there are 25 church buildings?...The Christian enterprise in this city is one of 
vast proportions.”6
Lockport’s religious variety reflected the town’s particular patterns of settlement 
and growth.  Most significantly, Lockport’s history was tied to the construction of the 
Erie Canal in the 1810s and 20s.  The city was founded at the site of the five locks that 
“lifted” the Canal sixty feet, raising it to the level of Lake Erie.  Hailed as a technological 
marvel and a feat of modern engineering, the locks gave Lockport its name and led to its 
designation as the seat of Niagara County in 1822.  Land speculators and migrant 
laborers drove Lockport’s rapid growth and also built its first religious institutions.  In 
1816, a group of Quaker families settled in the area.  Their meetinghouse constituted 
Lockport’s first church, and their religious values “set the spiritual tone of the community 
from the outset,” including a commitment to religious toleration.  Within two decades of 
the Canal’s construction, Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Lutherans, 
and Congregationalists all had built churches in Lockport.  Lockport residents 
participated in the religious revivals that swept through New York’s “burned-over 
district” during the Second Great Awakening, and, like other communities in the area, 
experienced Protestant proliferation and fragmentation.  Religious institutions engaged in 
benevolent work, aiming to attend to the spiritual needs of canal workers, and Lockport 
became an important seat both for the antebellum abolitionist and temperance 
movements.  Irish laborers also brought Roman Catholicism to the area, building 
Lockport’s first parish in 1834.  Catholic residents faced some bigotry and 
                                                 
6Manning McCandlish, “Church Steeples of Lockport,” n.d., Lockport Churches (General) File, Local 
History Collection, Lockport Public Library, Lockport, NY.  Rev. Bergen is quoted in Kathleen L. Riley, 
Lockport: Historic Jewel of the Erie Canal (Charleston, SC: Arcadia, 2005), 104. 
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discrimination, and religious, ethnic, and class tensions occasionally erupted into conflict.  
But Lockport’s Catholic community continued to grow and thrive.  The Irish laborers 
were followed by German immigrants in the mid-nineteenth century and by Italian 
immigrants in the early twentieth century, who built their own national parishes and 
helped to secure a place for Roman Catholics within the broader community.  By 1934, 
Rev. Bergen could celebrate a religious landscape characterized by institutional strength, 
denominational diversity, and ecumenical cooperation.7
During the first half of the twentieth century, Lockport was transformed into a 
manufacturing city.  Its leading companies produced a wide range of goods, including 
radiators, steel, textiles, leather, and plumbing supplies.  While the city was not 
unaffected by the Depression, its factories contributed greatly to the war effort, and 
Lockport emerged from World War II with a revitalized economy, a bustling commercial 
downtown, and a sense of optimism about its future.  Its religious institutions also 
thrived, as Lockport residents attended church in high numbers.  A 1955 study found 
twenty-six churches or other houses of worship in the city, representing fourteen 
denominations.  Out of a total population of twenty-five thousand residents, over twenty-
one thousand claimed to belong to a religious congregation, split almost evenly between 
                                                 
7Riley, Lockport, 24.  For histories of Lockport, see Riley, Lockport; Paulette Peca, Lockport (Charleston, 
SC: Arcadia, 2003).  Kathleen Riley is an historian of American Catholicism and focuses especially on 
Lockport’s religious history.  For other sources on Lockport’s religious history, see “Mrs. Frank Patten 
Tells Lockport Church History,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, November 21, 1934; and the 
Lockport Churches File, Local History Collection, Lockport Public Library, Lockport, NY.  For classic 
studies of the Burned-Over District, see Whitney R. Cross, The Burned-Over District: The Social and 
Intellectual History of Enthusiastic Religion in Western New York, 1800-1850 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1950); Paul E. Johnson, A Shopkeeper’s Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 
1815-1837, 1st rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004).  For histories of the Erie Canal, see George E. 
Condon, Stars in the Water: The Story of the Erie Canal (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974); Carol 
Sheriff, The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of Progress, 1817-1862 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1996); Peter L. Bernstein, Wedding of the Waters: The Erie Canal and the Making of a Great 
Nation (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005). 
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Roman Catholicism and various white mainline Protestant denominations (primarily 
Methodist, Baptist, Episcopal, Lutheran, and Presbyterian).  Little tension existed 
between the city’s religious communities.  Instead, Lockport seemed swept up in the 
ecumenical spirit that marked postwar American religious life.   Lockport’s residents 
generally cared little about which church one attended, provided one attended a church.8
This ecumenical spirit was reinforced through a variety of channels.  The 
Lockport Federation of Churches encouraged interdenominational cooperation, 
particularly through its joint Lenten churches that brought together the city’s leading 
Protestant churches.  A Catholic priest contributed a weekly column to the local 
newspaper, clarifying Catholic beliefs and customs for its Catholic and non-Catholic 
audiences alike.  And a series of editorials in the local newspaper also reinforced this 
ecumenical spirit.  For example, a 1949 editorial encouraged Lockport residents to 
support the city’s churches financially, but emphasized that “we are not particularly 
interested in the church to which an individual belongs. This is a matter for each person 
to decide for himself.  Some persons like religion served one way and some like it 
otherwise.”  A 1947 editorial argued that public officials should not use their positions to 
promote the practices of any particular church, but should be guided, in general, by 
religious principles.  “I am for religion,” the writer concluded, “and against all religions.”  
Anticipating President Eisenhower’s memorable assertion that “In other words, our form 
of government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I 
                                                 
8On Lockport’s manufacturing and commercial history, see Lockport Board of Commerce, Lockport Today 
(Lockport, NY: Lockport Board of Commerce, 1935), 35-6; Lockport/Eastern Niagara Chamber of 
Commerce, Lockport—to the Canal and Beyond: A History of Lockport’s Settlement and Growth 
(Lockport, NY: Lockport/Eastern Niagara Chamber of Commerce, n.d.); Peca, Lockport, 7-9.  For the 1955 
study, see Nancy A. Disinger, “The Government of Lockport, New York,” 1956, Lockport Box, Lockport 
Local History Collection, Lockport Public Library, Lockport, NY. 
116 
don’t care what it is,” the newspaper’s editors encouraged a vague religious sentiment 
that could be mutually affirmed both by Lockport’s Protestant and Catholic 
communities.9
Above all, the editors of the Lockport Union-Sun & Journal emphasized the civic 
virtues of religious adherence and located religious life firmly within the walls of its 
institutional structures.  “The great task of civilization,” a 1946 editorial began, “is the 
making of finer human beings.  This is also the aim of Lockport whether we always 
realize it or not…Probably the greatest single agency for the advancement of mankind is 
the church…Going to church may or may not be a necessity to what is termed ‘salvation,’ 
but it is a source of comfort and solace to millions every week in the United States.”  The 
newspaper’s editors valued religious worship not for its soteriological promise, but for its 
cultivation of those values necessary for living a better life.  “Basically, religion is faith 
in spiritual values and the approach to life’s problems in the light of those values…,” 
another editorial declared, “That needed faith can be kept alive by the institutions which 
religion has created—the churches…There is no one who reads these lines who does not 
owe far more in happiness, in security, and in success to institutions of religion than they 
have received from the individual.  If you don’t believe this, just try to imagine Lockport 
                                                 
9“Churches Deserve Wholehearted Support,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, June 4, 1949; “Officials 
and Religion,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, October 20, 1947.  On the Lockport Federation of 
Churches, see “Church Council Holds Same Aims Nearly 34 Years,” 1955, Lockport Churches (General) 
File, Local History Collection, Lockport Public Library, Lockport, NY.  For an illuminating discussion of 
the different ways that Eisenhower’s quotation has been rendered and interpreted, see Patrick Henry, “‘And 
I Don’t Care What It Is’: The Tradition-History of a Civil Religion Proof-Text,” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 49 (March 1981): 35-49.  In my choice of wording, I have followed Henry’s 
reconstruction of what Eisenhower most likely said on December 22, 1952.  Interpreting Eisenhower’s 
comments as recognition of the deep religious roots of democracy, Henry notes that “Eisenhower’s 
statement leaves open the possibility that there might be, for instance, a Buddhist democracy” (41).  
Despite his use of religiously neutral language, however, Eisenhower was clearly locating the roots of 
American democracy in Judeo-Christian principles. 
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as a churchless city.”  The newspaper’s editors hailed the city’s religious institutions as 
sources of civic pride, strength, and identity.10
Lockport’s postwar spirit of religious toleration seemed premised on the 
assumption that religion had a proper time and place.  Although religious practice 
occasionally spilled over into the streets, particularly in the form of Roman Catholic 
festivals and processions, religious worship in Lockport generally meant going to church 
on Sunday.  “Sunday was a ritual,” recalls one long-time Protestant Lockport resident, 
“You go to a church.  That’s the way it was with me and, of course, I thought everybody 
got up on Sunday morning and went to church because that’s just what we always did.”  
Another long-time Catholic resident has expressed his feeling that “with the practice of 
religion and faith, its greatest impact is when we see love and goodness and then find out 
that you’re a Christian…You don’t have to broadcast that you are a Christian…[that] 
would be far better than trying to force [it] on someone…”  Sectarian differences were 
best managed by keeping them to oneself, this speaker implied.  Yet not all religious 
adherents agreed.  And not all religious adherents confined their worship to the 
institutional setting of a church.  Local Jehovah’s Witnesses brought their religious 
practice to Lockport’s public parks.  Could these also constitute religious spaces?  When 
Jehovah’s Witnesses began to broadcast their sectarian differences for all to hear, they 
tested the limits of Lockport’s ecumenical toleration.11
                                                 
10“Church Plays its Part,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, July 13, 1946; “Easter Calls for 
Consideration of Year-Around Devotion,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, April 20, 1946. 
11Lockport’s Roman Catholic churches made annual requests to the city’s Common Council to block off 
the surrounding streets for public processions or festivals.  For example, see Proceedings of the Common 
Council and Municipal Boards of the City of Lockport, Niagara County, New York for Municipal Year 
1946 (Lockport, NY: Lockport Common Council, 1946), 287, 319.  For the recollections of long-time 
Lockport residents, see Joseph Dumphrey, interview by Dave Marmon, August 23, 2005, transcript, Oral 
Histories of Lockport, Lockport Public Library, Lockport, NY. 
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 Spiritual Hearing and the Limits of Toleration 
On four consecutive Sunday afternoons in September 1946, Lockport police 
officers arrested Samuel Saia for using loudspeakers in a public park without a permit.  
Saia had obtained permission to operate his sound car on previous occasions, but his 
renewal application had been rejected after the police department reported complaints.  
Saia decided to proceed with the September park meetings nonetheless, knowing that he 
might face imprisonment.  Saia seemed an unlikely candidate, perhaps, to insist on his 
right to preach publicly.  A fifty-two year old immigrant from Sicily, Saia spoke broken 
English and worked as a garbage collector in Buffalo.  He had settled there with his wife 
and children shortly after serving in World War I.  Saia was raised a Catholic and had 
never read the Bible before arriving in the United States.  But during the 1920s, he 
became friendly with a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and started to attend their 
meetings.  He began to read the Bible for himself and was attracted to the Witnesses’ 
teachings, for he deemed them to be more in line with the Bible than were the doctrines 
of the Catholic Church.  In 1935, Saia purchased electronic sound equipment, which he 
affixed to the roof of his Studebaker.  He would drive up and down the streets of various 
upstate New York towns, broadcasting recorded sermons on phonograph records.  
Because he never felt confident about his English, Saia often brought his son, Joseph, 
along with him.  Joseph would speak through a microphone, announcing the times and 
locations of upcoming Witness meetings.  On Sundays, Saia typically would park his car 
in local public parks and invite other Witnesses to use his equipment in order to preach 
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the good news of God’s kingdom.  On the days that Saia faced arrest, he never spoke 
over the loudspeakers himself.12
Since 1933, sound cars, or cars equipped with electronic amplification devices, 
had offered Jehovah’s Witnesses an important means for spreading God’s word.  
Founded in the 1870s, Jehovah’s Witnesses believed that the apocalypse and dawning of 
a new age were imminent.  They followed the teachings of Charles Taze Russell, who 
came to be regarded as a prophet and who built the movement’s central organization, the 
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society.  Under Russell’s leadership, Witnesses focused on 
preparing themselves for the apocalypse through what they described as “character-
building.”  But Russell’s successor, “Judge” Joseph Rutherford, emphasized instead the 
obligation to proselytize publicly and to vindicate Jehovah’s name.  He understood 
evangelism as the means by which God’s elect would be separated from those who would 
be damned.  During the 1920s, Witnesses came to regard public preaching as a “sacred 
duty” and as “essentially the means by which Jehovah’s Witnesses get saved.”  Instead of 
attending church services on Sunday morning, Witnesses adopted proselytizing as their 
“highest form of worship.”  Beginning in 1928, Judge Rutherford explicitly encouraged 
Witnesses to engage in evangelizing activities on Sundays, arguing that the Sabbath was 
intended as a day of rest only for the Israelites, not for Christians.  “I consider it my 
Christian duty to preach the Gospel, not by standing up in church and preaching,” one 
                                                 
12Joseph Saia, interview by author, August 14, 2008.  The Watch Tower Society established the Gilead 
School in 1943 to train ministers and improve proselytizing techniques.  With the school’s opening, the 
Society increasingly encouraged ministers to preach for themselves, rather than play recorded sermons on 
portable phonograph players.  See Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, Jehovah Witnesses in the Divine 
Purpose (Brooklyn, NY: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, 1959), 213-4; James M. Penton, Apocalypse 
Delayed: The Story of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 83-4.  
Jacques Attali argues that phonograph machines channelized “the discourses of power” by preserving and 
replicating the words of political leaders.  While this was the case for the Witnesses in the 1930s and early 
40s, it seems to have shifted by the mid-40s.  Attali, Noise, 92. 
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Iowa Witness explained in 1940, “but by going from house to house with literature and 
asking people if they will read it.”  Employing house calls, pamphlets, magazines, 
booklets, phonograph records, radio broadcasts, sound cars, and a variety of other means, 
Witnesses urged their neighbors to prepare for Armageddon.13
“Witnessing” implies a visual orientation to God’s message, but Watch Tower 
Society publications also laid out an auditory path to salvation.  Preaching was to open 
formerly deaf ears; it was to provide new audiences with an opportunity to hear the truth 
of God’s kingdom and thus to join the elect.  “So it becomes plain how important it is to 
have an ear for God’s Word and how important it is to preach it,” a 1954 article 
explained, “because preaching leads to hearing, and hearing to salvation.”  A 1941 essay 
even imagined the apocalypse as an acoustic event.  “Jehovah God caused the walls of 
Jericho to fall down flat at the sound of a multitude of human voices, the voices of His 
then witnesses in the earth…,” this writer recalled, “But the great shout is yet to come, 
and is sure to come, whatever be its form.”  Hearing was at the heart of the Witness 
enterprise.  “Jehovah’s witnesses,” the 1941 article continued, “go about the earth with 
the witness by word of mouth, by sound-car, by phonograph, by radio…and sound enters 
into it all.”  But hearing was both a physical and a spiritual sense, for listeners had to be 
trained how to hear properly.  Spiritual hearing required one to be open to the word of 
God.  It required faith, love of righteousness, and humility.  These Watch Tower 
                                                 
13Penton, Apocalypse Delayed, 32.  The Iowa Witness is quoted in Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
32.  My understanding of Jehovah’s Witness history, beliefs, and social organization has been shaped 
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form of worship, see Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, Divine Purpose, 129, 177.  For examples of 
Watchtower publications that discuss the “true” meaning and purpose of the Sabbath, see “Real Time of 
Rest,” Watchtower (August 15, 1939): 252-4; “No Sabbath Day for Christians,” Awake! (August 22, 1956): 
5-8. 
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publications emphasized that hearing—and thus salvation—implied a necessary 
relationship between speaker and listener.  A preacher required a receptive audience; an 
evangelist only could offer the opportunity for election.  “After that,” instructed a 1948 
article, “it is up to the one to whom the message is presented to ‘hear’ it, that is, accept it 
into a good and honest heart with humility, faith, and obedience.”  Spiritual hearing 
required an ear that could distinguish “truth” and “genuineness” from the “great variety 
of sounds” to which one typically listens.  God’s word was not just a sound like any 
other, the Witnesses taught.14
Witnesses made use of a variety of new electronic media in order to make heard 
the sound of God’s word.  During the 1920s and 30s, Judge Rutherford broadcast radio 
sermons directly into listeners’ homes.  Rutherford evinced particular scorn for Roman 
Catholics, and he frequently colored his speeches with anti-Catholic invectives.  Catholic 
organizations initiated a campaign to keep Rutherford off the air, and Rutherford 
responded by advocating the increased use of portable phonographs and sound cars 
instead, each of which could be used to amplify recordings of his sermons.  Each of these 
media—radio, phonographs, and sound cars—made religion portable and radically 
expanded the boundaries of its acoustic territory.  Radio rendered physical proximity 
between speaker and hearer unnecessary.  Phonographs could be played at any time, 
eliminating the need even for temporal congruence, and the acoustic range of sound cars 
would shift continually as they were driven.  As the composer R. Murray Schafer has 
argued in his analysis of “the electric revolution,” with the “radio, sound was no longer 
                                                 
14For examples of articles on spiritual hearing, see “Sound and the Human Ear,” Consolation (October 15, 
1941): 3-8; “Hearing Ears,” Watchtower (May 1, 1948): 131-9; “Do You Have Hearing Ears?” Watchtower 
(May 15, 1952): 293-6; “An Ear for God’s Word,” Awake! (November 8, 1954): 25-6. 
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tied to its original point in space; with the phonograph it was released from its original 
point in time.”  These transformations in the modes of transmitting sound could bear 
implications for defining the boundaries of religious communities.  In chapter 2, I 
suggested that we might define a parish as including those within acoustic range of its 
church bells.  But deploying devices such as phonographs and sound cars meant that 
practically anyone at any time or place could be brought within range of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses’ call.  Anyone could be made part of their acoustic community, and any place 
could be made a religious space.15
Phonographs and sound cars were effective precisely on account of their 
portability.  Witnesses often would use them in towns prior to establishing a formal 
congregation or Kingdom Hall, as Witnesses named their houses of worship.  In 
Lockport, for example, Jehovah’s Witnesses began meeting in a rented downtown 
apartment on Main Street in 1947.  They converted a former store into a Kingdom Hall in 
1958 and erected a new building in 1963, which serves as Lockport’s Kingdom Hall to 
this day.  But at least as early as 1945, Samuel Saia and other local Witnesses had 
sponsored public meetings in Lockport by making use of sound cars in the city’s public 
parks.  And they were not alone.  While Witnesses tended to emphasize door-to-door 
canvassing and private Bible study, the Watch Tower Society’s Yearbook for 1947 
counted 101,632 public meetings held that year all over the world in “auditoriums, public 
parks, and other open-air meeting places.”16
                                                 
15Schafer, Soundscape, 89.  On the Witnesses’ shift from radio to phonographs and sound cars, see 
“Modern History of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Part 13: Champions of Freedom of Speech and Worship,” 
Watchtower (July 1, 1955): 392-5; Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, Divine Purpose, 129. 
16Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 1948 Yearbook of Jehovah’s Witnesses containing report for the 
service year of 1947 (Brooklyn, NY: Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 1947), 24.  On Lockport’s 
Kingdom Halls, see Al Hopkins, “Church Folk Building New ‘Kingdom Hall,’” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun 
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These public meetings enabled Witnesses to preach to larger audiences than they 
could reach through individual visits.  For example, the 1947 Yearbook estimated that 
over 250,000 persons had “listened to the good news” on a single Sunday.  But sound 
cars had another advantage that differentiated them from phonographs, radio, and printed 
literature.  By amplifying their religious message with electro-acoustic loudspeakers, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses could force unwilling listeners to hear God’s truth.  In contrast, 
individuals could choose to turn on a radio or to switch stations.  They could choose 
whether or not to read a pamphlet or Bible.  They could offer their consent before 
listening to phonographs, a point that U.S. Supreme Court Justices found significant in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, a landmark case to which I will return below.  But sound cars 
and loudspeakers ensured that neighbors might have no choice but to hear the sound of 
God’s word on city streets, in public parks, and even in the comfort of their own homes.  
Several Witnesses even praised their effectiveness precisely for that reason.  “Judge 
Rutherford has the idea,” exclaimed one minister in a letter of appreciation published in 
Watchtower, “he makes them hear whether they want to or not.”  Or as another sound car 
operator reported triumphantly in The Golden Age, “He can’t get away from this.  He 
can’t shut this off as he can the radio…[he] just can’t get away from that voice. It is clear 
and distinct wherever he goes.”  Sound cars, loudspeakers, and other amplification 
devices enabled Jehovah’s Witnesses to make their voices—and the sound of God’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
& Journal, December 20, 1963; “Services of Dedication Start at Kingdom Hall,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun 
& Journal, June 12, 1965. 
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word—heard, but they also enabled Witnesses to dominate space acoustically.  Neighbors 
would hear their message, whether willingly or not.17
In the disputes that I analyze in chapters 2 and 4, religious devotees claimed only 
to be targeting like-minded audiences with their sounds.  They claimed that the purpose 
of church bells and prayer calls was simply to announce the times of services and to 
remind Christians and Muslims to pray (although this was contested by their opponents).  
In this case, however, Jehovah’s Witnesses explicitly intended the sound of their 
preaching to reach religious outsiders, potential converts who might not want to hear it.  
Yet Witnesses also could use sound cars to attract fellow religionists and to construct 
community.  Other Jehovah’s Witnesses also could hear their broadcasted calls.  
Particularly in areas without an already established Kingdom Hall, Witnesses might be 
unaware of the presence of others engaged in the same task.  Sound cars and public 
meetings could announce Witness presence not only to outsiders but to themselves.  For 
example, according to a first-person account published in The Golden Age in 1935, one 
sound-car operator was surprised when another car pulled up at the conclusion of a 
lecture.  “The occupants jump out,” he recalled, “and almost stumble over themselves to 
get to us.  It is a carload of Jehovah’s Witnesses from Brownsville.  We didn’t know they 
were there, and they didn’t know we were around, until the lecture began.  They locate 
the sound car, and everybody is happy.  On their way back they make arrangements for 
us to have our supper at Uniontown.”  Through the sounds of their preaching, Jehovah’s 
                                                 
17Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 1948 Yearbook, 24; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); 
“People Friendly After Sound Car Witness,” Watchtower (May 15, 1935): 159; Thomas A. McKnight, 
“Five Days with the Sound Car,” The Golden Age (January 16, 1935): 247-51. 
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Witnesses announced presence, fashioned collective identity, and strengthened communal 
bonds.18
This question of intended audience is significant because of the ambivalent 
attitude that Jehovah’s Witnesses have maintained toward religious outsiders.  On the one 
hand, as discussed above, Witnesses have embraced proselytizing as their highest form of 
worship, a practice that necessarily brings them into regular contact with non-Witnesses.  
But Watch Tower publications also have emphasized repeatedly a sense of alienation 
from and conflict with the world.  Jehovah’s Witnesses have tended to see themselves as 
setoff and separate from other peoples.  For example, a 1948 Watchtower article 
emphasized that what made “these peculiar people…so different” was their unswerving 
adherence to God’s law.  Ironically, Jehovah’s Witnesses defined themselves in 
opposition to the very people whom they sought to convert—the very people whom they 
hoped would respond to their call.  The sounds of their preaching might attract new 
members, but also might strengthen Witnesses’ own sense of being different.19
In part, the Witnesses’ sense of being set apart and different emerged from their 
belief that the end of the world was imminent and that only the elect would be saved.  But 
their sense of alienation also was shaped by the persecution and discrimination that they 
regularly faced.   Their distinct identity was thus forged in part through their interactions 
with often hostile, and sometimes violent, religious others.  During the 1930s and 40s, 
many Americans criticized Jehovah’s Witnesses as unpatriotic because of their refusal to 
                                                 
18McKnight, “Five Days with the Sound Car,” 249.  For other essays that similarly emphasize how 
religious communities construct collective identity through public performances, see Robert A. Orsi, ed., 
Gods of the City: Religion and the American Urban Landscape (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
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19“Why They Are So Different in 1948,” Watchtower (January 1, 1948): 3-12.  For more on Witness 
alienation and separation from the world, see Penton, Apocalypse Delayed, 138-41, 154-6. 
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salute the flag, recite the Pledge of Allegiance, or serve in the military.  In a wartime 
atmosphere, they were suspected of being Communists, traitors, or worse.  But Witnesses 
also faced virulent opposition to their proselytizing activities.  Some critics felt that 
witnessing on Sundays desecrated the Sabbath.  Others were offended by the content of 
their religious message, which frequently assailed other faiths.  And some opponents 
simply insisted on their right to be left alone, undisturbed by the sounds of public 
preaching.  Witnesses were confrontational in their methods, and some observers accused 
them of courting trouble purposefully.  Even a champion of the Witnesses’ civil liberties 
described them as “a peculiarly aggressive, even obnoxious set of people, at least as 
judged by ordinary standards of polite, conventional life.”  Witnesses often would 
broadcast Judge Rutherford’s incendiary sermons in what they knew were predominantly 
Catholic neighborhoods.  In one case, they even built an armor-plated sound car in order 
to broadcast anti-Catholic invectives to a hostile Quebec audience.  Through their public 
proselytizing, Witnesses tested the limits of religious toleration and of religious freedom.  
Many observers agreed with U.S. Supreme Court Justice Jackson, who wrote in a 1944 
decision, “I think the limits [on religious freedom] begin to operate whenever activities 
begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public.”20
                                                 
20Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses, 33; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177-78 (1944) (Jackson, 
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During the 1940s, Jehovah’s Witnesses frequently faced mob violence, but they 
also encountered a series of legal obstacles.  Municipalities dusted off a wide range of 
rarely enforced statutes and ordinances in order to block the Witnesses from engaging in 
public proselytizing.  Witnesses responded with an impressively organized legal 
counterattack.  From 1938 to 1946, they brought nearly forty cases to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  They contended that their activities were protected by the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, which guaranteed the freedoms of religion, speech, assembly, and 
press.  As the historian Shawn Francis Peters has argued, these cases helped “to set the 
stage for a revolution in constitutional jurisprudence.”  While the Witnesses did not win 
all of these cases, their success on the whole had a profound impact “by helping to bring 
minority and individual rights—areas long overlooked by the Supreme Court—out of the 
shadows and into the forefront of constitutional jurisprudence.”  Perhaps most significant 
was the 1940 case, Cantwell v. Connecticut, in which the Supreme Court “completed the 
important task of incorporating the First Amendment’s protections of speech, press, and 
religion into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus shielding those 
rights from infringement by the states.”  Jehovah’s Witnesses defended their own rights, 
but they also expanded the scope of civil liberty protections for all Americans.21
By 1946, when Samuel Saia was arrested for operating his sound car in 
Lockport’s Outwater Park, the tide of Witness-related cases had somewhat subsided.  In 
fact, historians Shawn Francis Peters and Merlin Owen Newton each conclude their 
important studies of Witness legal battles in that year.  Among other rights, Witnesses 
had successfully defended their freedom to distribute printed literature, to canvass door-
                                                 
21Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses, 13, 15.  Also see Newton, Armed with the Constitution; Henderson, 
“Jehovah’s Witnesses.” 
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to-door, and to play phonographs for willing listeners without obtaining a permit from 
municipal authorities.  But for at least the next seven years, Witnesses faced continued 
efforts to bar them from holding open-air meetings in public parks and from operating 
sound cars or other amplification devices, with related cases reaching the Supreme Court 
in 1948, 1951, and 1953.  As the Watch Tower Society Yearbook reported in 1948, “The 
biggest opposition experienced in the field has been because of the public meetings in 
parks and halls.”  Communities seemed to be drawing a line at this practice, putting up 
with individual solicitation but resisting these public gatherings.  In large part, I propose, 
the use of city parks and sound cars seemed different because of their unparalleled 
potential to dominate space acoustically, subjecting unwilling listeners to sounds that 
they did not want to hear and transforming public places into religious spaces.  As I noted 
above, the defendants in the Cantwell case obtained consent before playing portable 
phonographs for passersby on the street.  Individuals also could choose whom to admit 
into their homes.  But broadcasting religious messages over loudspeakers took away this 
critical element of choice.  Witnesses risked infringing on the rights of others to a much 
greater extent.  In striving to make their voices heard, they could become aural 
aggressors.22
                                                 
22Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 1948 Yearbook, 50-51.  For their explanations of why they 
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At least as early as 1937, Witness leaders had acknowledged that the use of sound 
cars and loudspeakers might be different from other proselytizing activities.  In an essay 
that offered practical instructions for ministers in the field, one author celebrated sound 
cars as “one of the many effective instruments provided by the Lord for the proper 
execution of the witness in this the Lord’s day.”  But, he cautioned, they were “also one 
instrument that [had] to be handled with care…,” for “the use of sound equipment [was] 
different.  When you park a sound car on the street and start broadcasting you are to a 
certain extent infringing on the right of the people to peace and quietness.”  This author 
advocated “good judgment in sound-car operation,” warning ministers not to broadcast 
overly incendiary messages that might prove counter-productive to their ends.  And he 
even suggested that sound cars might reasonably be prohibited altogether.  “If Ceasar 
says ‘no broadcasting on Sunday,’” he concluded, “we go elsewhere on that day. If 
Caesar says ‘no broadcasting in town at all’, we remain silent in the community.”23
But by 1946, buoyed by their many successes before the Supreme Court, 
Witnesses had grown more aggressive in asserting and defending their liberties.  Watch 
Tower publications trumpeted a right to be heard and denied that there might be a 
corresponding right “to be let alone…in a public place.”  Witnesses defended their right 
to operate sound cars, use electro-acoustic loudspeakers, and hold public park meetings 
                                                                                                                                                 
Amendment guaranteed them the right to choose the extent to which they would be exposed to the sounds 
of religious difference. 
23O.R. Moyle, “Counsel to Publishers,” Consolation (November 3, 1937):5-15.  The author acknowledged 
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because they saw these as indispensable means for a minority group to make its voice 
heard, not as instruments for “sound imperialism.”  But municipal authorities grew 
equally determined to block Witnesses from engaging in such practices.  In many cases, 
state actions clearly were motivated by animus against a sect perceived as obnoxious, 
unpatriotic, and subversive.  For example, when Jehovah’s Witnesses attempted to hold a 
series of public meetings in Locona, Iowa, in September 1946, they were physically 
attacked by a mob that was angered by Witnesses’ refusal to salute the flag or to serve in 
the military.  But other cases were more complicated, offering less clear evidence of overt 
hostility.  When Samuel Saia operated his sound car in Lockport that same month, he was 
prosecuted under a municipal noise ordinance that regulated the use of loud speakers.  As 
we will see, complainants in this case denied paying any attention to the content of Saia’s 
lectures.  They denied any animus against Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Instead, they claimed 
merely to be “annoyed” because the sounds of his sermons were disrupting conversations 
and disturbing the park’s peaceful atmosphere.  But Saia justified his actions in the name 
of religious freedom and freedom of speech and contended that he was being treated 
unfairly.  In the lawsuit that followed, the Supreme Court would rule for the first time on 
whether the First Amendment protected the use of sound cars and electronic amplifying 
devices.  In order to do so, U.S. judges would be asked to determine whether public 
proselytizing constituted religion or noise—and whether that distinction bore any 
constitutional relevance.24
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 Regulating Loudspeakers 
The Lockport police arrested Samuel Saia for violating sections 2 and 3 of 
Lockport Penal Ordinance No. 38, “Prohibiting Unnecessary and Unusual Noises,” which 
stated: 
Section 2.  Radio devices, etc.—It shall be unlawful for any person to maintain 
and operate in any building, or on any premises or on any automobile, motor truck 
or other motor vehicle, any radio device, mechanical device, or loud speaker or 
any device of any kind whereby the sound therefrom is cast directly upon the 
streets and public places and where such device is maintained for advertising 
purposes or for the purpose of attracting the attention of the passing public, or 
which is so placed and operated that the sounds coming therefrom can be heard to 
the annoyance or inconvenience of travelers upon any streets or public places or 
of persons in neighboring premises. 
 
Section 3.  Exception.—Public dissemination, through radio, loudspeakers, of 
items of news and matters of public concern and athletic activities shall not be 
deemed a violation of this section provided that the same be done under 
permission obtained from the Chief of Police.25
 
The Lockport Common Council had adopted this ordinance on December 3, 1945.  
In many cases, Jehovah’s Witnesses rightly accused municipal authorities of crafting new 
regulations expressly to target their proselytizing activities, but there is no evidence of 
such intent in the Lockport case.  The city code had not been revised since 1913.  
Ordinance No. 38 was one of twelve new regulations that the council adopted on the 
same night as part of an effort to bring the code up to date.  According to the Lockport 
Union-Sun & Journal, the anti-noise ordinance was prompted by complaints about a wide 
range of city sounds, including the loud playing of musical instruments, the blaring of 
emergency sirens, the blasting of car horns, and even the jingling of tin cans attached to 
the cars of newlyweds.  Approved exceptions to the law were expected to include 
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“announcements of Lockport High School and other athletic events as well as salvage, 
charity, and bond campaign appeals.”  No one involved in the discussions about the 
ordinance appears to have had the Jehovah’s Witnesses in mind, nor did anyone seem to 
anticipate that this law might bear implications for any of Lockport’s religious 
communities.  It did not occur to the bill’s drafters that religion ever might constitute 
noise.26
This inattention to religion seems consistent with the flurry of anti-noise 
ordinances that U.S. municipalities adopted during the first half of the twentieth century.  
In the nineteenth century, noise had been regulated under more general nuisance laws, as 
in the St. Mark’s church bells case.  Complainants had to demonstrate that particular 
sounds interfered materially with their reasonable enjoyment of property or with the 
ordinary comfort of life.  This is how most of the neighbors in the St. Mark’s case had 
framed their complaints, describing the sound of St. Mark’s bells as a particular source of 
personal distress.  But several of the physicians in that case had gone further and had 
associated the ringing of St. Mark’s bells with other acoustic annoyances of industrial 
life.  Over the next few decades, urban noise problems became increasingly contentious 
matters of public debate as even some industrial sounds came under attack.  By the 
beginning of the twentieth century, many communities heard noise not as a private 
nuisance, but as a threat to the general welfare and as a problem requiring a distinctive 
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public policy.  Legislation provided an important means for combating the growing 
crisis.27
From the early 1900s until World War I, citizen groups waged an organized legal 
campaign against urban noise.  As historian Emily Thompson has suggested, “‘Noise 
reform’ was part of a larger program of reform that included urban planning, public 
health programs, and other progressive efforts to apply expert knowledge to the problems 
of the modern city.”  Noise reformers concentrated their attacks on “unnecessary” noise, 
which they criticized for its health risks, for its inefficiency, and for its association with 
“barbarism.”  Unnecessary noise had to be eliminated, they argued, for it stood in 
opposition to civilization, progress, and growth.  In 1906, the wife of a wealthy 
businessman and publisher, Julia Barnett Rice, organized the Society for the Suppression 
of Unnecessary Noise in New York City, and she successfully persuaded a New York 
congressman to introduce federal legislation that would prohibit the unnecessary 
sounding of whistles in ports and harbors.  Legislative remedies were more typically 
sought at the local level, however, and by 1913, cities across the country had adopted 
municipal ordinances that specifically prohibited certain “excessive” or “unnecessary” 
noises.28
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(February 2001): 37-70.  Influenced by his own concerns in the 1970s, Smilor (like Schafer) treats this 
early anti-noise campaign as a forerunner to the movement for environmental regulation.  He offers two 
reasons for why anti-noise legislation was pursued at the local level: 1) local conditions shaped which 
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These early statutes tended not to restrict noise in general, but rather specific 
types of sounds.  A 1913 report compiled by the Municipal Reference Library of Chicago 
identified five broad categories of legislation: occupational noises (those sounds that 
individuals made in carrying out their jobs), motor vehicles (related especially to the use 
of horns and mufflers), steam whistles, the sounds of animals and fowls, and zones of 
quiet.  The latter category regulated the production of noise in specifically designated 
areas, usually next to hospitals, schools, and occasionally churches.  Within these broader 
categories, however, there could be some variability from city to city, depending on local 
circumstances.  For example, the city of New Bedford, Massachusetts, expressly targeted 
“vendors of ice cream, fish, fruit or vegetables,” while Washington, D.C., went after 
itinerant street musicians.29
Although these municipal ordinances constituted the most prominent means 
through which early noise reformers pursued their goals, they were not overly effective.  
Legislative action was hampered by the reluctance of individuals to complain about their 
neighbors and by the intrinsic difficulties in defining “noise.”  The standards by which 
sounds were deemed “excessive,” “unnecessary,” or “disagreeable” were inherently 
subjective and varied from case to case and from court to court.  Reform efforts were 
further hindered by public ambivalence about the problem of noise.  On the one hand, 
critics associated noise with inefficiency, waste, and barbarism.  But, as I discussed in 
chapter 2, listeners also associated industrial sounds with material progress and 
                                                                                                                                                 
sounds were targeted as noise; 2) it was easier to mobilize public support on the local level.  Bijsterveld 
studies anti-noise campaigns in Europe as well as in the United States. 
29Anti-Noise Ordinances of Various Cities (Chicago, IL: Municipal Reference Library, 1913).  Also see 
Smilor, “Personal Boundaries,” 31; Thompson, Soundscape of Modernity, 127. 
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technological advancement.  Not everyone was convinced that all noises should be 
eliminated.  Noise could signify the disruption of public order and social hierarchies, but 
it also could serve as a vehicle of power, for only certain groups could make noise 
without censure.  In fact, these municipal ordinances tended to reflect middle-class 
values, targeting specific classes of noise-makers, rather than urban noise in general.  
They most frequently went after street hawkers and pushcart peddlers, whom middle-
class reformers regarded as a threat to their dreams of a well-ordered, rationally 
organized modern city.  As would become a point of contention in the Saia case, anti-
noise ordinances thus could be used to produce city streets on which only certain types of 
voices and sounds would be tolerated.30
  Anti-noise reformers complemented their legislative efforts with public 
education initiatives, which used moral suasion to inculcate a new “noise etiquette,” and 
with zoning policies, which aimed to reorganize the city spatially, restricting certain 
sounds to certain areas.  But a second wave of noise abatement campaigns, which peaked 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s, increasingly turned to scientists and engineers to 
combat the problem of urban noise.  For example, New York City’s Noise Abatement 
Commission, organized in 1929, dispatched teams of acoustic technicians throughout the 
city in specially designed trucks in order to survey systematically the sounds of the city.  
These acoustic experts developed increasingly sophisticated mechanisms for measuring 
and quantifying sound objectively, such as the audiometer, an electric device that could 
be used to gauge the intensity of different sounds in uniformly-calibrated units.  The 
                                                 
30On the ineffectiveness of anti-noise legislation, see Smilor, “Personal Boundaries,” 33-5.  On anti-noise 
ordinances reflecting middle-class values, see Thompson, Soundscape of Modernity, 123.  For a discussion 
of how debates about noise reflected a “cultural symbolism of noise” that introduced discourses about 
civilization and barbarism, see Bijsterveld, “Diabolical Symphony.” 
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introduction of the “decibel” as a unit of measurement offered a new standard by which 
different types of auditory annoyances could be compared.  The Commission also 
distributed questionnaires, polling the public on its attitude toward different types of 
sounds.  Through these various means, the Commission acted on its expectation that 
mapping the urban soundscape might offer a means for controlling it more effectively.31
The Commission’s findings documented a monumental acoustic shift since the 
early 1900s.  Emily Thompson has argued that “the American soundscape underwent a 
particularly dramatic transformation” between 1900 and 1933, which played a significant 
role in the production of a distinctly modern American culture.  The legal ordinances of 
the early twentieth century primarily had targeted “natural” or traditional sounds that had 
long been the sources of complaint in cities, such as those produced by human voices, 
animals, bells, or whistles.  But by 1930, public complaints concentrated on the 
“mechanical” sounds produced by traffic, elevated trains, radios, and electro-acoustic 
loudspeakers.  Ironically, the engineering experts who had developed new technologies 
for measuring sound also had been responsible for creating entirely new sources of 
acoustic annoyance and aggravation.  As long as cities have brought residents into closer 
proximity, there has been an urban “noise problem,” but industrialization exacerbated the 
situation by introducing fundamentally new types of sounds into the urban environment.  
New devices such as the radio and the loudspeaker, which Judge Rutherford and the 
                                                 
31For discussions of this second wave of anti-noise campaigns, see Smilor, “American Noise, 1900-1930,” 
in Hearing History: A Reader, ed. Mark M. Smith, 319-30 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2004); 
Schafer, Soundscape; Thompson, Soundscape of Modernity; Bijsterveld, “Diabolical Symphony.”  I borrow 
the phrase “noise etiquette” from Bijsterveld, 50. 
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Jehovah’s Witnesses exploited so effectively, offered unprecedented opportunities for 
dominating acoustic space and for infringing on the rights of others.32
Municipal noise ordinances dating from the late-1920s and 30s increasingly 
tended to target “unnecessary noise” in general, rather than specific classes of sounds, but 
loudspeakers faced particular resistance and became the subjects of particular legislative 
action.  Over thirteen hundred respondents to a 1930 New York City survey 
(approximately twelve percent of the total received) cited the noise of loudspeakers as 
most bothersome.  Approximately nineteen percent of the letters of complaint received by 
New York City’s Noise Abatement Commission that same year cited the noise of 
loudspeakers, the single greatest source of annoyance.  New York City’s Board of 
Aldermen worked to rectify the situation, passing a bill in 1930 that required “anyone 
desiring to operate a loudspeaker out of doors to obtain a permit from the city.”  The 
city’s Board of Health similarly amended its Sanitary Code to regulate the use of “any 
mechanical or electrical sound making or reproducing device.”  Other cities, such as 
Lockport, gradually followed suit, adopting ordinances that specifically targeted the use 
of loudspeakers, singling them out from other producers of urban noise.  As Emily 
Thompson has argued, “The new, amplified sounds of loudspeakers were clearly 
distinctive enough to mobilize into action a legal system that had been almost uniformly 
unsuccessful in addressing the problem of more traditional sources of sound.”  But the 
                                                 
32 Thompson, Soundscape of Modernity, 2.  The results of the questionnaire are reprinted in Thompson, 
Soundscape of Modernity, 159.  For further discussion of the Commission’s work, see Smilor, “American 
Noise”; Blijsterveld, “Diabolical Symphony.” 
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Saia case would test the constitutional validity of such legal action when enforced against 
members of a religious minority.33
Given their widespread use of such amplifying technologies, it might seem 
surprising that even Jehovah’s Witnesses joined the chorus of mid-century voices 
complaining about the urban noise problem.  For example, a 1950 article in the 
Watchtower publication Awake! documented in detail the physiological risks associated 
with excessive noise and praised the noise abatement measures that cities were adopting.  
The article decried the apparent increase of noise in modern society and urged Witnesses 
to do their part in “the battle against useless noise.”  Noise reformers relied on communal 
involvement, the author emphasized, for “to a large extent they depend on you and other 
citizens to tell them where there is excess and useless noise and what noises are irritating.  
Don’t be ashamed to complain.”  With no apparent sense of irony, a 1941 article in 
Consolation even singled out loudspeakers as a source of irritation.  “A loudspeaker 
device uses a new series of sound waves,” this author explained, “They travel at twice the 
speed of ordinary sound waves and are capable of hurling the human voice many miles.  
Who would want to live in a world where titanic bellowers could project their words in 
tones stupendous?”  While these articles encouraged Witnesses to complain about 
offending sounds, they never seemed to consider that the sounds of their own 
proselytizing activities might engender similar opposition.  They assumed that what they 
were doing was different—that Witness ministers were not simply “titanic bellowers” 
and that their religious sermons were not merely noise.34
                                                 
33 Thompson, Soundscape of Modernity,149-152, 158-160. 
34“Noise Can Drive You Crazy,” Awake! (August 22, 1950): 17-19; “Sound and the Human Ear,” 
Consolation (October 15, 1941): 3-8. 
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In fact, strikingly absent from the early twentieth-century debates about urban 
noise was any consideration of religion or of the implications of anti-noise ordinances for 
religious practice.  There were a few exceptions, of course.  There were occasional 
complaints about the volume of church bells, as in the St. Mark’s case.  Churches and 
other religious institutions also were included sometimes within zones of quiet that 
restricted noise-making activity in their vicinity, but usually only on Sundays.   But 
otherwise, religion hardly appears in the various accounts of these noise abatement 
campaigns.  Noise reformers seemed deaf to the ways that their efforts might shape 
American religious practice.35
Perhaps this inattention to religion can be explained by assuming that religious 
sounds were different, that religious sounds could not be deemed “unnecessary,” a critical 
point of contention in the 1877 St. Mark’s bells case.  Perhaps we find in this absence 
implicit evidence of secularization, buttressing the assumption that religion had no place 
in the modern city or that religious voices would be drowned out by the din of modern 
urban life.  After all, the acoustic technicians of New York City’s Noise Abatement 
Commission had surveyed the city, documenting in detail the various sources of urban 
noise, yet had made no reference to religious sounds in their 1930 report.  Or perhaps 
noise reformers heard religion as quiet, private, or personal, regarding religion not as a 
producer of noise, but as something to be circumscribed and protected from noise, as in 
the case of the legislatively enforced zones of quiet. 
But as the cases to which I attend in this dissertation demonstrate, religious 
groups also have been noisy, and urban religion regularly has been practiced out loud.  
                                                 
35For examples of complaints about church bells, see Smilor, “Personal Boundaries,” 29.  For examples of 
zones of quiet, see Anti-Noise Ordinances of Various Cities; Smilor, “Personal Boundaries,” 32. 
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Although the early twentieth-century noise abatement campaigns did not appear to have 
religion in mind, their legislative legacy bore implications for public religious practice, 
especially for unpopular minorities and other dissenting groups.  After all, were street 
preachers really any different from pushcart peddlers, beyond the fact that they hawked a 
different kind of product?  When the Lockport police arrested Samuel Saia in September 
1946, they unwittingly put that question to the test.   But despite the increasingly 
objective standards available for measuring and categorizing different types of sounds, 
the definition of noise—or of what made certain sounds undesirable or out of place—
remained essentially subjective.  Could religious worship constitute noise?  Did religious 
freedom include a right to make noise publicly?  Were dissenting religious groups, such 
as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, striving to make their voices heard or to dominate public 
space acoustically?  What were the limits of a city’s right to protect its citizens from 
unwanted sounds—and from unwanted religious messages?  In the trials and hearings 
that followed Saia’s arrest, to which I now turn, U.S. courts were asked to adjudicate 
each of these contested issues.36
 
Contesting Religion’s Boundaries at Trial 
On September 10, 1946, and again on September 28, 1946, Samuel Saia stood 
trial in Lockport’s Police Court for violating the city’s anti-noise ordinance.  Saia pleaded 
not guilty, maintaining that the U.S. Constitution’s First and Fourteenth Amendments 
protected his actions and that the ordinance therefore was “invalid and void on its face.”  
                                                 
36The frontispiece of the 1930 report is reproduced in both Thompson, Soundscape of Modernity, 118 and 
Blijsterveld, “Diabolical Symphony,” 54.  The picture classifies a wide range of urban sounds, including 
bells and loudspeakers, but does not differentiate between religious and non-religious sounds. 
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Over the course of the two trials, testimony was solicited from police officers, city 
officials, Lockport residents, and a number of local Jehovah’s Witnesses who had 
attended the disputed public meetings.  Saia was prosecuted by Lockport’s well-respected 
city attorney, James A. Noonan, and the case was heard by Judge Daniel P. Falsioni, a 
registered Independent in a strongly Republican-leaning town.  Falsioni was a temporary 
appointment to the bench, selected in February to finish the term of the previous police 
judge, who had resigned in disgrace following charges of misappropriating public funds.  
Falsioni would lose his bid for election that November to a Republican challenger, 
serving for less than a year, yet issuing a ruling in the Saia case that would be challenged 
before the U.S. Supreme Court.  In the first trial, Saia was represented by a fellow 
Jehovah’s Witness, Walter Reid, a Lockport resident with no formal legal training who 
had in fact used Saia’s amplifying equipment himself to preach on the days in question.  
In the second trial, the Watchtower Society arranged for Julius Himmelfarb to serve as 
defense counsel, a Jewish lawyer from Buffalo who was sympathetic to the Witnesses’ 
cause.  At the conclusion of each trial, Falsioni found Saia guilty and ordered him to pay 
a fine or face imprisonment.  Following the example of the Christian Apostles who 
“never paid fines,” Saia refused to make payment to the city, but Falsioni suspended his 
prison sentence pending appeal.37
The witnesses who testified at Saia’s trials agreed on the basic facts of the case.  
On at least four occasions prior to the passage of Lockport’s anti-noise ordinance, 
                                                 
37Transcript, 41, 69; “Jehovah Man Scorns Fine, Goes to Jail,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, 
September 12, 1946.  On Falsioni, see “Record is Good,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, August 19, 
1946.  On Himmelfarb, see Saia, interview.  Citing the example of the Apostles, Watchtower publications 
instructed ministers to accept imprisonment rather than to pay municipal fines.  They hoped to make it 
costly for cities to prosecute Witnesses, not profitable.  See Hayden C. Covington, Defending and Legally 
Establishing the Good News (Brooklyn, NY: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, 1950), 81. 
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Jehovah’s Witnesses had used Saia’s sound car to offer sermons in Lockport’s Outwater 
Park without interference.  Following the statute’s passage, they had obtained a permit 
from Lockport’s chief of police, William Newell, to hold a series of four public meetings 
in the park during the summer of 1946.  When they applied to renew the permit in order 
to sponsor four additional meetings in September, Newell denied their request, citing 
anonymous complaints about noise.  They appealed to Lockport’s mayor, Fred A. 
Ringueberg, who also denied their request.  The Witnesses decided to proceed with the 
meetings nonetheless. 
On Sunday, September 1, 1946, Saia parked his sound car on a road adjacent to 
Outwater Park at around 3:30pm and began to set up his amplifying equipment.  
Outwater Park was the largest of Lockport’s eight public parks, about sixteen hundred 
feet long and from two hundred and fifty to four hundred feet wide.  The park was used 
primarily for recreation.  One side of the park housed a playground, wading pool, and 
horseshoe pitch.  The other side of the park offered benches and small fireplaces for 
picnickers.  In the far corner of the park was a stadium where Lockport residents could 
watch the city’s Pony League baseball team compete.  On a beautiful summer afternoon, 
Outwater Park might attract as many as a thousand people, though on the days that Saia 
was arrested, witnesses estimated only fifty to hundred park-goers. 
On September 1, Saia parked his truck near the picnic area, generally the park’s 
quietest section.  He was joined by approximately fifteen to twenty other Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, several of whom expected to take turns preaching.  They arranged benches in 
rows facing Saia’s car.  As the Witnesses prepared for their meeting, a special park 
officer called the Lockport police department, and two police officers quickly arrived on 
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the scene.  They approached Saia and asked if he had a permit to operate loudspeakers in 
the park.  Saia showed the police officers an identification card, which named him as an 
ordained minister in the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, and he showed them a 
booklet that cited various decisions from Witness-related Supreme Court cases.  Saia 
asserted that these documents guaranteed him the right to preach in the park, with or 
without a permit.  The police officers responded that they “did not give a damn” about 
these documents, shut off the sound equipment, and arrested Saia.  Saia posted bail, 
returned to the park the following Sunday, and was arrested again, following a very 
similar pattern of events.  On September 10, he stood trial and was convicted for these 
first two offenses.  On the following two Sundays, September 15 and 22, Saia returned to 
Outwater Park and was arrested yet again.  On September 28, he stood trial for the third 
and fourth offenses.  On none of these occasions were there physical altercations between 
the Witnesses and the police officers, nor did the Police Department ever receive formal 
complaints from any of the other park-goers, though several of them did offer testimony 
at trial.  The Lockport police officers arrested Saia simply because he was operating 
sound equipment without a permit.38
Although there was general agreement about these basic facts, the participants in 
the Saia case did not agree on how these facts should be interpreted.  Throughout the 
trials, the attorneys, witnesses, and judge debated whether this case was essentially about 
religion or noise, whether it was about the right of religious dissenters to make their 
                                                 
38Transcript, 73.  A series of Watchtower publications trained Witnesses in highly specific detail how to 
conduct themselves when facing arrest, how to interact with police officers, and how to defend themselves 
in court.  The Lockport Witnesses followed these strategies almost exactly step-by-step.  The Watchtower 
Society frequently initiated “test cases,” purposefully inviting arrest to test certain types of municipal 
ordinances, but that does not seem to have been the case in Saia.  For an example of one of these 
publications, see Covington, Good News.  For an insightful analysis of the Witnesses’ organized legal 
strategies, see Henderson, “Jehovah’s Witnesses.” 
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voices heard or about the city’s right to bar individuals from dominating public space 
acoustically.  The Jehovah’s Witnesses repeatedly tried to enter into the record evidence 
about the content of their sermons.  In part, this was because Witnesses regularly took 
advantage of their appearances in court as prime opportunities to proselytize publicly, 
using their time on the witness stand to bear witness to the good news of God’s kingdom.  
But the Witnesses in the Saia case also emphasized the religious content of their sermons 
in order to assert that their amplified sounds constituted religious worship and therefore 
were different from other types of sounds and were specially protected by the U.S. 
Constitution.  They alleged discrimination, implying that their voices were being silenced 
on account of the message they were trying to convey.  “The whole question, Your 
Honor, is the question of religion,” Defense Counsel Himmelfarb explained at Saia’s 
second trial, “When the statute prohibited the freedom of worship and speech the 
appellate courts have held that it is unconstitutional and illegal.”  But Judge Falsioni 
disagreed. “There is no question of any religious principle whatsoever,” he responded.  
Both Falsioni and City Counsel Noonan did their best to keep all discussion of religion 
out of the courtroom, preferring instead to focus more narrowly on the question of 
whether or not Saia had a permit to operate his sound equipment.  They seemed more 
concerned with the public’s reasonable expectation of peace and quiet than with Saia’s 
asserted right to be heard.39
This debate about what was at stake in the Saia case played out especially through 
three contested issues to which the courtroom testimony returned repeatedly.  First, 
participants in the trials debated the nature of the authority on which the Jehovah’s 
                                                 
39Transcipt, 230.  On Witnesses using court testimony as an opportunity for proselytizing, see Peters, 
Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses, 127-28; Covington, Good News, 25. 
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Witnesses claimed the right to engage in their proselytizing activities.  Whose sanction 
did the Witnesses require in order to produce their sounds publicly?  By requiring a 
permit to use loudspeakers, the Lockport Common Council unwittingly had placed 
Witness practices squarely under the jurisdiction of city officials, limiting the manner in 
which they could fulfill what they perceived to be a religious obligation.  Only 
Lockport’s police chief had the authority to determine which sounds would be permitted 
in public spaces.  “We are living in Lockport,” one of the police officers was purported to 
have told Saia on the day of his first arrest, “and you are to observe the laws of the City 
of Lockport.”  But the Witnesses appealed to a higher authority.  They denied needing a 
permit because they believed that God’s laws sanctioned their actions and that God’s 
laws superseded those of Lockport.  “We get our authority from Isaiah 61 and 62,” 
Lockport resident Walter Hammond explained to the court.  “When the ordinance is 
contrary to the law of God, it is not an ordinance,” Roy Mort maintained.  These 
Witnesses insisted that their right to amplify religious lectures came from God, not from 
the city, and that city officials had no authority to curtail that right.40
Ironically, perhaps, the Witnesses relied on U.S. courts—on the authority of state 
institutions—to legitimize their claim that their authority came from God and not from 
civic officials.  This was why Saia had shown the arresting officers a booklet citing 
previous Supreme Court decisions.  “They come to me and I present this card and this 
here book,” Saia explained to the court, “to show them the rights we have from this 
                                                 
40Transcript, 79, 90, 98.  Watchtower publications regularly reinforced this message that Witnesses’ 
fundamental obligation was to follow God’s law, not the law of the state.  Witnesses regularly advanced 
this claim in court.  For example, see “Fear Jehovah the Superior,” Watchtower (June 15, 1952): 368-73.  
Mormon polygamists had advanced a similar defense in the nineteenth-century, but Witnesses were quick 
to differentiate their practices from polygamy.  Polygamy was immoral and violated God’s law, they 
maintained.  See Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, Divine Purpose, 176. 
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Constitution.”  Indeed, the validity of requiring a permit in order to preach had been at 
the heart of several previous Witness-related court cases, most notably in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut.  In that case, the Supreme Court had struck down a New Haven, 
Connecticut, municipal ordinance regulating public soliciting because it vested in a single 
city official the authority to determine what constituted a “bona fide” religious cause.  
Lockport Witnesses hoped to apply similar principles in their own case.  But Lockport 
officials did not think that their law curtailed the right to preach in any way.  According 
to them, the ordinance’s sole purpose was to regulate the use of amplifying equipment, 
which surely could not be regarded as an essential component of religious practice.  
Surely there was nothing in God’s law that mandated the use of electro-acoustic 
loudspeakers.41
The Witnesses and the city officials advanced competing conceptions of the 
relationship between civic and religious authority, and, at several points throughout 
Saia’s trials, they sounded as if they simply were talking past each other.  Consider this 
exchange between City Counsel Noonan and Witness Roy Mort: 
Q. And you knew, of course, at that time a permit was required, didn’t you? 
A. Well, see, this work, you understand— 
Q. I am asking you: You only had a permit issued by the Chief of Police to 
operate under that this year, didn’t you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. By reason of that you knew that the permit was required, isn’t that true? 
A. I knew.  But here is the point— 
Q. Answer the question. 
A. I am not going to commit myself.  On this Book I swore to tell the truth.  They 
may have an ordinance conflicting with God’s law. 
                                                 
41Transcript, 72.  The booklet that Saia showed to the police officers was Covington, Defending and 
Legally Establishing the Good News.  Covington had distributed this updated manual to Witnesses at the 
Cleveland Assembly in August 1946.  The manual instructed Witnesses to cite Supreme Court decisions 
when asserting their rights.  This practice led Newton to title her book with the apt phrase, “Armed with the 
Constitution.” 
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Q. If you can’t answer, say you don’t understand and I will make it plainer…Can 
you answer that? 
A. This permit is required, but here is the point, and I want you to hear this— 
The Court: Answer the question yes or no. 
A. Not a permit required to preach the gospel, which I am an ordained minister to 
do.42
 
Back and forth they went.  Noonan and Judge Falsioni demanded a direct answer: 
was Mort aware of the permit requirement or not?  But Mort repeatedly tried to qualify 
his response, explaining that any ordinance that restricted his right to preach the gospel 
was necessarily invalid.  The two sides disagreed about precisely what the permit was 
purported to permit, for the city officials did not think that the permit requirement had 
anything to do with preaching the gospel.  “The only question here is whether or not there 
was a permit to use the loudspeaker,” Judge Falsioni explained, “there is no question here 
as to Jehovah God or anything of that nature.”  According to the Witnesses, however, 
religious sounds were different, and thus amplifying a religious sermon differed from 
other public uses of loudspeakers.  After all, they regarded their actions as a form of 
religious worship.  The arresting officers had “interfered with our work,” explained 
Witness Willard Wendt, “I mean, preaching the gospel of Jehovah’s kingdom.”  Without 
the use of loudspeakers, the Witnesses claimed that they were unable to make their voices 
heard, and thus unable to fulfill what they perceived to be their most important religious 
obligation. Their sounds constituted religion, not noise, they maintained.  They were not 
street hawkers nor pushcart peddlers, but ministers, and thus subject to a different 
authority.43
                                                 
42Transcript, 221-2. 
43Transcript, 83, 90. 
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But the Witnesses pressed their claims further.  It was not just that religious 
sounds, in general, should be regulated differently, they asserted, for many religious 
sounds already were treated differently.  The problem was that the Witnesses’ sounds 
were being singled out—that their voices alone were being silenced.  They alleged that 
they were the victims of discrimination and that their permit application had been denied 
not because of complaints about noise, but because of animus against their teachings.  
They insisted that they were not trying to dominate space with their sound, but were 
simply striving to make themselves heard amidst the cacophonous chorus of Lockport 
religious voices.  They demanded not special privileges, therefore, but only equal 
treatment. 
This question about whether opposition to the Witnesses’ preaching was 
motivated by objections to volume or to content constituted a second critical point of 
contention throughout the legal proceedings.  Over and over again, Defense Counsel 
Himmelfarb questioned park-goers about whether they deemed the Witnesses’ message 
objectionable or offensive.  “Were you in disagreement with what came out of the 
loudspeakers?” he asked one picnicker.  “Was that religious sermon contrary to your 
religious principles?” he demanded of another.  Himmelfarb hoped to demonstrate that 
the complaints had nothing to do with noise at all, but instead were driven by religious 
intolerance.44
Even more central to the defense’s strategy were the analogies that the Witnesses 
drew between their proselytizing and other religious sounds.  If other religious groups 
could make noise, the Witnesses insisted, then their activities had to be permitted, as 
                                                 
44Transcript, 133, 145. 
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well.  They called the court’s attention to two other practices, in particular.  First, 
Lockport’s Lutheran churches sponsored an annual outdoor rally in Outwater Park’s 
baseball stadium, for which they received a permit from the city.  The 1946 rally had 
been held on Sunday, September 8, on the same day and at the same time as Saia’s 
second arrest.  Over two thousand Lutherans had gathered at the stadium to hear an 
amplified lecture delivered by Rev. Walter A Maier of St. Louis, but the police 
department had not received any complaints.  Why, Himmelfarb wondered, should the 
Lutherans be permitted to broadcast their religious message but not the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses?45   
Second, Himmelfarb repeatedly compared the Witnesses’ preaching to the 
chiming of Lockport’s church bells, a strategy that disputants also would adopt in the call 
to prayer case that I discuss in chapter 4.  Typical of Himmelfarb’s approach was this 
exchange with Walden Sidebottom, a Lockport resident who was picnicking in the park 
on one of the Sundays : 
Q. Now, Mr. Sidebottom, in the city of Lockport do you ever hear church bells 
rung? 
A. Sure… 
Q. Would you say the sound of the church bells, are they louder than this 
loudspeaker? 
A. Well, as you said before, they ring at six o’clock in the morning.  I am not up 
then. 
Q. I am not asking you about six o’clock in the morning.  I am asking you if you 
ever hear them? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Are they louder than the loudspeaker? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do they annoy you? 
A. Bells don’t annoy me. 
Q. But the loudspeaker did? 
                                                 
45For example, see Transcript, 63-4.  For more on the Lutheran rally, see “Peace Without God Declared 
Impossible,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, September 9, 1946. 
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A. Yes.46
 
Over and over again, Himmelfarb successfully coaxed prosecution witnesses to admit 
that they never had complained about church bells even though bells produced louder 
sounds than those emanating from Saia’s speakers.  Surely this was evidence of 
discriminatory treatment, Himmelfarb alleged, evidence that park-goers objected to the 
Witnesses’ message, not their volume—evidence that this case was about religion, not 
noise. 
Analogizing their practices to those of more “mainstream” religions constituted an 
effective legal strategy, and one that Jehovah’s Witnesses (and other religious minorities) 
often pursued in their myriad legal disputes.  But this strategy also had an important 
social effect, for the Witnesses invited Lockport residents to notice church bells.  And in 
so doing, they implicitly called attention to the ways that mainline Protestantism and 
Roman Catholicism collectively shaped—and dominated—the city’s public culture.  The 
ordinary, unremarkable status of church bells as customary features of Lockport’s 
soundscape spoke precisely to their power, for they had long since faded into the 
background—unnoticed and unchallenged, and therefore distinctly unlike the sounds of 
the Witnesses’ preaching.   
At one point during Saia’s trial, even Judge Falsioni disputed the connection that 
Himmelfarb was attempting to make between chimes and loudspeakers.  “Church bells 
have been rung since the Revolution,” Falsioni interjected, expressing surprise that 
anyone might find them objectionable.  Falsioni’s attitude echoed that of St. Mark’s 
leaders, whom I discussed in chapter 2.  Like Falsioni, they could not believe that anyone 
                                                 
46Transcript, 147-8. 
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might challenge an American church’s right to ring its bells.  But this was precisely 
Himmelfarb’s point.  His analogy to church bells de-naturalized their position as 
background noise.  He implied that chimes were not inherently pleasing and 
unobjectionable.  Instead, their apparent unobtrusiveness reflected Christianity’s 
normative status in American society.  In other words, Himmelfarb suggested that sounds 
became noticeable on account of who produced them, rather than because of the volume 
at which they were produced.  As I suggested in chapter 2, sound production regularly 
has functioned as an exercise of power, for only certain groups have been able to make 
noise publicly without censure.  Therefore, when the Lockport Witnesses broadcast 
sermons over loudspeakers, they were fulfilling a religious obligation, but they also were 
claiming a place for themselves within the broader community.  They were asserting that 
religious toleration required making space for the sounds of religious dissenters, 
alongside those of the majority.  They were aspiring to make their sounds as 
unremarkable as those of church bells—or, perhaps, to make church bells seem as 
remarkable as their preaching.  Church bells already dominated Lockport’s public space 
acoustically, the Witnesses implied.  Through their broadcasting, they simply were 
adding their voices to the mix, amplifying the sounds of religious difference.47
But the Lockport residents who picnicked at Outwater Park heard things 
differently.  Those who testified at Saia’s trial denied paying any attention to the content 
of the Witnesses’ lectures.  All they noticed was the noise, not who was producing it.  “I 
have no quarrel with any religious sect at all…,” insisted Gilbert Van Wyck, but the 
amplifier made it difficult “when you were carrying on a conversation.”  He and other 
                                                 
47Transcript, 164. 
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park-goers professed annoyance at having to raise their voices in order to hear each other, 
but cared little about the source of the disturbance.  “I wasn’t interested [in the 
substance],” Francis Sheehan explained, “I didn’t pay attention to it.  I didn’t hear a 
thing.”  Some of the witnesses hardly even seemed disturbed by Saia’s activities at all.  
For example, one picnicker denied being “annoyed,” “irritated,” or “angry,” though he 
finally admitted that he found the noise somewhat “disconcerting.”  But he, too, insisted 
that this had nothing to do with the content of the lectures.  These Lockport residents 
supported the city’s contention that this case had nothing to do with silencing members of 
a religious minority; it was only about whether Saia had obtained a permit to operate his 
loudspeakers as the law required.48
Over and over again, prosecution witnesses denied any animus towards the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses or any other religious sect.  Each of them avowed a basic 
commitment to religious liberty, responding affirmatively each time Himmelfarb asked if 
they believed that “every man has a perfect right to worship Almighty God as he 
pleases.”  But at the same time, it was not clear that all Lockport residents understood the 
Witnesses’ activities to constitute worship—at least not in the manner to which they were 
accustomed.  Even as the park-goers maintained that their annoyance had nothing to do 
with the content of the Witnesses’ lectures, their testimony raised critical questions about 
the nature of religious practice and about its proper time and place.  Whether or not the 
Witnesses’ sounds constituted a nuisance, in other words, did they belong in a public park 
on a Sunday afternoon?49
                                                 
48Transcript, 131-3, 184. 
49Transcript, 163. 
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A few of the park-goers were not even sure if they would characterize the 
Witnesses’ speeches as “religious” at all.  For example, Francis McLoughlin did not 
know what to make of their political content.  As he explained to Himmelfarb, these were 
unlike the sermons he was accustomed to hearing: 
Q. Would you say it was religious? 
A. I never heard the League of Nations discussed in a religious lecture. 
Q. In any kind of lecture where they put in “League of Nations” it could not be a 
religious lecture? 
A. I think you are stretching a point. 
Q. You make a conclusion here.  You heard the League of Nations and therefore 
it couldn’t be a religious lecture.  Did you hear anything about Jehovah God, 
Christ? 
A. I heard Jehovah God, yes. 
Q. Anything about Christ? 
A. Dates and other incidental things. 
Q. Did you hear quotations from the Bible? 
A. I don’t recall that; might have been quotations from the Bible, quotations, I 
didn’t pay any attention. 
Q. You wouldn’t form a conclusion because the lecture contained some reference 
to the League of Nations it wouldn’t be a religious lecture, would you? 
A. I wouldn’t say references to the League of Nations would definitely label it 
religious. 
Q. I am not saying that.  I am merely saying this: due to the fact any lecture which 
contained or referred to the League of Nations, would you say because it referred 
to the League of Nations it couldn’t be a religious lecture? 
A. No, I wouldn’t say that. 
 
In order for the Jehovah’s Witnesses to argue that their sounds should be treated 
differently because they were religious in nature, they had to establish that their speeches 
in fact were religious, and for this they had to introduce the content.  These were not just 
any sounds.  Yet the definition of what made certain lectures religious was itself a point 
of contention.  Was it sufficient to make reference to God, Christ, or the Bible?  Were 
speeches essentially religious or political?  And did this practice really constitute 
worship?  Lockport residents like McLoughlin seemed unsure.50
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Other community members acknowledged that the speeches were religious but 
questioned whether this was the proper time and place for such activities.  As noted 
above, Witnesses had been criticized for Sunday proselytizing since the late 1920s, yet 
they maintained that it was their obligation to spread the good news each and every day.  
“I preach the gospel of Jehovah God’s Kingdom and Jesus Christ every day of the year,” 
Walter Reid told the court.  But several Lockport residents maintained that Sundays were 
properly observed as a day of rest and quiet.  Walden Sidebottom told the court that he 
went to Outwater Park for “peace and relaxation.”  Gilbert Van Wyck admitted that he 
often heard loudspeakers used at the park’s baseball stadium, but “never on Sunday.”  A 
lifelong resident of Lockport recently recalled Sundays during the 1940s as “a special 
day” when many people “felt you had to be quiet.”  Although the Witnesses understood 
their practices as constituting religious worship, these critics heard their sounds as 
desecrating the spirit of the day.  Churches might announce their services with bells, but 
chimes rang at regular, predictable intervals and marked the rhythms of daily life.  In 
contrast, these park-goers heard the Witnesses’ amplified lectures as irregular and 
unexpected irruptions, which served only to disturb the sacred peace of the Sabbath.51
If Sunday was the wrong time for these amplified lectures, then a public park was 
definitely the wrong place.  “Understand, a park is a place of assembly to worship God,” 
Witness Roy Mort explained to City Counsel Noonan.  “No,” Noonan replied, “I don’t 
understand that.  I don’t understand that the park is for that…We will differ on that part.”  
                                                 
51Transcript, 132, 144, 233; Dumphrey, interview.  Long-time Lockport resident John Hall similarly has 
recalled Sundays as a special day of rest and quiet.  John Hall, interview by author, July 24, 2008.  In the 
mid-nineteenth century, Lockport actually had proven relatively permissive on the Sabbath.  Residents had 
debated whether the Erie Canal should remain open for business on Sundays.  Sunday law opponents 
carried the day, permitting the Canal to remain open.  See Riley, Lockport, 59-61. 
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City officials denied that their prosecution of Saia had anything to do with his religious 
affiliation, but they also rejected the analogy between a park and a church and between 
the Witnesses’ lectures and church bells.  They did not think of a public park as a place 
for religious worship.  According to the city, the park was maintained for picnicking, 
recreation, and games; churches were where religion happened.  And there were no 
churches in Outwater Park, Noonan emphasized, nor could one hear any bells there.  
Churches rang their bells in order to attract willing worshippers to join together in 
service, but parks attracted adherents of diverse religious traditions who did not expect to 
be called collectively to pray.  In Outwater Park, religious sounds would mediate contact 
among religious communities, blurring the boundaries between religious and public 
space.  Non-Witnesses, too, would hear the sounds of the Witnesses’ amplified lectures.  
In fact, that was precisely the point.  The Witnesses claimed that they were engaged in 
worship, but they also were proselytizing, targeting an unwilling audience of religious 
“others.”52
This question of intended audience constituted the third critical point of 
contention through which disputants debated whether this case centered on religion or 
noise.  Park-goers objected to the use of loudspeakers because they would have no choice 
but to hear the Witnesses’ preaching.  They would become an unwilling audience.  “You 
didn’t go to the park to listen to the amplifier?” Noonan inquired of Lockport off-duty 
police officer Francis McLoughlin.  “No, I certainly didn’t,” McLoughlin replied, “I went 
                                                 
52Transcript, 148-9, 224.  Although several of the prosecution witnesses implied that proselytizing in a 
public park was inappropriate, at least one witness maintained that a park was at least better than 
approaching his home.  During his cross-examination by Himmelfarb, Police Officer Francis Sheehan 
admitted holding a grudge against the Jehovah’s Witnesses because “they approached my home several 
times and annoyed my wife…I want them to stay away from my home.”  Of course, Sheehan also 
maintained that the Witnesses had a “perfect right to preach their Gospel as they see fit.”  For Sheehan, 
then, religious freedom seemed to be a matter of time and place.  Transcript, 186. 
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to enjoy the facilities of the park and relax.”  Walden Sidebottom similarly testified that 
he did not “expect any amplifier” and that he “didn’t go out there to hear an amplifier.”  
These witnesses supported the city’s efforts to regulate the use of loudspeakers and the 
production of noise because they assumed a right to choose what kind of sounds they 
wanted to hear in public.  Or, at the very least, they implied that certain sounds belonged 
in certain places.  Perhaps it simply was a matter of expectations.  They did not expect to 
hear amplified religious lectures in this public park, a setting that they felt was best 
preserved for peace and quiet.  Just as early-twentieth century legislation had marked off 
schools, hospitals, and churches as specially designated zones of quiet, these Lockport 
residents expressed their hope that Outwater Park might similarly be protected from 
unwelcome auditory intrusions.  They heard the Witnesses’ preaching as distinctly out of 
place.53
Perhaps disingenuously, the Jehovah’s Witnesses at first denied that their intent 
had been to target unwilling listeners.  In his affidavit on appeal, Samuel Saia maintained 
“that the only people who gathered around this loud speaker were Jehovah witnesses and 
were all interested in hearing the lecture being delivered.”  At trial, some of the 
Witnesses went further and suggested that even the non-Witness picnickers had flocked 
to the park in response to advertisements publicizing the meetings.  Despite testimony to 
the contrary, they claimed that everyone in the park was there for the purpose of hearing 
their lectures.  “Do you think all the people in the park came to hear the lecture?” City 
Counsel Noonan inquired of Witness minister Walter Reid.  “I believe they all did,” Reid 
replied, “They are very curious to hear this lecture.”  Roy Mort similarly explained the 
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purpose of the gathering as an opportunity to preach to a willing audience that had been 
“invited…by giving handbills and placards to a public assembly to worship Almighty 
God.”  Mort denied Noonan’s contention that “the sole and only purpose of taking that 
amplifier in Outwater Park and using it [was] to attract the general public in the park, not 
only your group but everyone else.”54
Noonan had little difficulty contesting the Witnesses’ claims.  Arresting police 
officers testified that “the [loud] speaker was not pointed toward the audience of the 
speaker” and that “the further you were away from it, the better you [could] hear it.”  
Superintendant of Parks Nelson Goehle, who had been picnicking at Outwater Park on 
one of the Sundays, testified that there were “quite a few more” people gathered in the 
park away from the Witnesses’ meeting than were gathered “in front of the microphone.”  
In his cross-examination of Roy Mort, Noonan established that Mort had continued 
preaching to the assembled audience after the police officers had shut off the sound 
amplification equipment.  In other words, Mort had not needed the sound car to preach to 
his fellow Witnesses, but only to expand his acoustic range in order to reach other areas 
of the park.  When pushed by Noonan, even Walter Reid admitted that he “hoped those 
who were not members of Jehovah’s witnesses would get the message.”  By broadcasting 
their lectures in a public park, the Witnesses targeted a heterogeneous listening public, a 
diverse audience consisting of both willing and unwilling hearers.55
For the Witnesses’ critics, it seemed that this element of choice was what 
differentiated the Witnesses’ gathering from the Lutheran rally held at Outwater Park’s 
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baseball stadium.  Police Officer Joseph Chausse testified that the Lutherans held their 
service “within a fence, an enclosed fence.”  Officer Paul Moorehouse further clarified 
that the fence was over six-feet high, that the stadium was close to a thousand feet from 
the part of the park reserved for picnicking, and that people were admitted to the stadium 
“in the regular way,” meaning that they had to pass through an entrance gate.  In other 
words, Lockport residents chose whether they wanted to attend the rally and listen to the 
amplified sounds of Rev. Maier’s sermon.  Furthermore, the six-foot tall fence separated 
the Lutherans from the other park-goers, physically circumscribing and containing the 
sounds of their gathering.  Even within the space of this public park, religion had been set 
off as separate and distinct, confined to its own place.  By setting up their loudspeakers in 
the picnicking area, the Jehovah’s Witnesses had challenged this arrangement, blurring 
the boundaries between public and religious space.56
Indeed, the city implied that the Witnesses might have received a permit had they 
been willing to hold their meeting in the baseball stadium.  But that would have defeated 
their purpose, for it would have limited their acoustic range and the size of their potential 
audience.  They did not wish to be set apart, but to operate in the midst of other park 
activities and so to reach the greatest number of people, as Walter Reid finally admitted 
to City Counsel Noonan: 
Q. You picked out for the point of your amplifier this particular spot? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And you set up this amplifier which had horns on top of it, and which would 
carry the voice a considerable distance, didn’t you? 
A. As far as it could be carried. 
Q. And you intended that these amplifiers would carry the voice as far as could 
be? 
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A. Everyone that came to the park to hear we hoped would hear.57
 
But the Witnesses hoped to attract the attention not only of those who had come to hear, 
but also of those who had come to the park for other reasons.  And they clearly 
accomplished this aim, even if they elicited complaints and curiosity rather than 
conversions.  Lockport resident Harry Moran sat, listened, and “wondered why it was 
there,” as these sounds seemed unlike what he was used to hearing at the park on Sunday 
afternoons.  Nelson Goehle said that he “just sat there and listened to it during that time.  
That was about ten minutes.”  Gilbert Van Wyck recollected that he had not observed the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in the park until they began to broadcast over the loudspeaker.  “No, 
I don’t think—particularly didn’t take notice of them,” he explained.  The visual 
spectacle of the Witnesses’ gathering had garnered little attention, but the loudspeaker 
had enabled these religious dissenters to amplify their presence, to make their voices 
heard by calling the attention of a heterogeneous listening public.58
As discussed above, Jehovah’s Witnesses of the 1930s and 40s deemed sound 
cars, loudspeakers, and phonograph players effective precisely because they could make 
religion portable, expanding the boundaries of religious space and of their acoustic 
community.  But as evidenced by the testimony at Saia’s trial, the effectiveness of such 
devices also was what made them sources of complaint.  The Lockport Witnesses 
justified their use of sound cars and amplifiers in the name of religious freedom, as 
necessary components of their religious worship, but their manner of worship necessarily 
involved religious others, unwilling hearers who resisted inclusion.  As discussed above, 
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Witness publications from the period identified hearing as a necessary means for 
salvation—to hear was to be made open to God’s word, a sound like no other, and 
potentially to gain entrance to God’s kingdom.  The Witnesses used loudspeakers, 
therefore, to make themselves heard, but also to ensure that others would hear, as well.  
They amplified and announced their presence, but also dominated the acoustic space 
around them, broadcasting their message to those who otherwise might not have chosen 
to listen to it. 
Throughout Saia’s trials, Lockport residents, attorneys, and city officials thus 
debated whether religious sounds were different from non-religious sounds, whether the 
sounds of the Witnesses’ preaching were analogous to other religious sounds and 
practices, and whether it mattered that the Witnesses’ intended audience included 
unwilling listeners.  Through these disagreements, the parties to this case articulated an 
array of assumptions about the nature of religious practice and about its proper time and 
place.  The voices emanating from Saia’s loudspeakers had mediated contact between the 
varied park-goers, shaping how they responded to each other and prompting reflection on 
religion’s place within their community.  And they framed very differently what was at 
stake in this case based on whether they heard the Witnesses’ preaching as noise or as 
worship. 
According to Judge Falsioni, however, all of that was somewhat beside the point 
as Saia’s conviction had almost nothing to do with religion at all.  Falsioni framed his 
relatively brief decisions around a single question: did Saia violate the city ordinance?  
And the answer to this was clearly yes.  Falsioni rejected the defense’s contention that the 
ordinance was unconstitutional because it violated Saia’s right to freedom of worship and 
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freedom of speech.  Differentiating this dispute from previous Witness-related court 
cases, Falsioni maintained that the city had not denied Saia’s right to distribute religious 
literature or to hold a public meeting.  Nor was there any evidence of discrimination, for 
the city required a permit “for all faiths and denominations and for all activities carried 
on in a public place or public street in said city.”  City officials had not silenced Saia, 
Falsioni contended, they only had regulated his use of loudspeakers, electric devices that 
bore “no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print, or distribute 
information or opinion.”  The city had acted reasonably, Falsioni found, quoting a recent 
Colorado Supreme Court decision, for surely citizens “had a right to protect themselves 
from concentrated and continuous cacophony” – even if the source of such cacophony 
was religious.  Saia had violated a valid municipal ordinance, Falsioni concluded, and 
thus had to pay a fine and face imprisonment.  Falsioni agreed to commute the sentence, 
pending appeal, but Saia found no relief from the Niagara County Court nor from the 
New York State Court of Appeals.  Both courts affirmed Falsioni’s decision without 
comment, leaving Saia with no option but to appeal his case to the U.S. Supreme Court.59
 
A Right To Be Heard 
The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in the case, Saia v. New York, in March 
1948.  Representing Saia was Hayden C. Covington, the imposing chief legal counsel for 
the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society.  Covington had orchestrated the Witnesses’ 
legal campaign since the late-1930s, dramatically expanding the scope of civil rights 
                                                 
59Transcript, 22-23, 33-39.  Judge Falsioni quoted Hamilton v. Montrose, 109 Colo. 228, 237 (Colo. 1942).  
For the decisions of the Niagara County Court and the New York State Court of Appeals, see Transcript, 
257-266. 
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protections for all Americans.  He was a tall, experienced orator, who appeared before the 
Supreme Court in forty-one separate cases between 1939 and 1955.  Representing the city 
was the young, recently appointed Niagara County district attorney, William E. Miller.  A 
Lockport native and skilled litigator, the thirty-eight year old Miller already had served as 
an assistant prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crime trials and later would enter politics, 
running alongside Barry Goldwater as the 1964 Republican candidate for vice-
president.60
The lawyers’ arguments rehearsed many of the same points raised at Saia’s trials.  
Covington asserted that Lockport’s noise ordinance was invalid on its face, for it 
abridged Saia’s constitutional right to freedom of speech, assembly, and worship.  Citing 
the examples of the Lutheran rally and the chiming of church bells, he alleged that the 
Witnesses were victims of discrimination.  Offering an expansive understanding of 
religion’s proper place, Covington contended that individuals had preached the gospel in 
public parks “since the days of the Lord Jesus Christ and His apostles,” and that “the use 
to which the public park has been put by the appellant is similar to that of orthodox 
worshippers and preachers in church buildings where people worship.”  Religious 
worship in a public park was not only permissible, then, but it should be constitutionally 
protected in the same way that worship in a church might be.  Covington denied that 
using amplifiers in a public park entailed any greater degree of compulsion than 
disseminating religious literature or engaging in door-to-door canvassing, two practices 
                                                 
60For news coverage of the oral arguments, see “Lockport Ordinance Said Curbing Free Speech Right. 
High Court Hearing Saia Case,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, March 31, 1948.  On Covington, see 
Penton, Apocalypse Delayed, 79, 88; Henderson, “Jehovah’s Witnesses.”  As was the case in Saia, 
Covington usually would arrange for local lawyers to argue Witness-related cases at lower levels and then 
intervene directly either at the Circuit Court or Supreme Court level.  On Miller, see Libby Miller 
Fitzgerald, Bill Miller—Do You Know Me?: A Daughter Remembers (Lynchburg, VA: Warwick House 
Publishers, 2004). 
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that the Court previously had upheld.  In other words, he downplayed any concern for 
unwilling listeners, rejecting the contention that noise infringed on others’ rights to any 
greater extent than the Witnesses’ other public proselytizing practices.61
For the most part, however, Covington did not focus on Saia’s freedom of 
worship so much as his freedom of speech.  “Freedom of speech includes the right to be 
heard,” Covington maintained, and therefore entailed the right to use loudspeakers.  Anti-
noise ordinances emerged from early twentieth century concerns about the growing 
problem of urban noise, but Covington argued that industrialization had rendered 
amplifying technologies all the more necessary if unpopular minority groups were to 
make their voices heard amidst the cacophony of urban life.  This was true not only for 
religious preachers, but for political campaigners, labor organizers, and a variety of other 
public speakers, all of whom Covington differentiated from those who would use 
loudspeakers for commercial purposes, the original targets of much anti-noise legislation.  
Yes, cities had the right to protect citizens from unnecessary noise, Covington 
acknowledged.  But the problem with Lockport’s ordinance was ultimately that it was 
prohibitory, not regulatory.  Lockport might have a right to set time, place, and manner 
restrictions on the production of sound, but it could not issue a blanket ban on a particular 
mediating technology.  If the problem was noise, then Lockport should regulate decibel 
levels, not simply prohibit the use of loudspeakers altogether.  Finally, Covington cited 
the Cantwell decision as precedent to argue that Lockport’s ordinance conferred undue 
discretionary power on the chief of police, who retained sole authority to issue permits 
                                                 
61Transcript, 268; Saia v. New York, Jurisdictional Statement, 15. 
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allowing the use of loudspeakers.  For all of these reasons, Covington urged the Supreme 
Court to strike down Lockport’s ordinance as unconstitutional.62
The city continued to maintain that its ordinance offered a constitutionally valid 
vehicle for regulating noise.  Attorney William E. Miller filed a short brief with the 
Supreme Court in which he re-affirmed Police Court Judge Falsioni’s findings.  Lockport 
had not abridged Saia’s freedom of worship, nor had it interfered with his freedom of 
speech.  The city had not blocked the Witnesses from distributing literature, from 
preaching, or even from holding public meetings in the park.  There was no evidence of 
discrimination as all religious groups required a permit to operate loudspeakers in the 
park.  Moreover, amplifying devices bore no necessary relationship to speech, Miller 
insisted, and thus could be prohibited.  As discussed above, cities had singled out 
loudspeaker noise as distinctive enough to warrant specific legislation since at least the 
1920s.  Miller argued for the legitimacy of such measures and expressed concern for the 
“chaotic situation” that might ensue if every religious or civic organization in town could 
insist on its right to operate loudspeakers.  The city had a right to adopt reasonable 
regulations for reducing urban cacophony.  Miller urged the Court to affirm the lower 
court rulings.63
                                                 
62For Covington’s arguments, see Transcript, 266-269; Saia v. New York, Jurisdictional Statement; Saia v. 
New York, Reply Brief.  By arguing that industrialization made loudspeakers all the more necessary, 
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The Supreme Court issued its 5-4 decision in Saia v. New York on June 7, 1948.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas laid aside all questions related to religious 
freedom.  Instead, he held Lockport’s ordinance “unconstitutional on its face” on the 
ground that it “establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech in violation of 
the First Amendment which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against State 
action.”  Following Cantwell and other previous Witness-related cases, Douglas found 
that the ordinance conferred undue discretionary power on the chief of police and failed 
to prescribe any standards on the basis of which he should issue permits.  The right to use 
loudspeakers was not absolute, Douglas clarified.  “Noise can be regulated by regulating 
decibels,” he wrote, “The hours and place of public discussion can be controlled.”   But 
“loud-speakers are today indispensable instruments of effective public speech,” and could 
not be prohibited outright.  Douglas implied that the decibel might offer an objective 
means for differentiating noise from unobjectionable sounds.  But he also acknowledged 
that noise complaints tended to target particular sound producers, rather than particularly 
loud sounds.  “Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound,” he insisted.  
But this was true for unpopular political groups as much as it was true for unpopular 
religious groups.  Douglas overturned Saia’s conviction not because the Witnesses 
understood their activities as religiously required, but because their sermons constituted 
protected speech, analogous to political campaigning.  For Douglas, it seems to have been 
the substantive content that differentiated the Witnesses’ sounds from mere noise, not the 
source of obligation.64
                                                 
64Saia, 334 U.S. at 559-560, 562.  Over forty years ago, Philip Kurland argued that the First Amendment’s 
religion clauses should be read as a unity, guaranteeing nondiscrimination in religious matters.  In other 
words, Kurland argued that religion should be treated the same as non-religion.  Therefore, Kurland argued 
that Saia was correctly decided as a free speech case (and that Cantwell similarly should have been treated 
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Justice Frankurter, joined by Justices Reed and Burton, dissented on the ground 
that Lockport’s ordinance constituted a reasonable means for protecting the rights of 
unwilling listeners, for new amplifying technologies could warrant distinctive regulatory 
remedies.  “The native power of human speech can interfere little with the self-protection 
of those who do not wish to listen,” he wrote, but new amplifying technologies offered 
“too easy opportunities for aural aggression.”  The city was entitled to determine that the 
rights of the picnickers “who sought quiet and other pleasures that a park affords” 
outweighed “the appellant’s right to force his message upon them,” for “surely there is 
not a constitutional right to force unwilling people to listen.”  Frankfurter thus defined 
noise in terms of volume and emphatically differentiated this case from Cantwell.  
Municipal officials could not determine what constituted a legitimate religious cause, but 
they certainly could determine “what is in effect a nuisance.”  They certainly could 
identify noise.  Judicial remedies were available if the chief of police were to abuse his 
authority, but Frankfurter found no evidence of discrimination in this case.  The Lutheran 
rally was different, he maintained, because it was held in the baseball stadium, far 
removed from those who had chosen to enter the park for other reasons.  Frankfurter thus 
ignored Douglas’ warning that complaints about sound went hand in hand (or ear in ear?) 
                                                                                                                                                 
as a free speech case).  According to Kurland, the Court properly treated religious speech as comparable to 
political speech, rather than singling religious speech out as specially protected.  Singling religion out 
required the Court to define what counted as religion, a project that Kurland understood as violating the 
Establishment Clause. Kurland, “Right to Proselyte.”  Over the past few decades, I would suggest that 
courts increasingly have tended to follow Kurland’s proposal, preferring to avoid having to differentiate 
religion from non-religion at all.  But it also is interesting to note that local Jehovah’s Witnesses with 
whom I have spoken do not remember the case as having been decided on free speech grounds.  In 
interviews, both Joseph Saia (Samuel’s son) and Eleanor Gehl (present on one of the disputed Sundays and 
daughter of one of the witnesses at Saia’s trial) recalled that the analogy between preaching and church 
bells had proven decisive.  They both remembered the Court’s ruling as having centered on religious 
discrimination against the Witnesses.  In fact, the Court avoided having to rule on that question at all, 
though Justice Douglas implied that discrimination may have been a factor.  Saia, interview; Eleanor Gehl, 
interview by author, July 24, 2008. 
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with complaints about content.  This case had nothing to do with religious toleration, he 
maintained.  It simply was about the problem of unwanted noise.65
Justice Jackson wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he mostly agreed 
with Frankfurter, arguing that the city had a right to prohibit amplifying apparatuses 
whose use “could render life unbearable.”  But Jackson’s dissent is also notable because 
he alone took on the religious issue.  Jackson pointed out that in another case that same 
year, McCollum v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court had held “that the 
Constitution prohibits a state or municipality from using tax-supported property ‘to aid 
religious groups to spread their faith.’”  But was not the majority decision in this case 
requiring Lockport in effect to do just that—to allow the Jehovah’s Witnesses to 
appropriate a public park for the purpose of spreading their faith?66
Jackson was highlighting the apparent tension between the Establishment and 
Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment, which seemed to mandate state action in 
one case that was deemed impermissible in another.  But he also was raising critical 
questions about religion’s place in a diverse society.  “I think Lockport had the right…to 
keep out of [the park] installations of devices which would flood the area with religious 
appeals obnoxious to many,” Jackson maintained.  The Witnesses already had held at 
least four meetings in Outwater Park, he reminded the Court: “There are 256 recognized 
                                                 
65Saia, 334 U.S. at 563-4 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Justice Frankfurter almost assembled a majority 
around his opinion.  In mid-May, just a couple of week before the Court handed down its decision, Chief 
Justice Vinson switched his vote from Frankfurter to Douglas.  The key issue for Vinson was whether Saia 
was distinguishable from Cantwell, and Vinson decided finally that it was not.  See Felix Frankfurter 
Papers (microfilm) (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America), 1986 (hereafter Frankfurter 
Papers). 
66Saia, 334 U.S. at 569 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  The McCollum case tested an Illinois law that permitted 
religious groups to use public school classrooms during school hours to teach religion.  The Court struck 
down Illinois’ policy as unconstitutional, finding that it violated the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause.  McCollum v. Board of Education 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
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religious denominations in the United States and even if the Lockport populace supports 
only a few of these, it is apparent that Jehovah’s Witnesses were granted more than their 
share of the Sunday time available on any fair allocation of it among denominations.”  In 
a religiously diverse society, the government could not possibly offer equal time to each 
religious group, and thus sectarian differences were best kept out of public space 
altogether.  Jackson privileged the ears of the majority and ignored the ways that 
mainline Protestantism already shaped American public culture, suggesting instead that 
religious difference was best kept private if certain messages were deemed “obnoxious to 
many.”  Were loudspeakers indispensable for dissenting groups striving to make 
themselves heard, to announce their presence, and to contribute to the chorus of 
American religious voices?  Or would amplifying religious difference only create chaotic 
confusion and intolerable cacophony?  The majority opinion had left such questions 
unaddressed and unresolved as it struck down Lockport’s ordinance and overturned 
Saia’s conviction.67
Reactions to the Saia decision predictably were mixed.  Watch Tower 
publications celebrated the Supreme Court’s decision as an unequivocal triumph for the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.  An article in Awake! exuberantly praised Saia as “one of the great 
landmarks in constitutional law” and as “a beacon to the right to hear and the right to be 
heard.”  The author interpreted the majority’s decision as a stinging rebuke to the notion 
that there might be a “freedom to be let alone” in public spaces.  “‘Freedom of privacy’ in 
a public place is too far-fetched to be taken seriously,” he concluded.  Buoyed by this 
success, the 1949 Yearbook of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society anticipated that 
                                                 
67Saia, 334 U.S. at 570 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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“the public meeting work in parks and public squares will be on the increase in the 
United States because of this fine decision by the United States Supreme Court.”  Public 
parks would continue to serve as places for spreading the good news of God’s kingdom, 
for opening deaf ears to the sound of God’s word.68
National critics of the Saia decision found solace in the strongly-worded 
dissenting opinions.  H.L. Mencken and E.B. White each sent letters to Justice 
Frankfurter praising his position and expressing their concerns about the escalating urban 
noise problem.  “At the rate we’re going in the world of noise,” White wrote, “we may 
shortly be faced with Supreme Court decisions recorded, amplified, and shouted down 
from low-flying planes—and even find Justice itself getting to be a public nuisance.”  
Mencken was characteristically even less reserved.  “I am glad you are thinking of the 
right to privacy,” he wrote, “It seems to me that this is a right even anterior to the right of 
free speech.  This great free Republic is being wrecked by bores and quacks who insist 
upon forcing their insane ideas upon their neighbors.  If anyone ever suggests hanging 
them I’ll certainly not object.”  Some listeners worried especially about the implications 
of the Court’s decision during an election year in which sound trucks were proving 
particularly pervasive.  “I plead for the establishment of just one more association: the 
Silence-Lovers of America,” R.W. Elliott wrote in a letter to the New York Herald 
Tribune, “There should be no dues.  The only obligation of members should be to refuse 
adamantly and without exceptions to support any political candidate or other advertiser 
who employs offensively loud sound trucks.”  These critics did not differentiate between 
                                                 
68“Right to Hear and To Be Heard,” Awake! (August 22, 1948): 3-7; Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 
1949 Yearbook of Jehovah’s Witnesses containing report for the service year of 1948 (Brooklyn, NY: 
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 1948), 54- 55. 
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religious and non-religious sounds.  Loudspeakers and other amplifying devices posed 
the same threat to society, regardless of source or content.69
These anti-noise crusaders undoubtedly would have been encouraged by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in another sound truck case the following term.  In Kovacs v. 
Cooper, the Court upheld the conviction of a New Jersey man for violating a Trenton 
anti-noise ordinance that prohibited the amplification of “loud and raucous noises.”  
Writing for the majority, Justice Reed differentiated Kovacs from Saia on the ground that 
Trenton’s ordinance offered a standard for regulating sound trucks that had been absent 
in Lockport’s statute.  But other Justices disagreed that the cases differed in any 
substantial way and believed that the Court’s Kovacs decision flatly contradicted its 
finding in Saia.  In fact, Justices Frankfurter and Jackson each wrote separate opinions in 
which they outlined the same basic positions they had adopted in Saia, although they 
concurred with the Kovacs decision rather than dissent from it.  Similarly, Justice Black 
wrote a dissenting opinion in which he re-affirmed the principles of Justice Douglas’ 
majority opinion in Saia.  The Supreme Court Justices continued to disagree about 
whether loudspeakers constituted a particular nuisance that warranted distinctive 
legislative redress.  The Jehovah’s Witnesses’ legal victory in Saia perhaps was not as 
conclusive as they had claimed.70
                                                 
69E.B. White to Justice Felix Frankfurter, 29 June 1948, Frankfurter Papers; H.L. Mencken to Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, 14 June 1948, Frankfurter Papers; R.W. Elliott, Jr., “The Loud Speaker Fallacy,” New York 
Herald Tribune, November 1, 1948. 
70Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).  It should be emphasized that Kovacs lacked any religious 
element.  The Kovacs broadcaster was commenting on an ongoing Trenton labor dispute.  The Court 
decided both Saia and Kovacs on free speech grounds.  But Philip Kurland has suggested that the cases’ 
disparate outcomes might be attributed to the fact that Saia was engaged in religious proselytizing.  In other 
words, without acknowledging it, the Court actually might have been treating religious sounds differently.  
Kurland, “Right to Proselyte,” 72. 
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In Lockport, the situation on the ground after Saia was even more mixed.  A local 
newspaper editorial offered lukewarm praise for the Court’s decision, but urged residents 
to practice “moderation in all things, especially when adjusting the volume control.”  
Samuel Saia certainly felt vindicated to an extent, although his son, Joseph, describes 
Samuel’s response to the decision as more relieved than anything else.  Joseph also thinks 
that the experience strengthened his father’s faith.  “He took a position that he felt was 
based on not only law, but based on the Bible,” Joseph recalls, “That he took the Bible as 
law for him, and he thought that the Bible taught you must preach the good news of the 
kingdom, just like Jesus did.  And he took that to heart, and he stood by it.”  Saia 
interpreted the decision as unambiguously affirming his right to use his sound car to 
preach the good news, but also emphasized in interviews that it was not only his own 
rights that were at stake, “for when the rights of just one individual are involved, the 
rights of all Americans stand in jeopardy.”71
Lockport’s city officials appear to have drawn a different message from the 
Court’s decision, however.  According to City Counsel Noonan’s interpretation of Justice 
Douglas’ opinion, Lockport’s anti-noise ordinance had two problems, namely that it 
delegated undue discretionary authority to a single city official and that it prohibited 
loudspeakers and sound trucks, rather than regulate their time, place, and manner.  In 
response, the Lockport Common Council passed two amendments to the anti-noise 
ordinance in June 1949.  First, permits had to be obtained from a Board of Police 
Commissioners, consisting of four city officials rather than the police chief alone, though 
                                                 
71“Moderation Philosophy Applies Also to Noise,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, June 8, 1948; 
Saia, interview; “Noonan to Study Court Decision on ‘Free Speech,’” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, 
June 8, 1948. 
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the ordinance continued not to offer any standards to guide deliberations.  Second, and 
even more significant, the council placed a series of new restrictions on sound car use.  
According to the new ordinance, sound cars only could be operated between 11:30am and 
1:30pm or between 4:30pm and 6:30pm, never on Sundays, and always had to be moving 
at least ten miles per hour.  Furthermore, their acoustic range could not exceed one 
hundred feet, and they could not be operated within one hundred feet of a hospital, 
school, church, or courthouse.  Lockport styled this new law after a model ordinance 
provided by the National Institute of Municipal Officers, and there is no evidence that the 
city officials specifically targeted the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  But these new restrictions 
seemed to preclude precisely the kind of activity in which Saia had been engaged.  They 
continued to single out sound trucks and loudspeakers as posing a particular threat to 
public peace and order.  They also protected particular times and places—including 
Sundays and churches—from unwanted noise, perhaps subtly implying that religious 
devotion was best kept quiet or at least out of the shared spaces of communal life.  
Lockport’s amended ordinance seemed to threaten the very rights that the Witnesses had 
fought to defend before the Supreme Court.72
Meanwhile, Lockport Witnesses with whom I have spoken do not recall ever 
again holding public meetings in Outwater Park.  They continued to canvass door-to-door 
and to distribute religious literature, but they do not seem ever to have acted on their legal 
victory.  It does not appear that this decision was a direct result of the council’s new 
regulations, although they undoubtedly had an effect.  Instead, Eleanor Gehl, who 
                                                 
72Lockport, NY, Code § 125 (1980); “City Amends Anti-Noise Ordinance,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & 
Journal, June 7, 1949; “Ordinance Sets Fee for Sound Trucks,” Lockport (NY) Union-Sun & Journal, June 
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attended at least one of the meetings at which Saia was arrested and whose father testified 
at Saia’s trials, thinks that the construction of a Kingdom Hall in Lockport rendered park 
meetings unnecessary.  Lockport Witnesses begin to sponsor services in their own space.  
“We invited people to our Kingdom Hall, same purpose,” she recalls, “The work was 
getting started…it was growing.  And that’s how they felt it was helpful to get people 
interested.”  Ironically, as the Jehovah’s Witnesses established themselves more firmly in 
Lockport, they appear to have moved increasingly indoors, into the more “traditional” 
built institutions that dominated Lockport religious life.  As the Witnesses made a place 
for themselves in Lockport, perhaps they found it less necessary to make a claim on 
Lockport’s public space.  Perhaps it no longer seemed necessary to make their voices 
heard quite as loudly.73
 
Conclusion 
The Saia case had focused on an unpopular minority group’s use of new 
amplifying technologies to announce presence, to claim space, and to fulfill a religious 
obligation to preach God’s word to others.  But in so doing, Jehovah’s Witnesses also had 
caused a public nuisance, infringing on the rights of unwilling listeners as they dominated 
acoustic space with their sounds.  Lockport officials had enforced the city’s anti-noise 
ordinance in order to protect the rights of local residents, of those who did not wish to 
hear, but such ordinances also could be applied discriminatorily, acting as effective mutes 
on dissent.  Throughout the legal proceedings, participants had disputed these varying 
interpretations of what was at stake, disagreeing fundamentally about whether this case 
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centered on concerns about religion or about noise, about protecting one group’s freedom 
of worship or about preserving the public peace.  They disagreed about whether the 
loudspeaker functioned as a vehicle of power or dissent. 
This case makes audible one of the central problems associated with regulating 
religious noise.  As I explore more extensively in chapter 5, regulating noise has required 
a stable definition of what constitutes noise, and regulating religion similarly has required 
religion.  Yet disputants advanced competing conceptions of each of these terms.  
Religion and noise were not fixed categories, but instead proved pragmatically malleable, 
negotiated in relation to each other and toward distinct strategic ends.  By defining their 
sounds as religion, the Jehovah’s Witnesses presented themselves as victims of 
discrimination, singled out because of their unpopular beliefs and deserving of special 
constitutional protection.  But Lockport officials defined the same sounds as noise.  And 
in so doing, they presented themselves as defenders of the general welfare and as 
advocates of equal treatment for all Lockport residents, whether religious or not.  They 
dismissed the Witnesses as sound imperialists, aural aggressors who were insensitive to 
the rights of others.74
But disputants did not contest whether the Witnesses in fact were engaged in 
religious practice so much as they disagreed about whether religion was out of place in 
this particular context.  They demarcated religion’s normative boundaries differently, 
offering competing conceptions of religion’s place in pluralistic public spaces.  By using 
loudspeakers to make their voices heard, the Witnesses had rendered religion portable, 
spilling over into Lockport’s streets, homes, and public parks.  They had transformed a 
                                                 
74For classic articles by legal scholars on the problem of defining noise legally, see Lloyd, “Noise as a 
Nuisance”; Spater, “Noise and the Law.” 
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public park into a religious site, constructing public space as a place for amplifying 
religious difference.  But some Lockport officials and residents sought to protect public 
space from chaotic cacophony, implying instead that sectarian differences were best kept 
quiet.  They aimed to shelter public space from the sounds of religious variety, 
circumscribing religion’s boundaries and confining it to certain times and places where 
individuals could choose whether to encounter it.  But in so arguing, they also turned a 
deaf ear to the acoustic dominance of Lockport’s more “mainstream” religions, to the 
ways that church bells already shaped Lockport’s public culture.  Disputants thus offered 
competing conceptions of the relationship between religious sounds, public space, and 
social power. 
The Supreme Court’s Saia decisions mostly ignored the case’s religious 
dimensions, yet they remain the Court’s most direct statements on the relationship 
between religion and noise.  Over the next fifty years, a series of other cases would 
continue to challenge U.S. courts to adjudicate between the rights of religious adherents 
and the rights of unwilling listeners.  Judges often referred back to the Saia decisions, 
particularly to Justice Douglas’ memorable assertion that “annoyance at ideas can be 
cloaked in annoyance at sound.”  Indeed, courts have continued to struggle to separate 
complaints about volume from complaints about content, complaints about noise from 
complaints about particular noisemakers.  The Saia case involved members of a new 
religious movement, a group of particularly aggressive religious dissenters.  But over the 
next fifty years, new religious immigrants also increasingly would introduce sounds of 
their own into American cities.  They would further diversify the American religious 
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soundscape, claiming a place for themselves while further dislodging church bells from 
their normative status.  But these sounds also would not go uncontested.75
In a blistering 1989 dissenting opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall reminded the 
Supreme Court that “new music always sounds loud to old ears.”  Although he was not 
talking about religious sounds, Marshall’s words easily could have applied just as well to 
recent religious noise disputes.  In the next chapter, I turn to a 2004 case about 
broadcasting the Islamic call to prayer in a historically Polish-Catholic Michigan 
community.  By attending to this dispute, I consider how “old ears” have responded to 
“new music”—or to the sounds of religious newcomers.  I consider how some Americans 
have continued to hear “new” sounds as distinctly out of place.76
                                                 
75As I discuss in chapter 4, a Michigan judge quoted Justice Douglas’ Saia assertion in 1980 while 
upholding a Dearborn mosque’ right to broadcast the Islamic call to prayer.  Dearborn v. Hussian, et. al., 
No. 79-933979-AR (Wayne County Ct. June 3, 1980). 
76Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 810 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall was 
quoting Nicolas Slonimsky, Lexicon of Musical Invective: Critical Assaults on Composers Since 
Beethoven’s Time (New York: Coleman-Ross, 1953), 18. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CALLING EVERYONE TO PRAY: 
PLACING MUSLIMS IN HAMTRAMCK, MICHIGAN 
 
Joanna Golen was upset.  “My main objection is simple,” she explained to the 
New York Times following a contentious Hamtramck Common Council meeting in April 
2004. “I don't want to be told that Allah is the true and only God five times a day, 365 
days a year.  It's against my constitutional rights to have to listen to another religion 
evangelize in my ear.”  Golen spoke for many long-time residents of that Michigan city, 
located next to Detroit, who opposed a proposed amendment that would exempt the azan, 
or Islamic call to prayer, from a municipal noise ordinance.  A historically Polish-
Catholic enclave, Hamtramck has received an influx of immigrants in recent years from 
Bangladesh, Yemen, Bosnia, and other Muslim countries.  Golen interpreted the city’s 
effort to accommodate Muslim practice as a violation of her religious freedom, for the 
azan would spill over into Hamtramck’s streets and homes, calling everyone to pray.  But 
others heard the azan differently.  Its sound was no more out of place than the chimes of 
nearby church bells, Rahiji Auooon contended.  “Just like we hear the church bells, 
which I have no problem with that because I love the sound of the church bells, they 
should not have a problem with our call for prayer,” Auooon explained to a National 
Public Radio reporter. “I mean, like I told everybody inside, we're all one.  Just as they're 
Americans, I'm an American citizen.  I was born and raised in America, and we should all 
be treated equally.”1
As in Hamtramck, the call to prayer frequently has functioned as a flashpoint in 
disputes about the integration of Muslims into American communities.  While many 
mosques have chosen not to broadcast the azan, others have used it to claim a place on 
the American religious soundscape alongside the chimes of church bells.  But the azan’s 
call rarely has gone unnoticed.  Neighbors regularly have resisted and regarded as 
inappropriate its public pronouncement of Islamic presence.  Even when they have put up 
with the visual display of new mosques, many communities have insisted that these 
mosques remain quiet.  In 2005, for example, another Michigan city approved 
construction permits for a mosque only after a contentious series of public hearings and a 
U.S. Justice Department investigation.  But even then, city officials insisted on a legal 
provision that “there be no loudspeaker or other device mounted on the building that can 
be heard from the outside of the building for the purpose of call to prayer five times a 
day.”  Even though the proposed mosque had not even intended to broadcast the azan, the 
city made clear that it would not tolerate any noise.2
In this chapter, I delve into Hamtramck’s discordant azan dispute, which began in 
December 2003 when the al-Islah Islamic Center requested permission to broadcast the 
azan over electric loudspeakers.  For the next six months, controversy raged in 
Hamtramck, receiving national attention, as residents such as Golen and Auooon debated 
                                                 
1John Leland, “Tension in a Michigan City over Muslims’ Call to Prayer,” New York Times, May 5, 2004; 
Quinn Klinefelter, “Analysis: Michigan Town’s Residents Divided on Muslim Prayer Calls Being 
Broadcast over Loudspeakers,” Morning Edition, NPR, April 27, 2004. 
2Steve Elturk, interview by author, July 24, 2007; Minutes of the Planning Commission of Warren, 
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the council’s proposed noise ordinance amendment and interpreted the azan’s call in 
different ways.  They disagreed about whether the azan was too loud.  They differed as to 
whether its call belonged in public or whether religious differences were best kept quiet.  
And they debated the social and political implications of their city’s shifting 
demographics.  As they contested whether the azan constituted noise, whether it sounded 
“out of place,” they negotiated the place of Muslims, Catholics, and religion in their 
community. 
The Hamtramck dispute offers a useful case study for considering both how 
immigrant religious communities have used public sounds to make place and how 
neighbors’ noise complaints have circumscribed that place.  By broadcasting the azan, 
Hamtramck Muslims placed themselves in their new community, alongside Hamtramck’s 
longtime Polish-Catholic residents, but some complainants heard the azan as signaling 
their own displacement.  The dispute also amplifies how religious sounds take on new 
meanings in new social contexts.  When Hamtramck Muslims broadcast the azan, they 
were not targeting a homogenous audience, but rather multiple, diverse listening 
communities, both willing and unwilling, who did not hear the call in the same way.  
Scholarship on religious auditory cultures has tended to concentrate on how sound 
functions within particular bounded traditions.  But this chapter attends especially to the 
ways that public sounds cross boundaries, mediating contact among diverse religious 
communities and shaping the terms of their encounters.  It attends to how the azan 
blurred religious borders, inviting Muslims, Catholics, and others all to respond to its 
call.  And it also attends to how critics re-fortified these boundaries by demarcating the 
azan’s sound as “foreign” or “out of place.”  As the azan spilled over into Hamtramck’s 
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streets and homes, residents debated whether it signaled new pluralistic possibilities or 
intolerable cacophony.3
Broader national debates about American religious pluralism shaped the 
Hamtramck dispute in significant ways.  While America always has been diverse, 
changes in immigration laws in 1965 have expanded the range of non-Protestant options, 
increasing the presence of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Latino Catholics, and others.  As 
in the Hamtramck case study, this expanded pluralism has raised practical questions 
about fairness, accommodation, and equality, while scholars also have debated its 
implications for civic unity, moral consensus, and national identity.  At the same time, 
political events have thrust American Muslims into a particularly public spotlight.  
Events such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution came to symbolize a global Islamic revival 
that has called “for a renewed intentionality about the role of Islam in the running of the 
state and in the public as well as private lives of Muslims.”  These movements have 
raised questions about Islam’s compatibility with liberal democracy and have shaped how 
Americans have received and responded to Muslim immigrants.  As is common among 
immigrant communities, American Muslims also have debated among themselves the 
extent to which they should adapt their beliefs and practices to the American context.  
The September 11 terrorist attacks only have intensified these discussions about 
                                                 
3 My understanding of how religious groups have used sound (and other public practices) both to make 
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Muslims’ place in American society, accounting for much of the national interest in the 
Hamtramck dispute.4
These broader factors shaped the Hamtramck dispute, but so, too, did particular 
local dynamics.  In the first section of this chapter, I trace how Hamtramck developed as 
a Polish-Catholic enclave and how its residents fashioned a distinct civic identity, defined 
in opposition both to Detroit and the more affluent suburbs.  In the next section, I 
consider how the azan placed Muslim newcomers in Hamtramck but also how it 
mediated contact among diverse listening communities.  The azan took on new meanings 
as it sounded in this new acoustic space.  I then situate the Common Council’s decision to 
accommodate Muslim practice within the context of Hamtramck’s rapidly shifting 
                                                 
4For an account of colonial diversity, see Jon Butler, Becoming America: The Revolution before 1776 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).  Of course, some regions were more diverse than 
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Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 207.  The azan has 
figured prominently in debates between conservative and liberal American Muslims.  In the late 1970s, for 
example, a conservative faction seized control of a Dearborn, Michigan, mosque that previously had been 
considered highly “Americanized.”  Shortly thereafter, they began to broadcast the azan, which led to a 
lawsuit that is discussed below.  For accounts of this takeover, see Tom Hundley and Stephen Franklin, 
“Worship in a World Apart,” Detroit Free Press, November 28, 1983; Nabeel Abraham, “Arab Detroit’s 
‘American’ Mosque,” in Arab Detroit: From Margin to Mainstream, eds. Nabeel Abraham and Andrew 
Shryock, 279-311 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000). 
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political landscape.  The council’s permission distinguished this dispute from the Saia 
case in important ways. 
Next, I analyze the arguments that speakers advanced at a series of contentious 
council meetings.  I listen to how they debated whether the azan belonged in Hamtramck 
or whether it sounded out of place, whether it was placing Muslims or displacing 
Catholics.  I attend especially to three common themes.  First, as in other chapters, 
disputants contested whether the azan constituted religion or noise, categories that proved 
pragmatically malleable and thus strategically useful.  Second, disputants contested 
whether religious sounds belonged in public.  The azan’s proponents imagined 
polyphonic public places overflowing with the sounds of religious variety, while its 
opponents demanded a right to be shielded from religious difference.  Third, disputants 
situated the azan differently within competing conceptions of American religious 
identity.  Opponents heard the azan signaling a threat to Christian consensus, while its 
proponents heard an opportunity to fashion new, more inclusive collective boundaries.  
Finally, I follow how the Hamtramck dispute was resolved through political processes, 
rather than by judicial intervention.  In the end, city residents voted to affirm the 
mosque’s right to broadcast, and the sound of the azan gradually faded into Hamtramck’s 
background.  This case study thus offers a particularly rich opportunity for listening to 
how ordinary Americans have responded to the sounds of religious difference, and, 
through their responses, how they have negotiated religion’s place in a pluralistic society. 
 
“A Touch of the World in America” 
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The official website for Hamtramck, Michigan, invites visitors to experience “a 
touch of the world in America.”  The website includes pages written in Arabic, Polish, 
Albanian, and Serbo-Croatian.  Storefront signs throughout the 2.1 square mile city 
located just north of downtown Detroit similarly attract customers in a variety of 
languages.  Diners can choose from any of a number of ethnic cuisines, including 
Lebanese, Mexican, Polish, Indian, Bangladeshi, Thai, Greek, and Ukrainian.  Walking 
around town, one gets the sense that the website’s boast is not far from the truth.  Yet it 
was not always this way in Hamtramck.  The call to prayer dispute emerged, in part, from 
the remarkable demographic, religious, and economic shifts that the city has experienced 
over the last several decades, as an almost exclusively Polish-American community has 
struggled to redefine itself.5
Named after a French Canadian soldier in 1798, Hamtramck Township remained 
rural throughout the nineteenth century.  Settled first by French explorers and then 
German immigrants, Hamtramck’s population barely had topped thirty-five hundred by 
the end of the twentieth century’s first decade.  But that all changed when the Dodge 
Brothers chose to build their new automobile factory in Hamtramck in 1910.  The Dodge 
Main, as it came to be called, attracted tens of thousands of Polish immigrant workers, 
who settled in Hamtramck and helped to transform its sprawling farmland into a densely 
packed, working-class urban neighborhood.  By 1920, Hamtramck’s population had 
skyrocketed to 48,615.  Its current geographic boundaries were fixed in 1922, when it 
                                                 
5City of Hamtramck, Michigan, “Official Website,” http://www.hamtramck.us. 
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was incorporated as politically independent, yet surrounded by the city of Detroit on all 
sides, except for a small section that borders Highland Park.6
The Dodge Main workers lived close together, within walking distance of the 
factory.  Eighty-five percent of Hamtramck’s homes were constructed between 1915 and 
1930, mostly two- and three-story bungalows on thirty-foot lots, with little space between 
neighbors.  Following political incorporation, the Poles quickly came to dominate local 
politics, displacing their German predecessors from all positions of power in the city.  
And the Polish workers also began to build religious, civic, and educational institutions, 
gradually transforming Hamtramck into an “island of Polish-American culture within the 
metropolitan area of Detroit,” as one sociological study described it in 1955.7
As in other Polish-American communities, Hamtramck’s three Roman Catholic 
parishes quickly became the city’s most important social institutions, offering its factory 
workers significant sources of strength and support.  Polish immigrants spreading 
northward from Detroit had organized St. Florian’s parish in 1907, three years before 
Dodge Main opened, and Hamtramck’s rapid demographic growth soon led to the 
organization of Our Lady Queen of Apostles parish in 1917 and St. Ladislaus parish in 
1920.  In addition, a Polish National Catholic Church was built in 1922.  Polish Catholics 
constructed their collective religious identity around these parishes.  As late as 1979, one 
urban anthropologist described “what it means to be an urban working-class Polish 
American” as “an individual whose life revolves around the family, the parish, and the 
                                                 
6Greg Kowalski, Hamtramck: The Driven City (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Pub., 2002); Arthur Evans Wood, 
Hamtramck, Then and Now: A Sociological Study of a Polish-American Community (New York: Bookman 
Associates, 1955); Greg Kowalski, interview by author, July 11, 2007. 
7Kowalski, Hamtramck; Wood, Hamtramck, Then and Now, 21; Kowalski, interview. 
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neighborhood.”  Detroit’s Polish Catholics largely lived in a world apart.  They 
segregated themselves from other Roman Catholics, maintained a distinct ethnic identity, 
and advocated strong lay authority, which frequently put them at odds with the Irish-
dominated Detroit Archdiocese.  They were proud of their parishes, and built magnificent 
churches, perhaps none as fine as St. Florian’s, which opened a new building in 1928.  St. 
Florian’s dominated Hamtramck’s visual and auditory landscapes, and it came to 
symbolize the community’s coalescing identity.  Located “in the midst of the small 
homes of those it served,” its two-hundred foot tall spire could be seen from miles away, 
and its bells resounded throughout the city.  Boston architect Ralph Adams Cram 
expressly intended St. Florian’s to replace the Dodge Main as emblematic of Hamtramck, 
hoping that it would stand for “beauty, prayer, community, and order at the very center of 
the world of ugliness, smoke, noise, profit and materialism.”  The dedication of its bells 
in 1928 provided an important opportunity for Hamtramck’s Polish Catholics to celebrate 
their communal growth.  As one historian described the event, “In a very tangible way 
the bells brought together the parish community as the first step in giving life and making 
their own the structure that was soon to become the center of their neighborhood and 
their lives.”8
                                                 
8Paul Wrobel, Our Way: Family, Parish, and Neighborhood in a Polish-American Community (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 39; Frank Serafino, West of Warsaw (Hamtramck, MI: 
Avenue Pub. Co., 1983); Leslie Woodcock Tentler, Seasons of Grace: A History of the Catholic 
Archdiocese of Detroit (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990); St. Florian Parish, Hamtramck, 
Michigan, 1908-1983: History of a Faith Community (Hamtramck, MI: St. Florian Parish, 1983), 80, 83; 
St. Ladislaus Parish, Hamtramck, Michigan, 1920-1970: The Growth of a Community (Hamtramck, MI: St. 
Ladislaus Parish, 1970); Our Lady Queen of Apostles Parish, Hamtramck, Michigan: 1917-1992 
(Hamtramck, MI: Our Lady Queen of Apostles Parish, 1992).  For a historiographical essay on Polish-
American religion, see William J. Galush, “Polish Americans and Religion,” in Polish Americans and the 
History: Community, Culture, and Politics, ed. John J. Bukowczyk, 80-92 (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1996). 
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With its religious and social institutions in place, Hamtramck continued to grow.  
By the mid-1930s, its population had reached close to 60,000, of whom over eighty 
percent were ethnically Polish.  Union activity was particularly strong during this decade, 
as the United Auto Workers staged the largest sit-down strike in American history at the 
Dodge Main in 1937.  Hamtramck’s Polish community also embraced democracy, voting 
in remarkably high numbers, always consistently Democratic, leading to campaign visits 
from Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and John F. Kennedy.  Hamtramck thrived 
during the 1940s and 50s, thanks in part to a booming postwar economy.  Religious 
devotion and church attendance remained strong, and the parish churches frequently took 
to the streets, sponsoring numerous processions throughout the year.  Its Polish Catholic 
identity was only reinforced further when Cardinal Karol Wojtyla (later Pope John Paul 
II) visited the city in 1969.9
By that time, the city’s fortunes had begun to change.  During the 1950s, 
increasing prosperity and the density of urban living encouraged thousands of 
Hamtramck residents to leave for the suburbs.  A 1940 population of 48,838 declined to 
34,137 by 1960 and to 27,245 in 1970.  In just thirty years, the city had lost nearly half of 
its population.  A disastrous urban renewal project during the 1960s combined with 
                                                 
9Kowalski, Hamtramck; Wood, Hamtramck, Then and Now, Kowalski, interview.  On union activity in 
Hamtramck, see Mark Steven Freyberg, “Constructing the UAW Dodge Local 3: Collective Identity, 
Collective Efficacy, Collective Action” (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1995); Patricia Leslie 
Pilling, “A Case Study of Skilled Polish American Automobile Workers in Hamtramck, Michigan” (PhD 
Dissertation, Wayne State University, 1987).  On public processions, see St. Florian Parish; St. Ladislaus 
Parish; Our Lady Queen of Apostles Parish.  St. Ladislaus parish claims the largest religious demonstration 
in Hamtramck history on Marian Day, 1954.  Also see Reports of Archdiocese of Detroit Canonical 
Visitations, 1954, Archives of the Archdiocese of Detroit.  These reports list the annual processions 
performed at each parish.  They also further reinforce Hamtramck’s sense of its distinct identity.  For 
example, in response to the question, “What special interest is manifested in non-Catholics in the parish?,” 
the report for Our Lady Queen of Apostles says “Nothing special – not too many of them,” while the report 
for St. Ladislaus leaves the question blank.  Of course, Hamtramck’s homogeneity was partially imagined, 
for its population has always consisted of about ten to fifteen percent non-Catholic African-Americans who 
have frequently been ignored by their Polish-American neighbors.  See Kowalski, Hamtramck. 
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problems in the automobile industry during the 1970s devastated Hamtramck’s economy, 
the final blow coming when the Chrysler Corporation decided to close the Dodge Main in 
1980.  Yet for many observers, Hamtramck remained synonymous with Polish-America.  
A public relations campaign during the early 1980s purposefully played on this public 
perception, marketing the city as a “touch of Europe in America.”10
While designed to attract shoppers and businesses, this public relations campaign 
ignored the ways that Hamtramck already was changing.  Starting in the early 1970s, 
Yemeni immigrants began to settle in Hamtramck’s south end, drawn by the promise of 
factory work.  Hamtramck’s Eastern European population diversified rapidly, as 
Albanians, Bosnians, Croatians, and Ukrainians moved to the town in large numbers.  
Immigrants from Bangladesh and other South Asian countries soon arrived, as well.  
These newcomers transformed the city’s ethnic composition, and they also revitalized its 
economy, opening new shops and restaurants and offering new labor forces.  The 2000 
Census recorded the first increase in Hamtramck’s population since 1930, rising from a 
low of 18,372 in 1990 to 22,976.  Poles remained the single largest ethnic group, but 
constituted only twenty-three percent of the population.  Moreover, various studies found 
that forty-one percent of residents were born outside of the United States and that public 
school students spoke close to thirty different languages at home.  Hamtramck had grown 
startlingly diverse.11
                                                 
10Kowalski, Hamtramck, 130; Serafino, West of Warsaw; Kowalski, interview. 
112000 Census; City of Hamtramck, Michigan, “Official Website,” http://www.hamtramck.us.  The Census 
figure is probably low, since it does not include undocumented immigrants and tends to undercount non-
English speakers. 
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These newcomers brought with them new religious beliefs and practices.  At the 
same time as the Detroit Archdiocese, facing an aging Catholic population, was closing 
all of Hamtramck’s parochial schools, mosques began to appear in converted office 
buildings and storefronts.  Indeed, a vast majority of the new immigrants were Muslim, 
especially those who had arrived from Yemen, Bangladesh, and Bosnia.  Arab 
immigrants and African-Americans had been building Islam in Detroit and nearby 
Dearborn since at least the first half of the twentieth century.  But Muslims were 
relatively new to Hamtramck.  Their presence challenged this historically Polish-
American community to rethink its distinct civic identity.12
 
Broadcasting the Call 
One of the newcomers to Hamtramck was Abdul Motlib, who in September 2003 
petitioned the Hamtramck Common Council for permission to broadcast the azan.  
Motlib had moved with his family from Bangladesh to New York City in 1984 and had 
                                                 
12Most Hamtramck residents with whom I have spoken assume that a majority of Hamtramck’s population 
is now Muslim, though reliable statistics are difficult to obtain in part because the U.S. Census does not ask 
about religious affiliation.  In fact, it is hard to come by reliable statistics for the American Muslim 
population as a whole, though many accounts describe Islam as the fastest growing religion in the United 
States today.  Recent studies have estimated the number of American Muslims as ranging from anywhere 
between one and a half million to seven million people.  For a discussion of the problems related to 
obtaining reliable statistics, see Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “Muslim Americans: Middle 
Class and Mostly Mainstream,” Pew Research Center, May 22, 2007, http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/ 
muslim-americans.pdf.  The Pew Forum report estimated the American Muslim population at 2.35 million.  
The “Building Islam in Detroit” project at the University of Michigan currently is studying the history of 
Islam in Detroit.  See their website at http://www.umich.edu/~biid/.  For a collection of essays that includes 
some attention to the roots of Islam in Detroit, see Nabeel Abraham and Andrew Shryock, eds., Arab 
Detroit: From Margin to Mainstream (Detroit: Wayne State University, 2000).   As the title suggests, this 
collection focuses on Arab-Americans, many of whom were not Muslim.  For one account of African-
American Muslims, see Richard Brent Turner, Islam in the African-American Experience (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1997).  Scholars of American Islam recently have turned their attention to the 
often tense relationship between African-American and immigrant Muslims.  It should be emphasized that 
Hamtramck’s Muslim population is both ethnically and racially heterogeneous.  St. Florian’s school was 
the last parochial school to close in 2005 and marked the end of Catholic education in Hamtramck.  The 
closings dealt a serious psychological blow to long-time Hamtramck residents.  See the Hamtramck (MI) 
Citizen, March 23, 2005. 
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relocated again to Hamtramck in 1998.  The Detroit area had attracted him with its 
relatively low cost of living and strong Muslim presence.  In 2001, Motlib converted a 
former chiropractor’s office into the al-Islah Islamic Center, a small, unassuming mosque 
located one block from Hamtramck’s primary commercial thoroughfare.  A factory 
worker and part-time travel agent, Motlib served as al-Islah’s president, gaining 
prominence within Hamtramck’s Bangladeshi community, though he was little known 
outside of it.  Indeed, his congregation remained highly introverted, interacting little with 
their neighbors.  Al-Islah offered religious instruction and worship space, but would 
hardly have been noticed by passers-by, dwarfed by the more visually imposing St. 
Ladislaus Roman Catholic Church directly across the street.13
All of that changed when Motlib installed electric loudspeakers on al-Islah’s roof 
in order to broadcast the azan.  While the mosque might have attracted little attention to 
itself visually, the loudspeakers would amplify its presence aurally, similar to how 
Jehovah’s Witnesses used loudspeakers in the 1940s.  In his petition to Hamtramck’s 
council, Abdul Motlib described broadcasting the azan as a religious obligation.  “As part 
of the Islamic religion,” he wrote, “it is our duty to ‘call’ all Muslims to prayer five times 
a day.”  “Why we make call to prayer?” he similarly has explained to me, “We tell them, 
now our congregation prays in the mosque.  If anyone wants to join, come.”  But he also 
has told me that he decided to broadcast the call, in part, because with its “cheap, small 
houses,” and neighbors in close proximity, Hamtramck reminded him of Bangladesh, 
where hearing the azan constituted a regular feature of daily life.  Similar to what 
Thomas Tweed has found in his work on Cuban-American diasporic religion, the sound 
                                                 
13Abdul Motlib, interview by author, July 21, 2007. 
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of the azan transported Motlib across time and space, forging a connection between 
Islamic practice, place, and identity.  The call to prayer would help Motlib’s community 
make space for themselves in Hamtramck while connecting them to the place they had 
left behind.  This public sound might place them in their new home.14
This interpretation seems consistent with what anthropologists of Islam have 
found elsewhere.  The call to prayer echoes as one of the most distinctive features of 
Muslim cities and towns with its interruption of daily routines five times a day.  Since its 
institution by the Prophet Muhammad, the azan has relied on a specially trained human 
voice, always male.  At the appointed time, as set by the cycles of the sun (before dawn, 
noon, late afternoon, after sunset, and evening), the muezzin, or person responsible for 
giving the call, traditionally ascends to a designated space in a mosque’s minaret and 
reminds Muslims of their obligation to “put aside all mundane affairs and respond to the 
call physically and spiritually.”  It has become increasingly common for mosques to use 
electric loudspeakers for this purpose, as they compete to be heard amidst the other 
sounds of urban life.  Anthropologist Charles Hirschkind evocatively describes the effect 
of hundreds of mosques broadcasting the azan throughout Cairo, engulfing the city “in a 
sort of heavenly interference pattern created by the dense vocal overlaying.  These 
soaring yet mournful, almost languid harmonic webs soften the visual and sonic tyrannies 
of the city, offering a temporary reprieve from its manic and machinic functioning.”15
                                                 
14Abdul Motlib to the Common Council Members, City of Hamtramck, 28 December 2003 (copy on file 
with author); Motlib, interview; Tweed, Our Lady of the Exile. 
15Tong Soon Lee, “Technology and the Production of Islamic Space: The Call to Prayer in Singapore,” 
Ethnomusicology 43, no. 1 (1999), 87; Hirschkind, Ethical Soundscape, 124.  Hirschkind also discusses 
Cairo critics who have complained that the azan is too noisy.  See Ethical Soundscape, 125-6.  On the rules 
governing the azan’s performance, also see Smith, Islam in America, 11; Muneer Goolam Fareed, 
“Adhan,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, ed. Richard C. Martin (New York: 
MacMillan Reference USA: Thomson/Gale, 2004), 13. 
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Through its ritual enactment and prescribed text proclaiming God as uniquely 
worthy of worship, the azan differentiates Muslim time and space, distinguishing sacred 
from profane and holy from mundane.  While visual cues may be more obvious, Barbara 
Metcalf has argued that “it is ritual and sanctioned practice that is prior and that creates 
Muslim space.”  The sound of the azan invests Islamic space with meaning, regulates the 
rhythms of daily life, and orients Muslims in relation to God and to each other.  
Borrowing R. Murray Schafer’s terminology, the azan constitutes a “soundmark,” 
analogous to a landmark, which “refers to a community sound which is unique or 
possesses qualities which make it specially regarded or noticed by the people in that 
community.”  In chapter 2, I suggested that we might interpret a parish as including those 
within acoustic range of its church bells, its communal boundaries defined aurally rather 
than visually.  Similarly, we might define an Islamic community as including those 
within range of the muezzin’s call.  Because of the azan’s significant social function, 
then, its absence might be particularly noted, as seems to have been the case for Abdul 
Motlib.  Henry Munson relates the experiences of a Moroccan immigrant to Europe, for 
whom the muezzin’s silence came to justify his decision to return home: “Sometimes I 
feel sad because I have no son and no house of my own.  Then I hear the call to prayer 
and it washes my heart….I was never happy working in France and Belgium because I 
missed hearing the call to prayer.”16
                                                 
16For an introduction to theories of sacred space, see David Chidester and Edward Linenthal, eds., 
American Sacred Space (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1995).  Barbara Daly Metcalf makes 
her argument in the introduction to her edited volume, Making Muslim Space, 3.  For Schafer’s definition 
of “soundmark,” see R. Murray Schafer, The Soundscape: Our Sonic Environment and the Tuning of the 
World (Rochester, VT: Destiny Books, 1993), 10.  On defining Muslims as an “acoustic community,” see 
Schafer, Soundscape, 215; Lee, “Technology and the Production of Islamic Space,” 87.  The Moroccan 
immigrant’s quote comes from Henry Munson, Jr., trans. and ed., The House of Si Abd Allah: The Oral 
History of a Moroccan Family (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 82. 
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The azan transforms Islamic space, and it also offers an important vehicle through 
which Muslims have practiced their faith publicly.  While public practice might orient 
immigrant communities in time and space, however, it also brings significant risks, 
attracting attention in ways that may not always be desired.  For this reason, some groups 
have preferred to keep quiet.  For example, many U.S. practitioners of Santeria have 
devised an array of strategies to conceal rituals involving animal sacrifice, fearing police 
intervention and public humiliation.  In fact, when one Santeria devotee deliberately 
decided “to bring the practice of the Santeria faith…into the open,” he faced arrest and 
litigation, which culminated in a famous 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision.  Similarly, 
broadcasting the call to prayer in a religiously pluralistic context regulates Muslim daily 
life, but it also makes Muslims audible to others and has invited controversy numerous 
times.  As I noted above, some American communities have permitted Muslims to 
construct mosques only on the condition that they not broadcast the azan.  There also 
have been notable call to prayer disputes in Germany, France, and England.  Muslims in 
Detroit and Dearborn went to court to defend their right to amplify the azan in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.  And as recently as spring 2008, some Harvard University 
students complained after Islamic Awareness Week organizers publicly broadcast the 
prayer call on campus.  In part to avoid these kinds of conflicts, many American mosques 
have turned their loudspeakers inwards, incorporating the azan into communal prayer and 
thus transforming its meaning and function.17
                                                 
17For the Santeria case, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526 (1993).  Also 
see the discussion of this case in David H. Brown, “Altared Spaces: Afro-Cuban Religions and the Urban 
Landscape in Cuba and the United States,” in Gods of the City, ed. Robert A. Orsi, 155-230 (Bloomington: 
University of Indiana Press, 1999).  On call to prayer disputes in France and Germany, see Katherine Pratt 
Ewing, “Legislating Religious Freedom: Muslim Challenges to the Relationship Between Church and State 
in Germany and France,” in Engaging Cultural Differences: The Multicultural Challenge in Liberal 
Democracies, eds. Richard A. Shweder, Martha Minow, and Hazel Rose Markus, 63-80 (New York: 
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Of course, religious rituals always take on new meanings in new contexts with 
new audiences, and this is perhaps no more true than when mosques broadcast the call to 
prayer throughout religiously diverse neighborhoods.  After all, it was not only Muslims 
who comprised Hamtramck’s acoustic community.  Calling Muslims to pray in 
Hamtramck, Michigan, in 2003, also meant audibly announcing Islamic presence to a 
Polish Catholic community that was only starting to come to terms with the city’s 
changing demographics.  Hearing the call would shape how other Hamtramck residents 
made sense of and responded to their new Muslim neighbors.  For these neighbors, 
engaging with religious difference would not mean contemplating Islam as an intellectual 
abstraction, but rather making sense of the new sounds which were entering their shared 
city streets.  Specific public practices would mediate their contact with these religious 
others and would invite—or demand—response.18
                                                                                                                                                 
Russell Sage Foundation, 2002).  On call to prayer disputes in England, see John Eade, “Nationalism, 
Community, and the Islamization of Space in London,” in Making Muslim Space in North America and 
Europe, ed. Barbara Daly Metcalf , 217-233 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).  I learned 
about the Detroit case in a telephone conversation with Adam Shakoor, who represented the mosque, May 
1, 2008, and in an interview with the mosque’s imam, Saleem Rahman, July 17, 2007.  For the Dearborn 
case, see Dearborn v. Hussian, et. al., No. 79-933979-AR (Wayne County Ct. June 3, 1980).  Although the 
Detroit and Dearborn cases offer the most direct precedents for the Hamtramck case, no one involved in the 
Hamtramck case appears to have known anything about them.  As will be discussed below, they were never 
mentioned in any of the Hamtramck deliberations.  Some Dearborn residents even attended the Hamtramck 
council meetings to protest the call, arguing that Hamtramck would set a precedent for Dearborn.  They did 
not realize that Dearborn already had offered a precedent of its own.  On the dispute at Harvard, see Neil 
MacFarquhar, “At Harvard, Students’ Muslim Traditions Are a Topic of Debate,” New York Times, March 
21, 2008; Leon Wieseltier, “Ring the Bells,” The New Republic, April 23, 2008.  Jane Smith discusses 
loudspeakers being turned inwards in Islam in America, 11. 
18Mallory Nye has made a similar claim regarding Hindu temples in Britain.  He argues that it is through 
specific uses of Hindu religious buildings that outsiders are made aware of them and form understandings 
of them—and of Hinduism, more generally.  Multiculturalism and Minority Religions in Britain: Krishna 
Consciousness, Religious Freedom, and the Politics of Location (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), 47.  
Susan Davis describes city streets not as “neutral” spaces, but as sites for displaying and negotiating 
imbalanced relations of power in Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986). 
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I do not mean to suggest that Abdul Motlib had all of these considerations in mind 
when he decided to broadcast the azan, nor that his act should be interpreted strictly in 
terms of its social function.  After all, Motlib described the azan simply as a religious 
obligation, not as a necessary means for making Muslim space or for placing Muslims in 
Hamtramck.  But he also seemed aware that his new neighbors might hear the azan as out 
of place.  He seemed to recognize that the azan would take on new meanings when 
broadcast in this new acoustic environment.  He had heard Hamtramck churches ring 
their bells, and he presumed that his mosque similarly could broadcast the azan.  But he 
was not certain.  And he wanted “to be a good neighbor,” he explains.  Unsure of his 
legal rights, Motlib approached the Hamtramck Common Council and requested explicit 
permission to broadcast the call to prayer.  And in so doing, he voluntarily placed this 
religious ritual under the regulatory authority of Hamtramck’s elected city officials.19
 
Regulating the Call 
Sound and law map spatial boundaries differently.  In 2003, some Hamtramck 
residents already could hear the azan being broadcast from nearby Detroit mosques.  As 
the azan’s sound spilled across the legal boundary separating Detroit from Hamtramck, it 
incorporated Hamtramck residents into the acoustic community constituted by the 
                                                 
19Motlib, interview.  Motlib was unaware that nearby mosques in Detroit and Dearborn already had secured 
their right to broadcast the azan in court.  In a conversation with the author (July 10, 2007), Dawud Walid, 
director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations’ Detroit chapter, argued that the Detroit and 
Dearborn precedents made it unnecessary for Motlib to ask the council’s permission.  Walid thinks that the 
ensuing dispute might have been avoided had Motlib simply begun to broadcast the call.  Saba Mahmood 
argues that the rush to interpret the “material expressions of particular religions” as symbols, “linked only 
contingently to religious truth,” reflects a “project of secular hermeneutics” that aims to construct a 
religious subject “in a manner consonant with the imperatives of secular liberal political rule.”  She 
encourages scholars to take more seriously the claims of religious practitioners that their rituals are part of 
religious doctrine or divine edict, rather than merely expressions of religious identity.  See “Secularism, 
Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation,” Public Culture 18, no. 2 (2006), 341-
344. 
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muezzin’s call.  These public sounds did not respect legal boundaries.  But legal 
boundaries mattered all the same, for Detroit law regulated Detroit mosques.  The al-Islah 
Islamic Center had a Hamtramck address, however, and therefore its practices were 
governed by Hamtramck ordinances.  And it was far from clear whether Hamtramck’s 
noise ordinance, as written, made space for the azan. 
On July 13, 1989, the Hamtramck Common Council had adopted Ordinance No. 
434, “An Ordinance to prohibit unlawful noise and sounds and setting forth certain 
prohibited acts and to provide for a penalty for the violation thereof.”  The ordinance 
especially targeted boom boxes and car stereos, which had become regular sources of 
complaint for Hamtramck residents.  The ordinance granted Hamtramck’s police officers 
the authority to cite offenders for noise violations regardless of whether they had received 
prior complaints.  The Hamtramck Citizen hailed the measure as a necessary weapon in 
the battle against urban noise.  “We’re not completely pleased with the ordinance,” the 
newspaper’s editors wrote, “it reeks of totalitarian heavy-handedness, if not downright 
silliness—but what other relief is there?  There are times when the civilized are going to 
have to play tough and demand a curtailment of mindless noise filling the air.”20
The ordinance’s drafters did not have religious noises in mind, but they included a 
number of provisions that might have implications for broadcasting the azan.  Section 1, 
subsection B applied to “the playing of any radio, phonograph, television set, amplified 
or unamplified musical instruments, loudspeakers, tape recorded, or other electronic 
                                                 
20Charles Sercombe, “City Moves to Turn Down Noise,” Hamtramck (MI) Citizen, July 20, 1989.  As I 
have discussed in other chapters, anti-noise advocates frequently have described noise as a “barbaric” threat 
to “civilization.”  For example, see Karin Bijsterveld’s discussion in “The Diabolical Symphony of the 
Mechanical Age: Technology and Symbolism of Sound in European and North American Noise Abatement 
Campaigns, 1900-40,” Social Studies of Science 31, no. 1 (February 2001): 37-70. 
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sound producing devices, in such a manner or with volume at any time or place as to 
annoy or disturb the quiet, comfort or repose of persons in any office or in any 
dwelling…or of any person in the vicinity.”  If the sound were “plainly audible on a 
property or in a dwelling unit other than that in which it is located,” that would be 
considered “prime facie evidence of a violation of this section.”  Section 1, subsection C 
applied specifically to human voices on city streets, prohibiting “yelling, shouting, 
hooting, whistling, singing, or the making of any other loud noises on the public streets, 
between the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M.”  And section 1, subsection J prohibited 
“the use of any drum, loudspeaker, amplifier, or other instrument or device for the 
purpose of attracting attention for any purpose.”  By 2003, ice cream trucks and lawn 
mowers had joined car stereos as Hamtramck’s most commonly cited sources of 
annoyance, but the 1989 Ordinance made few distinctions between types of noises.  A 
reasonable reading of any of these clauses might include the azan within their scope.21
A common pattern has emerged in religious noise disputes, including those 
involving the Jehovah’s Witnesses discussed in chapter 3 and the other call to prayer 
controversies mentioned above.  A religious group makes noise, neighbors complain, the 
police make arrests, and the parties fight it out in court.  The Hamtramck dispute 
proceeded differently, however, because of Abdul Motlib’s decision to seek the council’s 
permission before he began broadcasting the azan.  He wanted to “be a good neighbor,” 
he has explained, and to ensure that his practice would be acceptable to the broader 
community, that they would not hear it as out of place.  Despite disagreement as to 
whether he needed to do so, Motlib sought the legitimacy that he thought would come 
                                                 
21Hamtramck, MI, Ordinance 434 (July 13, 1989).  Michael Rehfus complained about the sounds of ice 
cream trucks and lawn mowers in “The Power of ‘Hey,’” Hamtramck (MI) Citizen, May 27, 2004. 
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with the council’s approval.  But the council’s involvement also transformed the azan 
into a symbol of Hamtramck’s shifting political power dynamics.22
By as early as the 1920s, Hamtramck had earned a reputation for political 
contentiousness, hi-jinks, and corruption.  Detroit newspapers ridiculed the city as a den 
of crime, vice, and immorality.  One editorialist described Hamtramck in 1924 as the 
“Wild West of the Middle West.”  The 1940s and 50s featured a series of bitterly 
contested municipal elections, replete with personal attacks and legal missteps.  Several 
prominent politicians spent time in jail, which Hamtramck residents tended to accept as 
normal.  But throughout this period, Hamtramck politics remained dominated by Polish-
Americans who had grown up and lived their entire lives in the city.23
Hamtramck’s political landscape began to shift during the 1990s.  In addition to 
the new immigrants from around the world, the city welcomed large numbers of artists, 
musicians, and young professionals, who were attracted by the benefits of urban living 
without the crime that marked downtown Detroit.  Already known for its bars, 
Hamtramck became the place for live music in Detroit, and the Utne Reader named it 
“one of the hippest cities in America.”  The bohemian newcomers lived awkwardly 
alongside Hamtramck “old-timers.”  While some of them were ethnically Polish, most 
had no prior connection to Hamtramck.  Tension between the two groups heightened 
when some of the new community members took an interest in politics and began 
                                                 
22Motlib, interview.  Winnifred Fallers Sullivan notes “how often religious groups seem to need the 
permission, even the ‘blessing’ of the courts and legislatures to do what they say they are compelled to do 
for religious reasons.  Legitimacy is understood to be conferred by the secular, not the religious authority.”  
The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 247n16. 
23Wood, Hamtramck, Then and Now, 49; Kowalksi, Hamtramck.  Detroiters ridiculed and complained 
about Hamtramck, but they also frequented it during the Prohibition Era.  Hamtramck boasts that it once 
had the most bars per capita in America, and Detroiters always knew they could find a drink there. 
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running for elected office.  In 1997, a relatively young artist named Gary Zych defeated 
longtime Hamtramck mayor Robert Kozaren in an election that symbolized the growing 
conflict between Hamtramck’s “old-guard” and “new-guard.”  Many long-time 
Hamtramck residents resented what they perceived as the new-guard’s arrogance and 
disregard for Hamtramck’s past.  Conversely, members of the new-guard sought to bring 
“an end to backroom, cigar-smoking, old boy network politics, and bring a focus on 
professionalism” to Hamtramck city government, as one of the new politicians has 
explained.  Campaigns grew increasingly nasty and divisive over the next several years as 
Zych fought constantly with his old-guard opponents.24
Abdul Motlib understood very little about this political context when he submitted 
his initial petition to broadcast the azan in September 2003.  Embroiled in a bitter re-
election campaign at the time, Hamtramck’s old-guard-dominated council wanted 
nothing to do with the issue.  The council president summarily denied Motlib’s 
application, citing concerns that the azan might disrupt the school located across the 
street from al-Islah.  But by the time Motlib renewed his request in December 2003, the 
November election had swept into office a new council, composed entirely of new-guard 
Zych supporters.  The new council president Karen Majewski was a scholar of Polish 
history, who had moved to Hamtramck in the mid-1990s after completing her doctorate 
in immigration and ethnic history.  New council member Scott Klein was a poet, who had 
led a Hamtramck team to compete in a national Poetry Slam competition.  Perhaps most 
notably, new council member Shahab Ahmed was the first non-white, non-Polish-
American elected to Hamtramck’s council since 1922.  He also was the first Bangladeshi-
                                                 
24Karen Majewski, interview by author, July 16, 2007.  Greg Kowalski offers an even-handed account of 
these political shifts in Hamtramck, 144-149. 
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American elected to any U.S. political office—and he was Hamtramck’s first Muslim 
councilmember.  Ahmed, in particular, came to symbolize the ways that Hamtramck was 
changing both politically and demographically.25
The new council proved more sympathetic to Motlib’s petition and expressed its 
unanimous desire to rewrite Ordinance No. 434 in order to accommodate the call to 
prayer.  Council members appealed to vaguely defined principles of religious freedom, 
toleration, and multiculturalism to justify their support.  Council President Majewski 
described the call simply as “a basic right, it was just an unquestioned right.  I mean, it 
was a prayer.”  Councilman Rob Cedar welcomed the call as “representative of the city’s 
cultural diversity.”  Councilman Klein suggested that the azan called Hamtramck’s 
Catholic residents to extend the same tolerance toward their Muslim neighbors that they 
had once demanded from American Protestants.  In the azan issue, council members saw 
an opportunity to fashion a new civic identity for Hamtramck, defined by its diversity 
rather than by its historic homogeneity.  The council’s support dramatically distinguished 
this case study from other call to prayer disputes, for Muslim immigrants more frequently 
have faced resistance from local elected officials.26
                                                 
25On the previous council’s decision, see “Council Notes,” Hamtramck (MI) Citizen, October 2, 2003.  In 
an ironic twist, Zych lost his fight for re-election to a local bar owner and “old-guard” politician, Tom 
Jankowski.  Jankowski barely participated in the azan debates, leaving it to the Common Council to decide 
what to do.  His absence was noted by the local newspaper.  See Charles Sercombe, “Mayor Follows 
Council’s Lead on Prayer,” Hamtramck (MI) Citizen, May 6, 2004.  Based on my conversations with 
council members, it appears that Motlib was aware that the new council was likely to be sympathetic to his 
request and that they encouraged him to resubmit his petition. 
26Majewski, interview; “Council Notes,” Hamtramck (MI) Citizen, January 22, 2004;  Hamtramck 
Common Council meeting, April 20, 2004.  John Eade describes a London dispute in which the local 
council opposed a mosque’s desire to broadcast the azan in “Nationalism, Community, and the Islamization 
of Space in London.”  Mallory Nye examines a case in which ISKCON faced local governmental 
opposition when trying to build a temple in Multiculturalism and Minority Religions in Britain. 
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While the new council members justified their support as consistent with their 
vision for an open, diverse, and tolerant Hamtramck, their political opponents accused 
them of crass opportunism.  Rumors circulated that Zych and his supporters were actively 
encouraging Muslims to move to Hamtramck and were capitalizing on the azan issue to 
consolidate their political power.  For these critics, accommodating the call was nothing 
more than political pandering, playing to the new “Muslim vote.”  The council members 
countered these charges by alleging that it was their opponents who were politicizing the 
issue, exploiting the fears and insecurities of long-time residents to mobilize their own 
political base.  Abdul Motlib had described the azan as a normatively prescribed religious 
ritual, but it also had become a potent political symbol.  Broadcasting the azan in 
Hamtramck thus was never simply a religious or political act.  Instead, this public 
practice offered a critical site both for investing meaning and negotiating power.27
The Common Council decided that it would amend Ordinance No. 434 in order to 
accommodate all religious sounds, but that it also would impose reasonable restrictions.  
It instructed the city attorney to draft language consistent with these general guidelines.  
On April 27, 2004, the Hamtramck Common Council adopted Ordinance No. 503, “An 
Ordinance to Amend Ordinance No. 434.”  Its three critical provisions read as follows: 
1. The City shall permit “call to prayer,” “church bells,” and other reasonable 
means of announcing religious meetings to be amplified between the hours of 
6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. for a duration not to exceed five minutes. 
 
                                                 
27Majewski, interview; Kowalski, interview; Robert Zwolak, interview by author, July 20, 2007; Scott 
Klein, interview by author,  July 17, 2007; Shahab Ahmed, interview by author, July 18, 2007.  Talal Asad 
argues that reducing the religious to the political or vice versa assumes essentialized meanings of the terms.  
He encourages attention to how these terms have been defined and deployed in different contexts and in 
different ways.  See “Secularism, Nation-State, Religion,” chap. 6 in Formations of the Secular: 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 181-201. 
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2. The City Council shall have sole authority to set the level of amplification, 
provided however; that no such level shall be enforced until all religious 
institutions receive notice of such levels. 
 
3. All complaints regarding alleged violations of this Section shall be filed with 
the City Clerk and placed on the agenda of the next regular meeting of the 
Common Council.  The Common Council shall take all appropriate action 
they deem necessary to alleviate the complaints, with such action to include, 
but not be limited to, an order to reduce the volume or an order to change the 
direction of the amplification or an order to terminate use of amplification.  If 
the Common Council deems that the means of announcing religious meetings 
must be reduced, the Council shall amend this Ordinance.  The Council may 
also determine that a complaint is without justification and choose to take no 
action on the complaint; if such determination is made, such decision shall be 
made by resolution of the Common Council.28 
 
The noise ordinance amendment thus singled out religion, treating its sounds 
differently from the other cacophonous noises of urban life.  But while the council went 
out of its way to accommodate the call to prayer, it also placed the azan squarely under 
its own regulatory authority.  Hamtramck’s police department would continue to handle 
all other noise complaints, but the council alone would determine what constituted 
“reasonable means of announcing religious meetings.”  In fact, this was precisely how the 
council marketed the amendment through a series of newspaper editorials, paid 
advertisements, and circulated pamphlets.  Council members argued that without this 
amendment, the al-Islah Islamic Center would retain the right to broadcast the azan as 
loud as it wanted and whenever it wanted.  But, they proposed, the new amendment 
would invest the council with the authority that it needed to regulate the call.  Council 
members felt that this was how they needed to frame their case to a public that was not 
sure it wanted to hear this new religious sound.  Through its effort to accommodate the 
                                                 
28Hamtramck, MI, Ordinance 503 (April 27, 2004). 
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azan, the council also shaped the space available for religious expression, as al-Islah’s 
leaders would have to consent to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.29
Before the Common Council could adopt Ordinance No. 503, it was required 
legally to hold three public meetings for open debate.  Complaints about the azan were 
circulating throughout the community, and these meetings already promised to be tense.  
But council member Scott Klein decided to fuel the flames even further.  He believed that 
the council was setting a positive example for the rest of the country by accommodating 
Muslim practice.  He also sensed that a media spotlight might demonize his political 
opponents, which would make it easier to ignore any reasonable concerns they might 
express.  So without informing his colleagues and political allies, he sent a press release 
to several local and national media outlets that publicized the council’s proposed 
ordinance.  Klein achieved his intended effect.  By the time the first public meeting began 
on April 13, 2004, numerous news cameras, reporters, and photographers had found their 
way to Hamtramck’s tiny council chambers.  Hamtramck’s azan dispute had attracted the 
world’s attention.30
 
Debating the Call 
For three long and tumultuous evenings on consecutive Tuesdays in April 2004, 
standing-room only crowds filled Hamtramck’s council chambers as community 
                                                 
29The prayer call schedule is fixed according to the cycles of the sun.  Depending on the time of year, the 
earliest prayer time frequently arrives prior to 6:00 A.M., and the last call frequently arrives after 10:00 
P.M.  In fact, one prominent Hamtramck resident thought that Motlib might do better to oppose the 
amendment and take his chances with broadcasting the azan under the original ordinance because then he 
would not be subject to these restrictions.  Of course, this resident also acknowledged that such an approach 
might not be politically viable.  Personal correspondence from Thad Radzilowski to Abdul Motlib (copy on 
file with author). 
30Klein, interview. 
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members gathered to debate the proposed noise ordinance amendment.  Council President 
Majewski had been in office for only three months and suddenly found herself in charge 
of moderating these contentious hearings.  “They were a zoo,” she has explained, “It was 
hot, it was crowded.  And the TV cameras were running.  My strategy was simply to be 
centered, calm, evenhanded.  To make sure that at the end of the day, no one would leave 
saying they weren’t heard…Say whatever you want, get as mad as you want, but you 
have five minutes, and then thank you very much, on to the next person.”  Over one 
hundred and fifteen speakers took the microphone over the course of the three evenings.  
There was some shouting, and police officers had to escort a few people out of the room, 
but conversation remained generally civil.  Several attendants noticed the meetings’ 
gendered dynamics, as most of the speakers either were Muslim men or Christian 
women.  And not all of the speakers lived in Hamtramck.  Concerned citizens arrived 
from Detroit, Dearborn, and surrounding suburbs.  A group of evangelical Christians 
from rural Ohio, who named themselves David’s Mighty Men, even drove up for two of 
the meetings to protest what they perceived as an intolerant attack on Christian 
freedom.31
Meanwhile, debate raged in other media.  Local access television brought live 
coverage of the meetings to Hamtramck homes.  Detroit and national news broadcasts 
carried the dispute to a broader audience.  Articles appeared in several national 
newspapers, including the Detroit News, the Detroit Free Press, the New York Times, the 
Los Angeles Times, and the Christian Science Monitor, and these articles elicited 
numerous letters to the editor.  Associated Press reports carried the story internationally 
                                                 
31Majewski, interview. 
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and to regional newspapers around the country.  Council members received messages 
from California, Texas, and West Virginia, and the Hamtramck Citizen printed letters 
from as far away as Japan and Hong Kong.  Pundits weighed in on twenty-four hour 
news channels, and internet chat rooms overflowed with comments.  And none of this is 
to mention the countless conversations that occurred over dinner tables, across backyard 
fences, and on city streets.  “These [council members] never understood the grapevine in 
Hamtramck,” a long-time Hamtramck resident has explained, “You know, I don’t even 
really understand, I don’t know where it all goes, who talks to who…but our council 
meetings are televised, and nobody knows how many people watch it.  It’s like Sopranos 
or 24.  You can’t miss an episode…there’s a tremendous amount of people who are 
seeing it, taping it, and giving it to their friends… So that was one important way that it 
was getting out.”32
The azan dispute transpired within the particular context of Hamtramck, with its 
distinctive religious, ethnic, and political history.  But the debates also constituted an 
“imagined community,” a network of strangers who felt similarly invested in whether the 
al-Islah Islamic Center would be permitted to broadcast the azan.  Disputants recognized 
that as the azan spilled over into Hamtramck’s city streets and domestic spaces, it would 
call Muslims to pray, but it would reach other audiences, as well, who would respond to 
the call in different ways.  Perhaps the azan functioned as background noise in 
Bangladesh, as a normal acoustic feature of daily life.  But in Hamtramck, residents were 
noticing and paying close attention to its call.  Multiple hearing communities were 
listening consciously to the azan, yet they were not hearing it announce the same thing.  
                                                 
32Zwolak, interview. 
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Through the common council meetings, they contested the azan’s meaning, and in so 
doing, they also negotiated the place of religion and religious adherents in this pluralistic 
urban environment.  They debated whether the azan belonged in Hamtramck or whether 
it sounded “out of place,” and they debated whether the azan placed Muslims alongside 
the city’s long-time residents or whether it in fact signaled the displacement of 
Hamtramck’s historically fragile Polish-Catholic establishment.  As I turn now to analyze 
the arguments that speakers advanced at the council meetings, I attend especially to three 
themes through which disputants contested the azan’s message.  First, I listen to debates 
about whether the azan constituted religion or noise.  Second, I listen to debates about 
whether religious sounds belonged in public spaces.  And third, I listen to debates about 
the azan’s implications for American religious identity.  Through these differences, I 
propose, participants advanced competing conceptions of religion’s place in a pluralistic 
society.33
 
Religion or Noise? 
As participants contested whether the azan belonged in Hamtramck or whether it 
sounded out of place, they debated whether the dispute was essentially about religion or 
noise.  Like Abdul Motlib, many of the Muslim speakers described hearing the azan as a 
normatively prescribed religious ritual.  They expressed surprise that the issue had 
become so controversial, and they advocated for the noise ordinance amendment by 
                                                 
33I borrow “imagined community” from Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), though I use the term differently.  Arjun 
Appadurai discusses “imagined worlds” in the “new global cultural economy” in “Disjuncture and 
Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” in The Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader, eds. 
Jonathan Xavier Inda and Renato Rosaldo, pp. 46-64 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 50-51.  Michael 
Warner describes a public as a relation among strangers in Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone 
Books, 2002), 74-76. 
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appealing to American constitutional principles.  “I would like you to know,” began one 
speaker, “that the Constitution of this country, which includes freedom of religion and 
freedom of the press, this is what attracted many people from all over the world to come 
to this country.  It’s the freedom in this country for everyone, not just for particular 
groups.”  A second speaker concurred, “We do have freedom of religion according to the 
Bill of Rights.  And freedom of religion is the call to prayer for the religion of Islam.”  
These speakers argued that the council was right to single out religious sounds and treat 
them differently from non-religious sounds.  In the name of religious freedom, they 
asserted their right to broadcast and hear the azan.  If the azan was religious, they 
implied, then it could not be noise.34
These speakers appealed to abstract constitutional principles, but they did not cite 
any legal precedents nor did they demonstrate any understanding of how courts have 
interpreted the First Amendment.  For example, not a single speaker at any of the three 
council meetings referenced a 1980 Dearborn court case that would have offered the most 
directly relevant precedent for the Hamtramck dispute.  In 1979, police arrested three 
members of a mosque in Dearborn’s South End for broadcasting the azan.  In court, the 
mosque argued that the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment protected its practice.  The 
city’s attorneys argued that loudspeakers were neither religiously mandated nor 
necessary, that the city’s ordinance was facially neutral because it treated all sounds the 
                                                 
34Hamtramck Common Council meetings, April 13, 2004; April 27, 2004.  While most of the speakers went 
on the record with their names and knew their comments were being broadcast on local access television, I 
have chosen not to use names in the analysis that follows except when discussing the city officials and 
other civic leaders.  A few residents have told me they regret certain things they said at the meetings or that 
they do not wish to be dragged back into a public spotlight.  I am interested in the types of arguments 
advanced and in the messages that Hamtramck residents heard the azan broadcasting, so I see no reason to 
single out specific individuals.  Statements are all quoted from video recordings of the meetings, which I 
have in my possession.  I am grateful to Rev. Sharon Buttry for sharing with me her personal copies of 
these videotapes. 
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same, and that broadcasting the azan violated the rights of neighbors.  In their brief on 
appeal, they even cited Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting decision in the Saia case: “Surely 
there is not a constitutional right to force unwilling people to listen.”  In his decision, 
Judge Thomas J. Brennan of Wayne County’s Circuit Court ruled for the mosque and 
struck down Dearborn’s ordinance as unconstitutionally vague.  Brennan based his 
decision on two points.  First, he agreed with the mosque that stricter scrutiny should be 
applied in the case of religious sounds.  Religious sounds were different than non-
religious sounds, he maintained, because of religion’s special position under the First 
Amendment.  Second, Brennan acknowledged that Dearborn had a right to regulate noise, 
but criticized the city’s targeting of “unnecessary” sounds.  He found the standard of 
“necessity” unconstitutionally vague, as determining what sounds were necessary could 
lead to discriminatory and subjective application.  To buttress his position, he, too, cited 
the Saia decision, quoting Justice Douglas’ famous contention that “annoyance at ideas 
can be cloaked in annoyance of sound.”  Judge Brennan ordered Dearborn to adopt more 
objective standards and strongly encouraged them to set a specific decibel level above 
which sounds would be prohibited.35
                                                 
35Dearborn v. Hussian, et. al., No. 79-933979-AR (Wayne County Ct. June 3, 1980).  Also see Appellee’s 
Brief on Appeal, Dearborn v. Hussian (No. 79-933979-AR); Dave Zoia, “Moslems wage ‘Holy War’ on 
Court,” Dearborn (MI) Times-Herald, September 6, 1979; Gary Woronchak, “City Hall Picketed as 
Mosque Goes to Court,” Dearborn (MI) Press and Guide, September 6, 1979.  Judge Brennan based his 
decision that religion should be treated with a higher standard of scrutiny on two Michigan precedents.  In 
City of Dearborn v. Bellock, 17 Mich. App. 163 (App. Ct. Mich., 1969), the defendant was convicted of 
breaching the peace under the Dearborn Heights noise ordinance for hosting a “loud and raucous” party.  
The Court of Appeals of Michigan upheld her conviction because hosting the party was not a 
constitutionally protected activity.  On the other hand, in United Pentecostal Church v. 59th District Judge, 
51 Mich. App. 323 (App. Ct. Mich., 1974), the same court overturned the conviction of a Pentecostal 
Church under the same noise ordinance because it recognized the use of sound amplification equipment in 
worship as a constitutionally protected activity.  The Court of Appeals of Michigan thus treated different 
types of sounds differently depending on whether they were “religious” in nature.  See chapters 2 and 3 for 
further discussion of “necessity” as a standard for evaluating noise. 
208 
While Dearborn Muslims celebrated Brennan’s decision as having vindicated 
their rights, the historical record seems more mixed.  Dearborn adopted a new noise 
ordinance that set specific decibel limits but continued to treat all sounds the same.  
Members of the mosque complained that city officials purposefully had selected a decibel 
limit below the volume of the broadcasted azan, contending that the facially neutral 
ordinance remained discriminatory.  The decibel did not provide as objective a 
measurement of noise as Judge Brennan had presumed.  The mosque’s attorney 
suggested that the city should have exempted the call to prayer from the city’s new 
ordinance as the Hamtramck Common Council would choose to do two decades later.  
Specific exemptions for the call to prayer have never been tested in court, yet exemptions 
for other religious practices, such as ritual peyote use, have proven highly contested.  
Legal scholars continue to debate whether claims of religious obligation exempt devotees 
from facially neutral ordinances.  Muslims in Dearborn and Hamtramck demanded 
accommodation, but other observers suggested that the Hamtramck Common Council’s 
proposed ordinance in fact might have violated governmental neutrality by privileging 
religion over non-religion.36
                                                 
36On the Dearborn mosque’s response to the city’s new ordinance, see Mary Klemic, “Moslems Protest 
Curb on Noise,” Dearborn (MI) Times-Herald, November 6, 1980.  A former imam of the Dearborn 
mosque told me that the Dearborn police occasionally would test the decibel level of the azan and require 
the mosque’s officials to lower its volume.  He implied that the mosque would test the limits, gradually 
increasing the azan’s volume until neighbors complained and the police arrived.  Mohamad Musa, 
interview by author, July 24, 2004.  This seems to be a common pattern, as Hamtramck’s Yemeni mosque 
would similarly test the limits following passage of the noise ordinance amendment.  Today, there is little 
evidence that the Dearborn police ever enforces the noise ordinance against the mosque.  In fact, the 
mosque not only broadcasts the azan, but also the Friday afternoon sermon in Arabic – but, significantly, 
the South End has become an almost exclusively Arab neighborhood, no longer the diverse multiethnic 
neighborhood it once was.  Concerns about the constitutionality of Hamtramck’s proposed ordinance were 
expressed by the Detroit chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union in an editorial in the Detroit News.  
See Kary L. Moss, “ACLU of Michigan: Hamtramck Noise Ordinance Still Needs Work,” Detroit News, 
May 6, 2004.  For a famous case testing the ritual use of peyote, see Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).   
For a helpful introduction to debates about “exemptions” for religion, see Christopher L. Eisgruber and 
Lawrence G. Sager, “The Exemptions Puzzle,” chap. 3 in Religious Freedom and the Constitution, 78-120  
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The speakers at Hamtramck’s council meetings seem to have been unaware of this 
legal record, or at least they made no reference to it.  In fact, because the dispute never 
went to court, this legal history seems almost beside the point.  Through the council 
meetings, Hamtramck disputants expressed popular understandings of what religious 
freedom entailed.  They agreed that religious freedom required distinguishing religion 
from non-religion and that religious sounds should be treated differently.   And their 
emphasis on religious rights had real social effects.  Kathleen Moore describes “rights 
talk” as an important social language that has offered American Muslims a valuable tool 
for overcoming social isolation and facilitating interactions with non-Muslims.  By 
affirming religious freedom as a shared ideal, these Muslim newcomers claimed an equal 
place in Hamtramck as Americans.  In fact, several of the Muslim speakers seemed 
comfortable appealing to American norms even as they emphasized their ignorance of 
Islamic law.  And adopting the language of religious freedom also united these speakers 
as American Muslims, for it brought religious identity to the fore and temporarily effaced 
the ethnic differences that frequently have divided Hamtramck’s Yemeni, Bangladeshi, 
and Bosnian communities.  By defending the azan as a religious right, these Muslim 
speakers claimed a place for themselves in Hamtramck alongside its Polish-Catholic 
community.37
                                                                                                                                                 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).  They argue that legislative exemptions are permissible, 
but not constitutionally required. 
37For an important study that considers popular understandings of the First Amendment, see Philip 
Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).  Kathleen 
Moore makes her argument about rights talk in “The Politics of Transfiguration: Constitutive Aspects of 
the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998,” in Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible, 
eds. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I. Smith, 25-38 (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2002).  Jason 
Bivins analyzes how minority communities have internalized and mobilized rights talk in “Religious and 
Legal Others: Identity, Law, and Representation in American Christian Right and Neopagan Cultural 
Conflicts,” Culture and Religion 6, no. 1 (2005): 31-56.  John Eade encourages scholars to pay attention to 
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But if these speakers heard the azan as a specially protected religious obligation, 
then another set of speakers tried to tune out its religious significance altogether.  A 
number of the Hamtramck disputants claimed not to hear religion, but noise.  “We have a 
noise ordinance, a noise issue here,” one long-time Hamtramck resident has explained, 
“it’s not about religion, it’s not about having a call to prayer, it’s about amplification.”  
Hamtramck already was a noisy city, these critics contended.  “It’s a busy, urban 
environment,” one speaker at the public meetings declared, “full of people, children, cars, 
trucks, buses, motorcycles, motor tools, air conditioners, stereos, boom boxes, car radios, 
taverns, drunks, church bells, and calls to prayer.”  These critics saw no reason to single 
out religious noises or to treat them differently.  The 1989 Noise Ordinance did not 
prohibit or discriminate against prayer calls, they argued.  It just regulated them like all 
other sounds.  Let the mosques broadcast the call, and deal with it on a case-by-case basis 
if people complained, but there was no need to pass a special ordinance to accommodate 
religious announcements.  In so doing, one speaker alleged, it was the council that was 
making “this a divisive issue.” Another speaker even went out of his way to voice 
appreciation for the sound of the azan.  “I came to this town because of its diversity,” he 
explained, “And I think that if we can find a way to live together, that would be the 
                                                                                                                                                 
when or in what contexts Muslim identity or ethnic identities come to the fore in “Nationalism, 
Community, and the Islamization of Space in London.”  Some observers felt that opposition to Muslims in 
Hamtramck was racially based, but expressed as an issue with religion because of the dispute over the 
azan. Walid, interview.  While the Muslim speakers discussed here appealed to the ideal of religious 
freedom, they also seemed to understand that they needed Hamtramck’s council to guarantee that right.  
They needed this civic body’s authority to carve out and protect the space in which they could practice their 
religion freely.  “We have a constitutional right to practice our religion in this country,” one speaker 
asserted, “We would like you to give us a chance to practice our religion like the United States says in the 
Constitution.  We hope the council approves our efforts.”  Councilman Shahab Ahmed has expressed the 
discomfort he felt when asked to grant official permission for Muslims to broadcast the azan.  “Especially 
being the only Muslim on the city council at the time,” he says, “I mean, God permitted this two thousand 
years ago.  Who am I to permit it again in the United States?”  Hamtramck Common Council meeting, 
April 13, 2004; Ahmed, interview. 
211 
greatest thing.  But this is more of a noise issue, then it is a religion issue or ethnic issue, 
in my mind.  I don’t care what noise it is, whether it’s bells or buzz saws, or my 
neighbors’ dogs, or whatever it is.  When I’m trying to sleep, and I get woken up, I get 
offended.  It’s not because of a religion or an ethnicity.”  A life-long Hamtramck resident 
summed up her concerns succinctly.  “You know what?” she said, “The bottom line is 
noise.  We’re here to talk about noise.  And I’m tired of it.  The bottom line is any more 
noise that I don’t have to hear, I’ll be glad.”38
The first set of speakers drew a line between religion and non-religion, arguing 
that religious freedom justified treating religious noises differently.  But these speakers 
rejected the significance of that distinction.  They defined noise solely in terms of volume 
and maintained that noise was noise, regardless of source or purpose.  The proponents of 
this position went out of their way to assert that they had nothing against the azan.  
Instead, they encouraged the council to follow the lead of other cities such as Dearborn 
by setting objective decibel levels that could be applied neutrally against all types of 
sounds.  “I didn’t come here to argue religion or anything,” one speaker explained, “My 
point is the decibel limit…At what point do you violate this ordinance?”  Instead of a line 
between religion and non-religion, this speaker sought an enforceable boundary that 
would unambiguously differentiate noise from sounds that did not disrupt the public 
peace.39
                                                 
38Zwolak, interview; Hamtramck Common Council meetings, April 13, 2004; April 20, 2004; April 27, 
2004. 
39Hamtramck Common Council meeting, April 20, 2004.  See chapters 1 and 3 for the history of debates 
about quantitative and qualitative noise legislation. 
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If the azan’s advocates differentiated religion from non-religion, then these critics 
drew lines of their own, distinguishing noise from sound.  But as we have found in other 
chapters, the lines between religion and non-religion and between sound and noise have 
proven pragmatically malleable.  Framing the Hamtramck dispute as either entirely about 
religion or entirely about noise served valuable strategic functions.  By arguing that the 
Hamtramck dispute was about noise, not religion, critics were able to affirm their 
commitment to religious freedom even as they circumscribed its boundaries.  They were 
able to assert their respect for Muslims precisely as they limited Muslims’ public place in 
their community.  This conflict had nothing to do with religion, they maintained.  It was 
about nothing more than dealing fairly with the aural inconveniences of urban life.  
Conversely, arguing that this dispute was entirely about religion also did important work 
for the azan’s advocates.  They were able to place Muslims in Hamtramck while ignoring 
any legitimate concerns about volume or disturbance of the peace.  They readily 
dismissed their opponents as motivated by religious intolerance, rather than by any “real” 
concerns about noise.  They were able to defend their practice even if it infringed on the 
rights of others.  As I explore further in chapter 5, the definitions of both religion and 
noise proved indeterminate and thus could be used to countervailing ends.40
 The first set of speakers had denied that a religious ritual ever could constitute 
noise.  For them, noise implied that a sound was meaningless or purposeless.  “I told my 
fellow council members yesterday that it was an insult to my Muslim friends to 
categorize their religious practice as noise,” Councilman Klein insisted.  Another 
Hamtramck resident protested, “It is not a noise.  It is a soft, human voice.  For less than 
                                                 
40Recall that one of Councilman Klein’s objectives in making this dispute a national issue was to demonize 
his political opponents. 
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two minutes.”  Characterizing the azan as noise ignored its substantive content and 
function, its advocates maintained.  But significantly, many of their opponents agreed.  
While some opponents heard noise, others heard only religious content—content that 
upset them.  This dispute certainly was all about religion, they agreed.41
 
Religion in Public Spaces 
Religious sounds did not belong in public places, these critics maintained, and this 
constituted a second critical theme through which Hamtramck disputants contested 
religion’s place in their community.  These opponents hastened to affirm their respect for 
Islam, in general, but they objected to having to hear about it.  “I’m here for one reason,” 
announced a seventy-two year old, life-long resident of Hamtramck, “and it’s not to 
object to any religion, because God help me, every religion is sacred to its believers….I 
am here about what is being said in the call to prayer….I respect their love for Allah, but 
my god is Jesus Christ…I’m asking that we all pray to our god as we should…but not to 
impose our god on a whole community.”  She objected to the azan not as noise, but as an 
affirmation of a faith to which she did not subscribe.  Her husband agreed, and couched 
his objection in the same “rights talk” that Muslim advocates had adopted.  “As a citizen 
of the U.S. protected by the Constitution of this great country,” he insisted, “I and my 
fellow citizens should not be subjected to the tenets of someone else’s religion.”  “Where 
are my rights?” another woman protested.  Offering a new twist on the voluntary 
                                                 
41Hamtramck Common Council meetings, April 20, 2004; April 27, 2004. 
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character of American religions, these residents asserted a right to choose the extent to 
which they would encounter religious difference.42
While its Muslim advocates argued that the azan was intended for them, as a 
reminder to them to pray, these Christian opponents recognized that they, too, would 
come to constitute the azan’s audience as it spilled over onto Hamtramck’s city streets.  
They described the azan as proselytizing, as a means for imposing Islamic faith on an 
unwilling audience, comparable to how Jehovah’s Witnesses used loudspeakers in public 
parks.  These critics felt threatened by the azan’s call, concerned about how this sound 
might affect and shape their own religious sensibilities and commitments.  Numerous 
anthropologists have noted how Islamic disciplinary practices constitute Muslim subjects.  
In Hamtramck, these non-Muslim neighbors seemed concerned about how such practices 
might shape their own affective subjectivities.43
While their appeals to constitutional principles might seem legally questionable—
courts have never suggested that we have a right to be shielded from the religious 
practices of others—these critics were recognizing something significant about the nature 
of religious sounds.  These residents sought to control the extent to which they would be 
exposed to religious difference, but they realized that sounds could not be contained so 
effectively.  “I do not have a choice as to whether I hear this or not,” one woman 
                                                 
42Hamtramck Common Council meetings, April 13, 2004; April 20, 2004; April 27, 2004.  On American 
voluntarism, see Sidney Mead, The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1963). 
43A letter writer to the Detroit News explicitly compared the call to prayer to Jehovah’s Witness 
proselytizing.  See “Do Calls to Prayer Infringe on Others?,” Detroit News, April 23, 2004.  For discussions 
of how disciplinary practices constitute religious subjects, see Talal Asad, Geneaologies of Religion: 
Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993); Hirschkind, Ethical Soundscape; and Sara Coakley, ed., Religion and the Body (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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protested.  While individuals may choose to enter a mosque, church, or other place of 
worship, they have less control over what they hear on city streets.  In fact, the azan’s 
intrusion into Hamtramck’s communal spaces upset these opponents precisely because 
they would not be able to regulate when they would have to hear it.  While Hamtramck 
residents might be able to shut their eyes to the growing diversification of their 
community, they realized that they would not be able to shut their ears in the same way.44
These opponents sought to contain the azan by drawing a solid line between 
public and private space, aiming to circumscribe religion’s boundaries and keep it in its 
place.  “If you want to call your prayer,” one speaker offered, “go ahead, but keep it 
within doors.  You guys need to have prayer, fine, but make sure it stays within the 
walls.”  Another life-long Hamtramck resident agreed.  “Muslims are allowed to pray in 
their mosque,” she maintained, “They are allowed to pray in their mosque, they can have 
their [call to prayer] in their mosque… that’s their right.  But why is the loudspeaker so 
important?  A holy prayer is a holy prayer.  God hears it whether it’s on a loudspeaker, 
whether it’s in your heart, whether it’s in a mosque. Why agitate?  Why bring all these 
difficulties?”  These opponents located religion’s proper place in the built environments 
of a church or mosque, or in the personal relationship between an individual and God.  
Religion should stay out of the shared spaces of communal life, they insisted.  Reflecting 
long-standing American sentiments, they conceptualized religion as personal, 
individualistic, and private.  “Freedom of religion is to be able to practice what you want 
without imposing your religion on someone else,” a Polish-Catholic woman explained to 
me, “It doesn’t mean broadcasting.”  These opponents seemed fearful of how religious 
                                                 
44Hamtramck Common Council meeting, April 27, 2004. 
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sounds might blur the boundaries between religious communities as they entered the 
pluralistic public spaces of urban life.  In such a setting, they maintained, religion was 
best kept quiet.45
Ironically, these opponents’ efforts to keep religion private, to keep the sound of 
the azan out of Hamtramck’s public spaces, created a forum for publicly exchanging and 
discussing religious beliefs, albeit one in which they could choose the extent of their 
participation.  In advance of the council meetings, one of the most vocal opponents 
bought books on Islam, surveyed websites, and learned all she could about the azan’s 
religious significance.  During the meetings, she and others engaged in theological 
debates and contested the azan’s true meaning with their Muslim neighbors.  Was it a 
prayer or a call to prayer?  Could Christians ascribe to its affirmation of Allah’s 
greatness?  Did its text properly include a reference to Ali, the Prophet Muhammad’s 
son-in-law?  Did Muslims and Christians share a common belief in Jesus Christ?  To the 
Hamtramck Common Council members’ surprise and obvious discomfort, disputants 
raised each of these questions, transforming Hamtramck’s council chambers into an arena 
for theological debate.  This civic body became a religious court, of sorts, sitting in 
judgment over competing interpretations of Islamic and Christian theology.  “I respect 
their love for Allah, but my god is Jesus Christ,” one opponent declared.  “We, in the 
Muslim community,” responded the next speaker, “every one of us, believes in Jesus 
Christ.  It is our duty, it is our belief, to believe in Jesus Christ.”  But another speaker was 
                                                 
45Hamtramck Common Council meeting, April 27, 2004; Polish-Catholic Hamtramck resident, interview 
by author, May 1, 2008 (requested anonymity).  On American traditions of keeping religion private, see 
Sally M. Promey, “The Public Display of Religion,” in The Visual Culture of American Religions, eds., 
David Morgan and Sally M. Promey, 27-48 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).  I discuss 
assumptions about public and private religion more extensively in chapter 5. 
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quick to clarify: “Muslims don’t call Jesus a god.  He’s a human being, he’s a prophet.  If 
Christian people want to believe that he’s a god, that’s up to them.”  Back and forth it 
went.  As the meetings continued, several participants did not even bother to stake a 
position on the azan issue, preferring instead simply to seize the opportunity to profess 
their beliefs publicly.  Disputants were unable or unwilling to artificially divide belief 
from practice.  To debate the azan was also to debate theology.  By trying to keep 
religion private, opponents actually had brought religious differences to the fore, making 
them the subject of public debate, contact, and exchange.46
But many of the azan’s advocates denied that these opponents were trying to keep 
religion private in the first place.  Religious sounds already blurred the line between 
public and private space, they maintained, for when they listened to Hamtramck, they did 
not hear a religiously neutral or secular soundscape, but rather one marked as normatively 
Christian.  When they listened to Hamtramck’s churches, they heard the sounds of annual 
festivals and processions, which carried Roman Catholic faith into the streets.  More 
important, they heard Hamtramck’s churches ringing their bells, announcing daily 
services.  How did this differ from a call to prayer?  Analogizing the azan to church bells 
constituted the most common line of argument that proponents of the council’s ordinance 
advanced.  “If the churches will ring bells to call to prayer, then we have the right to do 
                                                 
46Polish-Catholic Hamtramck resident, interview; Hamtramck Common Council meetings, April 13, 2004; 
April 20, 2004; April 27, 2004.  For a discussion of how American courts frequently function as religious 
arbiters, see Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom.  As I mentioned in chapter 3, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses frequently used their court cases as an opportunity to profess their beliefs publicly.  The debate 
about Ali had to do with the fact that some Shi’i versions of the azan’s text include an extra line, referring 
to Ali.  An opponent had quoted this version of the text in her public comments, and a Sunni Muslim 
corrected her in his response.  Neither one acknowledged the possibility of contested versions of the text, 
however – both presented their versions as the text.  Hamtramck Common Council meeting, April 13, 
2004.  For a brief discussion of the different Sunni and Shi’i texts, see The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: 
Brill, 1960), s.v. “Adhan.” 
218 
the same thing,” one Muslim speaker insisted at the council meetings.  These advocates 
appealed to ideals of fairness and equal treatment.  The government could not 
discriminate among religions, so if it allowed church bells, then it had to permit prayer 
calls, as well.  As we found in chapter 3, religious dissenters frequently have adopted this 
analogizing strategy to claim their rights to religious freedom.  While some observers 
have criticized this approach, because it effaces differences among religions, does not 
protect practices that cannot be analogized, and perhaps implicitly bolsters Christian 
hegemony, it has proven pragmatically effective.47
Analogizing the azan to church bells constituted an effective legal strategy, but it 
also enabled Hamtramck Muslims to claim a place alongside Christians in the 
community’s public life.  A Polish historian and prominent Hamtramck resident argued 
in the local newspaper that public practice distinguished Polish Catholics from other 
American Christians.  And with the azan, Hamtramck’s Muslims merely were joining 
this tradition.  “Hamtramck’s religious communities,” he wrote, “have not fully been 
                                                 
47Hamtramck Common Council meeting, April 13, 2004.  I also discussed this analogizing strategy in 
chapter 3, since the Jehovah’s Witnesses also adopted it in their cases.  For a discussion of this strategy in 
the British context, see Metcalf, Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe, 14.  For a discussion 
of its use in post-1965 American jurisprudence, see Courtney Bender and Jennifer Snow, “From Alleged 
Buddhists to Unreasonable Hindus: First Amendment Jurisprudence after 1965,” in A Nation of Religions: 
The Politics of Pluralism in Multireligious America, ed. Stephen Prothero, 181-208 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006).  In a discussion with Dawud Walid, Executive Director of the 
Michigan chapter of the Council on America-Islamic Relations, he stressed the importance of this strategy 
in his work.  Walid, interview.  Jonathan Z. Smith argues that this analogizing strategy constitutes an act of 
translation that performs essential cultural work in a pluralistic democracy.  He claims that this act of 
translation negotiates difference, without effacing it.  See Jonathan Z. Smith, “God Save This Honorable 
Court: Religion and Civic Discourse,” in Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion, 375-90 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).  For a critique of this strategy, see Stephen M. Feldman, 
Please Don’t Wish me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation of Church and State (New 
York: New York University Press, 1997).  Analogizing the azan to church bells seems particularly ironic 
given the story of the azan’s origins.  According to one version of the story, Muhammad chose the human 
voice explicitly to differentiate the azan from Christians’ use of bells to announce prayers.  Muhammad 
used the azan to fashion a distinct Muslim identity, not one that was easily analogized to or conflated with 
Christianity.  See Muneer Goolam Fareed, “Adhan,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, 
ed. Richard C. Martin (New York: MacMillan Reference USA: Thomson/Gale, 2004), 13.  Also see my 
discussion of this point in chapter 5. 
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absorbed into what Robert Bellah has called the ‘Protestant Structure of American 
Society,’ in which faith is seen as primarily personal and private.  Nor have they accepted 
the notion that the public square must be naked of religion.”  If Hamtramck’s civic 
identity was tied to Catholic public practice, then Hamtramck’s Muslims could claim 
their own place in the community by instituting public practice of their own.  By 
diversifying Hamtramck’s soundscape, they simply were demanding a place alongside 
the historically Catholic majority in shaping the city’s civic identity and public life.  
Critics had argued that religion should keep quiet in public.  But these advocates, many 
of whom were Christian, imagined polyphonic public places, open to diverse religious 
forms and overflowing with the harmonies of global religious variety.  The azan would 
offer Muslim newcomers an important means for placing themselves in their new 
community.  The azan certainly was not just noise.48
But the azan’s opponents claimed not to hear church bells in the same way.  It 
seems that bells, too, could broadcast mixed messages.  Speakers differentiated the azan 
from church bells in at least two ways.  First, the azan had substantive content whereas 
bells were “merely” sounds.  “A church bell is a sound,” one speaker declared, “A school 
bell is a sound.  But a prayer is a prayer.”  “Church bells don’t speak,” another opponent 
offered.  Second, they denied that church bells’ primary function was to call prayer times.  
Instead, bells marked “secular” time in quarter-hour increments.  One opponent 
acknowledged that bells might once have called Christians to pray, but “the bells are not 
a call to prayer any longer,” he explained.  These speakers responded to efforts to 
analogize Muslim and Christian religious practices not by denying the significance of the 
                                                 
48Thaddeus Radzilowski, “Muezzins and matins—A Hamtramck story,” Hamtramck (MI) Citizen, May 13, 
2004. 
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Muslim ritual, but instead by denying that their own practice was religious.  Church bells 
had constituted background noise in Hamtramck, unremarkable acoustic features of daily 
life.  But as soon as residents noticed their chimes, as soon as the bells’ public presence 
became problematic, their defenders strategically redefined them as “secular,” thus re-
asserting the normative neutrality of Hamtramck public places over the protests of their 
opponents.  Again, the line between religious and non-religious sounds proved 
indeterminate and strategically useful.  By hearing the church bells as non-religious, these 
disputants actively constructed and produced secular space.  And in so doing, they 
implicitly rejected Muslims’ claims on Hamtramck public space.  Disputants thus 
contested whether religious sounds belonged in public, whether public spaces should be 
places for amplifying or muting differences.  And as they did so, they debated the place 
of Muslims and Catholics in their community.49
 
American Religious Identity 
                                                 
49Hamtramck Common Council meetings, April 13, 2004; April 27, 2004; Polish-Catholic Hamtramck 
resident, interview.  Because of Hamtramck’s aging and declining Catholic population, the city’s Roman 
Catholic churches no longer conduct daily services.  That is one reason why local residents might not have 
heard the church bells as prayer calls.  In the 1979 case that I quoted in the introduction to chapter 2, a New 
York judge actually rejected the argument that church bells infringed on listeners’ religious freedom 
precisely because they lacked substantive content.  “Plaintiffs also argue that the playing of the music is an 
infringement on their right to religious freedom,” Judge Tenney wrote, “This argument has no merit.  The 
music is played without words although it is the music of well-known Christian hymns.  There is no 
attempt to preach or impose any unwanted views.”  Impellizerri v. Jamesville Federated Church, 428 
N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).  In a prominent Supreme Court case that tested the 
constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance, some proponents similarly sought to redefine the Pledge’s 
reference to “God” as secular.  See Elk Grove v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).  Scholars have paid 
increasing attention to how religious communities construct sacred space.  For example, see Chidester and 
Linenthal, eds., American Sacred Space; Louis P. Nelson, ed. American Sanctuary: Understanding Sacred 
Spaces (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).  Less attention has been paid to the practices that 
produce the secular.  For one prominent study of the secular, see Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
221 
 Many critics worried that Muslims were not claiming a place for themselves 
alongside Hamtramck’s Christians, but instead were displacing a historically fragile 
Polish-Catholic establishment, replacing it with a new Muslim majority that would 
dominate Hamtramck aurally, socially, and politically.  “Let’s face it,” one life-time 
Hamtramck resident declared at the council meetings, “These churches have been here 
for almost one hundred years…And never in my life did I think this would be a debate in 
the city.  I never thought mosques would outnumber churches.”  These complainants 
heard the azan not simply as a religious ritual but as announcing Muslim presence and 
power.  “I think they just wanted to prove that they could do what they want,” one 
prominent opponent has insisted.  “The statement I hear,” said another community leader, 
“is that they want to dominate the environment and continue to make their presence 
known.”  “The prospect is there in people’s minds that the whole community could 
become a fortress of Islam,” another community activist explained to me.  If sound could 
make place, critics contended, then it also could dominate space.50
But it was not only Hamtramck residents who expressed such concerns.  While 
nearby neighbors debated whether the azan placed Muslims in or displaced Catholics 
from Hamtramck public life, outside observers also claimed a stake in the Hamtramck 
dispute.  Critics contended that the azan signaled a broader challenge to American 
society, a threat to an imagined Christian consensus.  And others rushed to defend the 
azan, proposing that the Hamtramck dispute might offer a productive opportunity to re-
imagine what it meant to be American.  They suggested that the azan might signal new 
pluralistic possibilities.  These participants thus situated the azan dispute differently 
                                                 
50Hamtramck Common Council meeting, April 13, 2004; Polish-Catholic Hamtramck resident, interview; 
Zwolak, interview; Sharon Buttry, interview by author, October 30, 2007. 
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within broader debates about American religious identity, and this constituted a third 
point of contention that merits consideration. 
Many opponents heard the azan as a daily reminder of the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks.  “How sad,” a Bloomfield Hills resident wrote to the Detroit Free Press, 
“another thing to remind us of 9/11.  The thought of a broadcast over loudspeakers 
calling Muslims to prayer five times a day will only make me think five times a day of 
9/11.”  Another woman wrote directly to the council members in outrage: “You and 
Hamtramck, Mich. are an embarrassment and disgrace to all Americans.  You have the 
gall, the insidious arrogance to even consider allowing a call to allah—you know twin 
towers allah—3,000 plus incinerated in the name of allah and 27 virgins!!  And in Arabic 
no less!!  What a disgrace—did you know anyone burned, killed, or maimed in the 
towers??...Maybe Hamtramck is next for annihilation in the name of allah.  What a joke.”  
These writers heard a literal threat to American society in the azan’s public 
pronouncement of Islamic presence.51
But other critics also heard the azan challenging their conception of what it meant 
to be American religiously.  While Hamtramck residents tended to focus on their own 
community’s shifting identity, many outside observers interpreted the azan’s implications 
more broadly.  In particular, they contrasted the Common Council’s efforts to 
accommodate the azan with what they perceived as Christianity’s removal from 
American public life.  They pointed to Supreme Court decisions that had prohibited 
prayer in public schools and Ten Commandments monuments in government buildings, 
and they argued that the United States was turning its back on its Christian heritage.  
                                                 
51“From Our Readers.” Detroit Free Press, April 22, 2004; Correspondence from Nancy Hildwein to Karen 
Majewski, April 27, 2004 (copy on file with author). 
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What made those public displays of religion inappropriate but made it acceptable for the 
Hamtramck Common Council to go out of its way to permit the call to prayer?  For these 
opponents, the azan dispute signaled broader efforts to displace Christianity from the 
center of American life.52
Most prominent among such critics was a group of evangelical Christians, who 
called themselves David’s Mighty Men.  Led by their pastor, James Marquis, the group’s 
members belonged to the same nondenominational church in rural Wellston, Ohio.  They 
also shared a commitment to defending Christian freedom, which they perceived as under 
nationwide attack by the forces of “secularism” and “Islamism.”  Although they admit 
that it sounds like a joke, David’s Mighty Men came together at a tailgate party preceding 
a Friday night high school football game in 2003, shortly after Judge Roy Moore had 
been ordered to remove a two-ton Ten Commandments monument from Alabama’s State 
Supreme Court building.  “We decided that we needed to move outside the walls of our 
church,” Pastor Marquis explains, “and actually take a stand for religious freedom.”  
Pastor Marquis and his followers traveled to Alabama and prayed in solidarity with Judge 
Moore.  Less than a year later, they saw a CBN report on the Hamtramck azan dispute 
and drew an immediate connection.  While Hamtramck residents analogized the azan to 
church bells, the members of David’s Mighty Men compared it to Judge Moore’s Ten 
Commandments statute and were furious that one should be permitted, but not the other.  
“I realize that we’re supposed to be a country that proposes religious freedom for 
everyone,” Pastor Marquis maintains, “But it seems to me that there’s religious freedom 
                                                 
52For the two most prominent school prayer decisions, see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) and 
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).  For cases that removed Ten Commandments statues 
from public buildings, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); McCreary v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); and Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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and tolerance for everyone except…evangelical Christianity.”  Pastor Marquis assembled 
the other members of David’s Mighty Men, and they made the ten-hour round-trip 
journey to Hamtramck for both the second and third public meetings.53
When he spoke during the meetings, Pastor Marquis appealed to liberal-sounding 
principles of equality, religious freedom, and minority rights.  He urged toleration for 
Hamtramck’s declining Christian community and respect for its religious rights.  “I’d like 
to remind you,” he addressed the council members, “as a publicly seated, elected body, 
you have a responsibility to support the petitions that come before you, but also to hear 
from the minority.  In this case, the minority might be those who do not wish to hear the 
public call to prayer.”  He then turned and spoke directly to those in the audience.  “Many 
in this room know what it is to be a minority,” he pleaded, “I would like to ask them to 
consider that perhaps today they are the majority, and those in the community who do not 
want to hear this forced prayer on them might be the minority that needs protecting.”  He 
adopted the same “rights talk” that Muslim speakers had used to advocate for the noise 
ordinance amendment.  But in private, Pastor Marquis slips into a different style of 
argument.  His rhetoric flows comfortably back and forth between appeals to liberal 
principles and appeals to America’s Christian heritage.  “Of course we believe that our 
nation was founded, and that our founding fathers had a strong belief in God,” he 
explains, “and that our laws were written from the word of God.  It’s offensive that we 
                                                 
53James Marquis, interview by author, July 26, 2007.  Legal scholars might contest Marquis’ analogy 
between the azan and Ten Commandments statues.  Nothing prohibits private citizens from posting Ten 
Commandments statues.  Problems have arisen when government actors display the Ten Commandments in 
public buildings.  Presumably, the situation in Hamtramck would have been very different had the 
Hamtramck Common Council decided to broadcast the azan itself.  Notice how the efficacy of the 
analogizing strategy depends on the choice of analogy.  Was the azan more similar to church bells or to a 
statue of the Ten Commandments?  Acts of translation are invariably acts of interpretation.  See Smith, 
“God Save This Honorable Court.” 
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would be making prayers to other gods vocal in our nation.”  Marquis rejects post-9/11 
efforts to recast American religious identity as Judeo-Christian-Islamic.  In fact, the 
Hamtramck dispute was “about the attempted subversion of our culture by the Islamists,” 
he says, associating “their” sounds with an attack on “our” culture.  Muslims do not seek 
to claim space alongside American Christians, he contends, but to displace Christians and 
redefine American identity.  “Islam has this nation as its goal,” he argues.  Pastor 
Marquis saw in Hamtramck’s shifting demographics a microcosm of what he feared was 
happening to America as a whole.  For him, silencing the azan offered a critical step in 
resisting this challenge to an imagined Christian consensus.54
Many Hamtramck residents dismissed the members of David’s Mighty Men as 
meddling outsiders with no real stake in what happened in their community.  But some 
local opponents agreed that Islam threatened American society, and they used the public 
meetings to criticize publicly what they perceived as Islamic values.  In particular, they 
focused their critique on gender relations and religious freedom.  Several speakers 
expressed anger about how Hamtramck Muslims segregated the sexes.  “They say the call 
to prayer is for the entire community,” declared one male opponent, “but they direct it to 
the men and boys of their community.  The women can’t come to the mosque, they don’t 
pray with the men.  This is the United States of America.  Our women are just as equal as 
we are.”  Other speakers argued that Muslims were seeking religious rights that would 
not be granted to Christians in their countries of origin.  “We have a separation of church 
and state here,” a Polish-American man asserted, “and just about every one of these 
                                                 
54Hamtramck Common Council meeting, April 27, 2004; Marquis, interview.  Jason Bivins has described 
this kind of slippage between appeals to America’s Christian identity and appeals to liberal principles as 
“the polymorphous discourse of law, rights, and religion.”  See Bivins, “Religious and Legal Others.” 
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people…they came from an Islamic state, where the government was the religion and the 
religion was the government.”  Sounding a similar note, one Catholic clergyman 
explained to me recently that although he supported the call to prayer at the time, he now 
believes that Hamtramck missed an opportunity to exert pressure on its Muslim 
communities.  He argues that the council should have adopted the noise ordinance 
amendment on the condition that Hamtramck Muslims would work to secure non-Muslim 
rights in their countries of origin.55
Regardless of the accuracy or even the coherence of these positions, what seems 
significant is that each of these speakers heard the azan as signaling a threat to 
“American” values.  As they heard the azan spilling over onto city streets, they 
interpreted its sound as fundamentally alien, foreign, or out of place—in short, as noise.  
They could not imagine the azan ever constituting background noise, sounding alongside 
church bells or other “normal” sounds of American public life.  The azan did not belong 
in Hamtramck, just as Muslims did not fit into their conceptions of American religious 
identity.  Complaining about the azan as noise thus circumscribed the place of these 
religious newcomers, demarcating the limits of their public participation.  Noise 
complaints aimed to contain the threat that these religious others posed. 
                                                 
55Examples of local opposition to the David’s Mighty Men involving themselves in the Hamtramck dispute 
can be found in Buttry, interview; and Kowalski, interview.  Quotes are from Hamtramck Common 
Council meeting, April 13, 2004.  The Catholic clergyman requested anonymity but expressed his 
sentiments in a conversation with the author on April 30, 2008.  On the position of women in American 
Muslim communities, see Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Jane I. Smith, and Kathleen M. Moore, eds., Muslim 
Women in America: The Challenge of Islamic Identity Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
Concerns about gender relations and about religious freedom have constituted two of the most common 
fronts on which Islam has been criticized by those who see it as fundamentally inimical to “American 
values.”  These same concerns were central to critiques of Catholicism and Mormonism in nineteenth-
century America. 
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But if some opponents heard the azan as signaling a threat to American identity, 
then many of its proponents heard it affirming a different conception of what it meant to 
be American.  They heard in the azan an opportunity to improve relations between the 
different religious, ethnic, and racial groups that called Hamtramck home.  They heard an 
opportunity to build a community in which those of different backgrounds could coexist 
peacefully.  They heard the azan as a call “to dialogue” and to “create a new 
community.”  If religious sounds could spark conflict, these advocates maintained, then 
they also could prompt cooperation.  The azan could signal new pluralistic possibilities.56
Many of the speakers at the council meetings argued that accommodating the 
azan could symbolize the potential for Hamtramck’s diverse peoples to form a single 
community.  “Here in Hamtramck we have a lot of problems,” urged one speaker, “So we 
have to tolerate each other…in the end, we are one city, one community, we have to 
come together, work together, to solve all of our problems and responsibilities.”  Other 
speakers tried to mute differences between Islam and Christianity by emphasizing their 
common beliefs.  “I’ve had relatives die in wars for you people to have the capability to 
worship the lord God of Abraham,” one Muslim speaker stated, “irregardless of what you 
call Him.  There’s only one God.  There is only one God.  That God is not Christian, He’s 
not independently Jewish, He’s not independently Islamic.  He is all of that. He is all of 
that.”  To claim a place for Muslims in Hamtramck and in America, this speaker 
emphasized shared military service in defense of religious freedom, and he also 
emphasized shared belief in God.  He adopted the “Abrahamic religions” rhetoric that 
many political leaders have employed strategically since September 11, 2001, in order to 
                                                 
56Personal correspondence from Dennis Archambault to Sharon Buttry (copy on file with author). 
228 
re-imagine the United States as a Judeo-Christian-Islamic nation.  For these proponents, 
the azan could signal commonality or a shared claim on American identity.  The azan did 
not have to sound foreign or out of place.  It could harmonize with the other chords of 
American religious variety.57
A group of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish leaders from around Detroit advocated 
this position most forcefully.  They described themselves first as the Hamtramck 
Interfaith Partners and later as the Children of Abraham, and they joined together to mute 
the growing discord through a series of community outreach events.  Ironically, the group 
was formed after a prominent Muslim community leader tried to convince Abdul Motlib 
not to broadcast the call.  Victor Begg chaired the Council of Islamic Organizations and 
had built the Muslim Unity Center in West Bloomfield, Michigan.  A Detroit 
businessman and civic activist since the late 1960s, he had worked hard to improve the 
position of Muslims within the broader community.  In the aftermath of 9/11, Begg had 
created an Interfaith Roundtable that brought together Muslim, Christian, and Jewish 
community leaders both to demonstrate support for Detroit’s Muslims and to educate 
non-Muslims about Islam.  But although he cared passionately about Muslim rights, he 
found it difficult to believe that a small Hamtramck mosque was making an issue out of 
the call to prayer.  “It sounded crazy in Hamtramck,” he explains, “for the Muslim 
community, in this day and age, to be involved with a silly issue like that….It’s not a 
critically important aspect of our faith.”  Begg felt that Muslims no longer needed the call 
to remind them when to pray, and he pointed out that few American Muslims lived close 
enough to a mosque to hear it anyway.  He did not understand why a mosque would draw 
                                                 
57Hamtramck Common Council meetings, April 20, 2004; April 27, 2004. 
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unwelcome attention and negative publicity to a community still reeling from the after-
effects of 9/11.  “We’ve got enough problems,” he thought, “Why bring them 
unnecessarily?”58
Begg changed his mind after meeting with Abdul Motlib.  “I saw that these guys 
were very simple, very humble,” he explains, “And I know I don’t like, in my own 
mosque, when some outsider comes in and tries to tell me what to do.”  Begg drew on his 
network of interfaith colleagues from across metropolitan Detroit to offer critical support 
for Motlib and the leaders of al-Islah.  Several Hamtramck Christian leaders, who heard 
in the azan an important opportunity to build interfaith relations in the city, also decided 
to get involved.  Through a series of outreach events, they used the azan dispute as an 
opportunity to display “a show of unity,” intended both for Hamtramck residents and for 
the broader world.  “We were trying to present a statement to the media,” Father Stanley 
Ullman, pastor of St. Ladislaus Roman Catholic Church, located directly across from al-
Islah, has explained, “We were trying to present a statement of support.  And definitely 
we were trying to dispel fear, to work toward some kind of cooperation and a mutually 
beneficial coexistence.”59
Members of the Hamtramck Interfaith Partners heard slightly different messages 
in the azan’s call.  For Thaddeus Radzilowski, an ethnic historian and director of a 
                                                 
58Begg, interview.  Ecumenical activities and displays of spiritual unity constituted one common religious 
response, nationally, to 9/11.  Patrick Allitt discusses this in Religion in America since 1945: A History 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).  Other religious leaders interpreted 9/11 as God’s 
punishment for a nation gone astray.  For an analysis of this rhetoric, see Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: 
Thinking About Religion after September 11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).  For more on 
interfaith activities in the United States, see Kate McCarthy, Interfaith Encounters in America (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2007). 
59Begg, interview; Buttry, interview; Stanley Ullman, interview by author, October 29, 2007; Thaddeus 
Radzilowski, interview by author, July 12, 2007. 
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national Polish-American political advocacy institute, the azan signaled “real” pluralism 
and offered an opportunity to educate Hamtramck’s Polish community about its own 
past.  In a series of newspaper editorials, he contrasted “the pallid diversity of the 
shopping mall food court” or “the exotic but genial community presentations of dances 
and customs from someplace else far away” with “the raucous, noisy, and messy” 
pluralism of Hamtramck, in which “neighbors jostle and argue with each other as they 
evolve a rough and ready toleration.”  While its opponents heard the azan as necessarily 
foreign, alien, or out of place, Radzilowski heard in the azan the sound of all immigrant 
communities struggling to place themselves in new homes.  He reminded his fellow 
Polish-Americans about the discrimination they faced when they first moved to the 
United States and about how fragile and insecure was their own establishment in 
Hamtramck.  According to him, the azan dispute offered Hamtramck residents an 
important opportunity to discuss “who are these new people, and how should we live 
with them?”60
Father Stanley Ulman heard the azan’s call as a theological challenge “to reflect 
on the proper Christian response when neighbors have a vastly different perspective of 
God.”  He seized the opportunity afforded by the dispute to educate his parishioners 
about Catholic moral obligations toward religious others.  Most of St. Ladislaus’ 
parishioners were aging Polish-Americans, and Ulman expressed sympathy for their 
concerns about how quickly Hamtramck was changing.  But he sought to set an example 
for his community by reaching out to their new neighbors.  “The Scriptures are full of 
passages that say be kind to the stranger,” Ulman explains, “There’s a sense of, be 
                                                 
60Radzilowski, interview; Radzilowski, “Muezzins and Matins.” 
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hospitable.  That’s in our culture, to be hospitable.  To make someone feel welcome.”  
Theological difference need not be frightening, he maintained.  Hamtramck Catholics 
could hear the azan as a celebration of religious diversity and also as a reminder of their 
moral obligation to welcome newcomers, just as their parents and grandparents had 
wanted to be welcomed when they came to the United States.61
Other Interfaith partners went even further and expressed hope that Hamtramck 
Christians also would hear the azan as a call to prayer.  Sharon Buttry, a Baptist minister 
and experienced community organizer, supported the call in the name of religious liberty, 
but also because of the message that it announced.  “I hope that [Christians] hear it as a 
call for all people to practice their faith,” she says, “Wouldn’t it be great if all of us 
practiced our faith in the way that our new neighbors are?”  Buttry hoped that the sound 
of the azan might encourage Christians to practice their own faith more stridently.  She 
hoped that her co-religionists also might heed the azan’s call.62
Like the other members of the Interfaith Partners, Buttry recognized that 
broadcasting the azan in Hamtramck would reach multiple audiences, and she interpreted 
its call as she hoped non-Muslims would hear it.  She dismissed the fears of opponents 
who felt that the call infringed on their religious rights, yet she ironically confirmed these 
very same fears.  As I discussed above, many critics argued that religion should be kept 
private because they did not want to hear a religious message with which they disagreed.  
They expressed concern about how the azan might shape their own religious sensibilities.  
The azan’s advocates had responded that they intended it only for its Muslim hearers, but 
                                                 
61Ulman, interview; Joe Kohn, “Hamtramck Catholics Get to Know Their Muslim Neighbors,” Michigan 
Catholic, June 25, 2004. 
62Buttry, interview. 
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Buttry implicitly acknowledged that the azan’s message might affect non-Muslims, as 
well.  In fact, she even hoped this would be the case.  She hoped that non-Muslims, too, 
would respond to it as a call to prayer.  As the azan spilled over into Hamtramck’s city 
streets, as it crossed boundaries between public and private, Buttry recognized that it also 
might blur the boundaries among religious communities, potentially shaping the 
sensibilities and subjectivities of all of its hearers—both intended and unintended 
audiences, willing and unwilling listeners. 
The members of the Interfaith Partners and of David’s Mighty Men thus situated 
the azan dispute differently within broader debates about American religious identity.  
The Interfaith Partners welcomed the opportunity to re-imagine what it meant to be 
American, to fashion a more inclusive collective identity.  David’s Mighty Men, 
however, tried to re-fortify the boundaries among religious communities, to resist the 
azan’s challenge to an imagined Christian consensus, and to circumscribe Muslims’ 
public place.  But these disputants all agreed that the azan would resonate for more than 
just its Muslim hearers.  While not all audiences would hear the azan announce the same 
thing, most would it hear it announce something, as it reverberated throughout this 
pluralistic urban environment. 
 
Voting for the Call 
Hamtramck residents thus contested the meaning of the call to prayer.  They 
debated whether the azan dispute was essentially about religion or noise, the right of 
religious newcomers to practice their faith publicly or the right of neighbors to protect the 
public peace.  They debated whether public places properly were spaces for amplifying or 
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muting religious differences, differing as to whether neighbors should be able to choose 
the extent to which they encountered religious others.  And they debated the azan’s 
implications for American religious identity, disagreeing about whether it signaled new 
pluralistic possibilities or a threat that had to be contained.  Through these differences, 
disputants contested whether Muslims were placing themselves alongside a Polish-
Catholic establishment or whether the azan in fact signaled this establishment’s 
displacement.  And through these differences, they contested religion’s place in an 
increasingly pluralistic society.  Diverse hearing communities were listening consciously 
to the sound of the azan, and they were hearing multiple messages in its call. 
But ultimately, the members of Hamtramck’s council would decide how they 
wanted to hear the azan—and how they would regulate it.  “In the end, I’ll tell you, it 
wasn’t going to matter what they said,” Mayor Karen Majewski has explained, “Because 
I was convinced that this was the way to go…But they can’t say they weren’t given an 
opportunity to speak.”  On April 27, 2004, at the conclusion of the three public hearings, 
the Hamtramck Common Council adopted Ordinance No. 503, amending Ordinance No. 
434.  They exempted the azan and “other reasonable means of announcing religious 
services” from the municipal noise ordinance while also placing those sounds directly 
under their own jurisdiction.63
The council’s decision did little to mute the concerns either of those who 
supported the azan or those who opposed it, and disputants proceeded in different ways.  
As discussed above, the Hamtramck Interfaith Partners hosted a series of outreach events, 
                                                 
63Majewski, interview.  Robert Cover has argued that the role of United States courts is not to settle 
uncertainty in law, but instead to suppress the multiple narratives that diverse communities tell about law.  
See “Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law Review 97 (1983): 4-68. 
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including a press conference to celebrate al-Islah’s ceremonial “first call” under the new 
ordinance.  On May 28, 2004, religious and civic leaders gathered inside the al-Islah 
Islamic Center.  Local media covered the event extensively.  Members of the Interfaith 
Partners expressed support for their new Muslim neighbors and their hopes for how 
Hamtramck residents would hear the call.  “In Hamtramck,” stated Rev. Sharon Buttry, 
“my neighbor worships in the church, in the mosque, and in the temple…I am glad for 
the call to prayer, because it is not only a call to prayer, it is a reminder to all of us to live 
out our faith in love and mutual respect.”  Council members attended the ceremony and 
offered their own words of encouragement.  Several Muslim leaders from across 
metropolitan Detroit also attended the ceremony, most of whom had been unaware of al-
Islah’s presence prior to this dispute.  Finally, Abdul Motlib recited the call into a 
microphone that was connected to the loudspeakers atop al-Islah’s roof.  Many of the 
news broadcasts that covered the event noted how quiet the call sounded from the street, 
as if the loudspeakers had purposely been set to a low volume.  At least for that day, what 
Motlib had initially proposed as a normatively sanctioned religious ritual appears to have 
been reduced almost entirely to a symbolic gesture.64
                                                 
64Buttry, interview; Motlib, interview; Majewski, interview.  The azan’s low volume was reported by 
Detroit’s Fox 2 News and Channel 4 News (video recordings on file with author).  At the ceremony 
celebrating the first call, Abdul Motlib presented Council President Majewski with a key to the box that 
controlled the loudspeakers’ volume, symbolizing how this religious ritual had been placed under the 
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“Interfaith Partners Case Study, Hamtramck, Michigan” (unpublished report, on file with author, 2004).  
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temples instead of synagogues.  For example, two days after the September 11 attacks, President Bush 
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terrorism.”  See “President Bush to Declare National Day of Prayer,” White House Bulletin, September 13, 
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rhetoric.  See “Mr. President, Why Do You Exclude Us From Your Prayers? Hindus Challenge American 
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Carolina Press, 2006). 
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In the meantime, opponents discussed their options.  They considered taking their 
case to court in order to challenge the ordinance’s constitutionality but decided instead to 
settle the issue through a ballot referendum.  They launched a petition drive, calling for 
the repeal of Ordinance No. 503, and gathered enough signatures to bring the question to 
a city-wide vote.  The Common Council agreed to add the ballot proposal to an already 
scheduled special election.  On July 20, 2004, Hamtramck citizens would vote both on 
whether to recall three school board members and whether to repeal the new noise 
ordinance.  But even the ballot language became a matter of intense public debate.  
Council members drafted the language themselves, purposefully manipulating it to suit 
their political needs.  The ballot read: “Shall Ordinance No. 503, which amended 
Ordinance No. 434, to allow the City to regulate the volume, direction, duration and time 
of Call to Prayer, Church Bells and other reasonable amplified means of announcing 
religious meetings, be repealed?”  In other words, a “No” vote would uphold the 
council’s ordinance, thereby guaranteeing Muslims’ right to broadcast the azan, while a 
“Yes” vote would repeal the new ordinance and leave the azan  in legal limbo.  As 
indicated in the ballot language, the council members marketed the new ordinance as 
necessary for regulating the call to prayer, implying that Muslims could do whatever they 
wanted in the absence of such a law.  They also realized that voters might think a “No” 
vote meant no to the call or no to the new ordinance.  They even ignored the protests of 
the city attorney, who declined to approve the proposed language.  He explained that he 
was “of the opinion that the language as proposed by Council is confusing.  It suggests 
that Ordinance 503 was intended to regulate something that was already permitted by 
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Ordinance 434.  The amplification of ‘Call to Prayer’ or ‘Church Bells’ and other 
religious announcing was not permitted under Ordinance No. 434.”65
The squabble over the ballot language amplified the lingering confusion about 
precisely what the council had accomplished and about the legal status of the call to 
prayer under the original 1989 noise ordinance.  But it also demonstrates how fully the 
council and its opponents had politicized the azan issue, enmeshing it within other 
Hamtramck disputes.  The “new-guard” politicians that dominated Hamtramck’s council 
opposed the school board recall and supported the call.  Their “old-guard” opponents 
supported the recall and mostly opposed the new noise ordinance amendment.  Council 
members linked the two issues together and distributed literature through their political 
action committee that encouraged constituents to vote “No” on both issues.  They 
deliberately worded the ballot question to simplify this campaign.  What was ostensibly a 
dispute about a religious ritual had become thoroughly caught up in Hamtramck’s 
contentious “politics as usual.”66
On the day of the vote, local and national media descended on Hamtramck yet 
again.  Political operatives distributed campaign literature and displayed signs near 
polling stations.  The Interfaith Partners, who had decided not to campaign actively on 
the issue, scheduled a press conference in the morning and a communal meal in the 
evening as they awaited the results.  David’s Mighty Men returned to town, too, wearing 
                                                 
65On the opponents’ deliberations, see Zwolak, interview; Polish-Catholic Hamtramck resident, interview. 
On the council’s manipulation of the ballot language, see Majewski, interview.  On the city attorney’s 
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along religious lines.”  For example, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971); and Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002) [J. Breyer, dissenting]. 
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purposefully confrontational T-shirts that announced “Allah is no God.”  They stood 
across the street from the al-Islah Islamic Center, prayed, and sounded shofars, or ram’s 
horns, in protest.  Some Polish-American residents placed loudspeakers in their windows, 
directed them towards the street, and blasted polka music.  These disputants engaged in 
acoustic warfare as twenty-seven hundred residents went to the polls, a little over half the 
number that would vote in a regular election the following November. By a two hundred 
and sixty two vote margin, the referendum failed, preserving the council’s amendment.  
Hamtramck’s citizens had voted to accommodate the call to prayer.67
Given the confusing ballot language, observers disagree to this day as to whether 
Hamtramck citizens understood how they were voting.  Nonetheless, most of the city’s 
political and religious leaders chose to interpret the vote as a symbolic affirmation of the 
call, of Hamtramck’s Muslim community, and of a religiously polyphonic public square.  
It is not clear if a desire for such affirmation prompted Motlib to approach the council in 
the first place, but he felt gratified by the vote and saw God’s hand in the results.  “This is 
for religion, not my power,” he says, “This issue came from God, to build relations.”  In 
                                                 
67Charles Sercombe, “Voters Keep Prayer Call, Boot Board Members,” Hamtramck (MI) Citizen, July 21, 
2004.  Local news affiliates also provided extensive coverage of the vote.  While voters decided not to 
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the months that followed, Motlib continued to build relations.  He co-sponsored a “Unity 
in the Community” event that brought together clergy and laity from Hamtramck’s 
churches and mosques at al-Islah.  He also conducted an “exchange program” with Our 
Lady Queen of Apostles Church and with a suburban synagogue, through which children 
of the three congregations visited each other’s houses of worships and learned about each 
other’s faiths.  By broadcasting the azan, Motlib had announced his mosque’s presence, 
and the surrounding community had taken note.  The azan dispute had transformed al-
Islah from an introverted, insular mosque into one that was widely known and involved 
throughout Hamtramck and the metropolitan Detroit area.  The dispute had transformed 
Motlib personally, as well, through his lasting friendships with representatives from other 
religious communities.68
But most observers agreed that the July 20 vote brought an end to the public azan 
dispute.  Opponents launched no further legal challenges.  The media lost interest and 
moved on to other stories.  One other Hamtramck mosque joined al-Islah in broadcasting 
the call.  Some neighbors continue to grumble to this day, but few have registered formal 
complaints with the police or with the Common Council.  When complaints have been 
lodged, the council has dealt with them quickly and quietly.  Hamtramck’s residents 
                                                 
68On different views about whether Hamtramck citizens understood the ballot language, see Buttry, 
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Nation of Religions, ed. Stephen Prothero, 23-42 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 
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generally have learned to live with the call, though they undoubtedly continue to hear it 
in different ways.  Despite its contentious beginnings, the azan seems mostly to have 
faded into Hamtramck’s background, its sounds no more noticed than those of nearby 
church bells.  As Muslims have claimed an increasingly public place in Hamtramck, 
perhaps the azan no longer has sounded quite so out of place.69
 
Conclusion 
When Abdul Motlib petitioned the Hamtramck Common Council for permission 
to broadcast the azan, he did not anticipate the intense discord that followed.  “This was a 
very small issue,” he has explained to me, “We thought we’d start a call to prayer.”  The 
call to prayer had functioned as background noise in the country where Motlib was born, 
a religious ritual that also regulated the rhythms of daily life.  When Motlib proposed to 
introduce this religious sound into Hamtramck, however, into a city that was struggling to 
                                                 
69The council has received a few complaints about the volume of the call to prayer at the Yemeni mosque 
in Hamtramck’s south end.  Neighbors also complained that the mosque was broadcasting the call before 
6am and after 10pm.  The city attorney sent a letter to the mosque, instructing it to comply with the 
ordinance’s restrictions.  Various Hamtramck residents described this back-and-forth as a game of sorts.  
The mosque would test the limits of the ordinance until neighbors complained.  This seems consistent with 
what happened in Dearborn following the court case there.  See Majewski, interview; Polish-Catholic 
Hamtramck resident, interview; Correspondence from James P. Allen to Dr. Abdul Kareem Al-Gazali, July 
6, 2005 (copy on file with author); “City Needs to Crack Down on Noise,” Hamtramck (MI) Citizen, April 
12, 2005; Charles Sercombe, “Wake Up Call Comes Too Early,” Hamtramck (MI) Citizen, July 6, 2005.  
The azan dispute also resurfaced unexpectedly during the November 2007 city council election.  Each of 
the candidates tried to portray themselves as supporters of the azan.  Even those who had opposed the noise 
ordinance amendment argued that they were opposed to the restrictions that the council had placed on the 
azan, not the azan itself.  The issue also resurfaced following the election.  In response to complaints about 
noise emanating from a local pizza parlor, the council debated whether to adopt a new noise ordinance that 
would set objective decibel limits.  Some council members expressed concern about what a new ordinance 
would mean for Hamtramck’s churches and mosques.  They also used the opportunity to express their 
concerns about the time, place, and manner restrictions that the 2004 ordinance had enacted.  Disagreement 
lingered about whether the 2004 ordinance had been necessary and whether it was in the best interests of 
Hamtramck’s religious institutions.  The council failed to adopt a new ordinance, so the 2004 ordinance 
still stands.  See Charles Sercombe, “City Seeks to Fine Tune Noise Law,” Hamtramck (MI) Citizen, 
November 21, 2007.  Also see the discussion of these debates on the “Hamtramck Star,” an on-line blog 
that covers Hamtramck politics, http://hamtramckstar.com.  
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redefine its civic identity in response to rapid demographic and political changes, many 
listeners heard it as distinctly out of place.  But the council’s decision to accommodate 
this practice enabled Muslim newcomers to make the azan “at home” in Hamtramck.  
And as they claimed acoustic space for the call, they placed themselves in their new 
community.  Attending to this dispute thus has offered a useful case study for considering 
how religious immigrants have used public sounds to make place.  As the azan’s call 
resounded alongside the chimes of church bells, Muslims contributed to re-constituting 
Hamtramck’s civic identity.70
Scholarship on religion and sound generally has concentrated on how sounds 
function within particular bounded religious traditions.  But as I explore further in chapter 
5, this case study has encouraged attention to the ways that sounds cross boundaries 
between public and private, mediating contact among diverse religious communities and 
shaping the terms of their encounters.  In Hamtramck’s pluralistic public spaces, the azan 
was not reaching a uniform audience of willing Muslim hearers.  Instead, the muezzin’s 
call constituted a heterogeneous acoustic community of diverse listeners who did not hear 
or respond to the azan in the same way.  And through their differences, they contested the 
place of Muslims, Christians, and religion in their city.  They contested who had the right 
to hear and to be heard. 
In chapter 3, I suggested that loudspeakers offered religious dissenters a critical 
means for making their voices heard, but that loudspeakers also could dominate space 
with sound, infringing on the rights of unwilling listeners.  Similarly, many Hamtramck 
neighbors objected to the azan simply because they heard it as too noisy, as an 
                                                 
70Motlib, interview. 
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unnecessary aural annoyance.  They saw no reason to exempt the azan from 
Hamtramck’s municipal ordinance.  But as in other disputes, the noise complaints also 
functioned to circumscribe the public place of these religious others.  As I discussed in 
chapter 1, noise complaints frequently have targeted classes or types of people who 
threaten the prevailing social order.  Indeed, Hamtramck complainants sought to keep 
these religious newcomers quiet by demarcating their sounds as noise.  They sought to 
keep Islamic practice in its place.  Some of the azan’s critics argued that religious sounds 
did not belong in public at all.  They asserted a right to choose the extent to which they 
would have to encounter religious difference or to engage with religious others.  But they 
ignored the chimes of church bells that already dominated Hamtramck’s religious 
soundscape, redefining them as secular once their public presence became problematic.  
Other critics heard the azan as displacing Christians from American public life.  They 
heard the azan announcing Muslim presence and power, as signaling a threat to the 
nation that had to be contained.  But in each of these cases, complainants responded to 
the azan by trying to re-fortify boundaries between public and private and among 
religious communities.  Their complaints sharpened distinctions between “us” and 
“them,” between “our” sounds and “theirs.” 
But the azan’s call also crossed and blurred the boundaries among diverse 
religious communities.  As I discuss more extensively in chapter 5, attending to this case 
study complicates essentialized notions of religious identity that assume fixed differences 
between traditions.  It encourages us to note that the muezzin today calls Hamtramck 
Christians to pray five times a day, just as church bells invite Hamtramck Muslims to 
worship.  Participants in the Hamtramck dispute made clear that they did not all hear the 
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azan announce the same thing, but most heard it announce something.  Regardless of how 
they responded, they all responded in some way to its call.  As I have discussed, many of 
the azan’s proponents even hoped that Hamtramck residents would listen consciously to 
the azan as it spilled over into public space.  Many of them hoped that Christians, too, 
would feel called to pray.  Many of the azan’s advocates heard in the call an opportunity 
to re-fashion collective identities and to rethink what it meant to be American religiously.  
They imagined the public chords of religious difference joining in harmony, signaling 
new pluralistic possibilities.  If hearing the azan prompted some listeners to sharpen 
distinctions and to fortify boundaries, then it invited others to mute differences and to 
draw new lines altogether.   
Through this dispute, then, participants contested religion’s place in an 
increasingly pluralistic society.  And because it was resolved through political processes, 
rather than by judicial intervention, this case study has offered a particular opportunity 
for attending to the concrete processes through which Americans have negotiated 
difference and managed conflict.  During the council meetings, Hamtramck residents 
expressed popular understandings of religious freedom, of pluralism, and of toleration, 
and these understandings had real effects, shaping the terms on which disputants engaged 
each other.  But participants also appealed to these discourses in ways that were shaped 
by concerns and interests particular to Hamtramck’s distinctive history and identity.  By 
attending to this case study, then, we have been able to listen in on how broader debates 
about American religious identity have played out in particular local contexts.  We have 
been able to listen in on how ordinary Americans have responded to the sounds of 
religious difference. 
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Today, the discord of the azan dispute mostly has faded away.  But Hamtramck 
residents continue to struggle with disorienting change.  Local observers estimate that 
thousands of new immigrants have arrived since the 2000 U.S. Census, and the aging 
Polish-American community has continued to decline.  “When I go back to Hamtramck,” 
says Father Stanley Ulman, who has since been transferred to a suburban parish, “I see 
more and more of the Muslim influence.  More and more shops.  Fewer and fewer Poles.  
I see the Muslim, the Pakistani, the Bangladeshi influence much stronger.”  Hamtramck’s 
public schools are struggling to meet the needs of a diverse student body that speaks 
close to thirty different languages.  City council elections continue to be fiercely 
contested, with Bangladeshi and Yemeni names now appearing regularly on ballots 
alongside Polish names.  But many of the recent immigrants also have begun to move to 
the suburbs, like the Germans and Poles before them.  The city’s future seems fraught 
with uncertainty.  Yet the azan continues to call Hamtramck to pray, claiming its place on 
the local soundscape alongside the peal of church bells, the jingles of ice cream trucks, 
and the melodic lilts of Polish polkas.  As the azan enters Hamtramck’s streets, it 
continues to mediate encounters among diverse citizens who hear it in different ways.  
And how Hamtramck residents manage their community’s increasing diversity may 
depend, in part, on how they choose to respond to the azan’s call.71
                                                 
71Ulman, interview. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RELIGION OUT LOUD: 
MAPPING AND CROSSING BOUNDARIES 
 
 “It’s not your imagination.”  That was the message whispered to New York City 
pedestrians as they passed by a billboard advertising a new network television show in 
2007.  The billboards employed speakers that used the human skull as a receiver, emitting 
sounds at a frequency that only an individual passerby could hear.  Known as 
“hypersonic sound projection,” this new technology potentially will be able to transmit 
messages at great distances—messages that will reach only targeted listeners.  Its 
advocates claim that it might prove invaluable for search and rescue missions, enabling 
emergency service workers to communicate with stranded victims of natural disasters, or 
for car dashboards, transmitting directions or warning signals to easily distracted drivers.  
Civil rights advocates already are concerned about its potential abuses, however.  They 
fear that this technology will contribute to the gradual eroding of personal privacy, 
transforming the body into an involuntary receiver and causing it to resonate in response 
to emitted signals.  The technology’s detractors also have imagined how the military or 
police might deploy it to control crowds.  They fear that hypersonic sound projection 
might constitute the next frontier in state surveillance and mind control.1
                                                 
1Clive Thompson, interview by Brooke Gladstone, “Head Space,” On the Media, WNYC, December 14, 
2007. 
 
For the foreseeable (fore-hear-able?) future, however, commercial marketers are 
most likely to exploit this new technology, as in the case of the New York City billboard.  
Similar to the futuristic billboards depicted in the 2002 movie Minority Report, 
hypersonic sound projection might enable advertisers to target individual consumers with 
personalized messages.  But could religious institutions also deploy this technology 
effectively?  On the one hand, broadcasting religious messages directly into the heads of 
unwilling listeners might exacerbate the kinds of problems that I have discussed in this 
dissertation.  But on the other hand, perhaps this technology might offer a solution to 
these religious noise disputes if broadcasters were to target only willing listeners.  
Perhaps churches and mosques might broadcast announcements directly to those who 
chose to be called to pray.  Preachers might transmit their sermons directly to those who 
wished to listen.  Methodists would not have to be awakened by Episcopalian bells, 
Catholics could avoid listening to the Islamic azan, and Sunday afternoon park-goers 
might find their picnics undisturbed by unwelcome proselytizing.  In short, religious 
communities might produce sound without making noise.2
Hypersonic sound projection would fundamentally transform these auditory 
religious practices, however.  No longer would these sounds be public in quite the same 
way, no longer would they constitute a heterogeneous audience of diversely religious 
hearers, and no longer could they be accused of being too loud (though they might prove 
objectionably invasive).  Perhaps most significant, no longer would they have the kind of 
unintended effects on unintended audiences about which Immanuel Kant once 
                                                 
2 Religious communities already have begun to employ mobile-phone applications in these ways.  For 
example, according to one recent report, the “most popular religious app by far is Azan, which alerts 
Muslims five times a day that it’s time to pray.”  Lisa Miller, “Is That a Bible in Your Pocket?,” Newsweek, 
May 4, 2009, 12. 
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complained.  In his Critique of Judgment, Kant compared the visual and musical arts and 
expressed his preference for the former because they provided the viewer with the choice 
to look away, whereas music “scatters its influence abroad to an uncalled-for extent 
(through the neighborhood), and thus, as it were, becomes obtrusive and deprives 
others…of their freedom.”  Sound impinged on personal autonomy, Kant maintained.  In 
the footnote that followed, he emphasized this insight’s implications for religious 
auditory practices: “Those who have recommended the singing of hymns at family 
prayers have forgotten the amount of annoyance which they give to the general public by 
such noisy (and, as a rule, for that very reason, pharisaical) worship, for they compel their 
neighbors either to join in the singing or else abandon their meditations.”3
Like many of the complainants in the case studies that I have discussed, Kant 
objected to religion practiced out loud because he would have no choice but to hear 
sounds crossing beyond the contained confines of church or home.  Auditory religion 
could not be avoided as easily as visual displays, he insisted, for sound did not offer the 
listener freedom to turn away, “compelling” him instead to “abandon [his] meditations.”  
Moreover, such worship was “pharisaical,” overly concerned with ritual practice instead 
of belief or meaning, inappropriately and ostentatiously public.  It constituted noise, an 
acoustic annoyance to the surrounding neighborhood, and not religion properly 
conceived.  And yet Kant also expressed his concern that he might feel compelled “to 
join in the singing.”  Kant interpreted auditory religion not merely as noise, but as an 
invitation to participate, as a call to pray that demanded response.  As the sounds of 
religion practiced out loud spilled over into public spaces, they would mediate contact 
                                                 
3Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1952), 195-6. 
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among diverse hearers, constituting a heterogeneous acoustic community among those 
within range.  Kant’s provocative footnote thus implicitly identifies the ways that 
religious sounds cross and blur boundaries between public and private, among diverse 
religious communities, and between religion and non-religion. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider how religious sounds map and cross 
these three symbolically significant and pragmatically useful boundaries.  In the 
preceding chapters, I delved into particular disputes in order to interpret what it meant to 
hear religious sounds as noise, what it meant to hear religious sounds as “out of place,” in 
particular historical contexts.  I argued that through these disputes, opponants contested 
and negotiated the proper place of religion and religious adherents amidst changing social 
conditions.  But in this chapter, I step back to reflect more broadly on these noise 
disputes, to identify some of the common themes that bridge their notable differences.  In 
particular, I examine how contestants aimed to draw clear lines between public and 
private, between religion and religion, and between religion and non-religion.  But I also 
attend to how the disputed sounds crossed and collapsed these boundaries almost 
precisely as they were demarcated.  First, I consider how complainants conceived of 
religion as private and voluntary while these case studies offer a conception of legitimate 
religion as in fact public and involuntary.  Next, I examine how participants constructed 
collective identity in relation to the disputed sounds while these sounds also blurred 
communal boundaries.  Finally, I consider how contestants differentiated religion from 
non-religion and how they negotiated religion’s meaning in relation to the similarly 
indeterminate category of noise.  In each of these case studies, I find that listening to 
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religious sounds underscores the shifting and permeable boundaries of American 
religious life.4
 
Public and Private 
Americans have long conceived of religion as properly private and voluntary.  
This notion has prompted numerous complaints about public religious sounds.  But in this 
section, I consider how religious noise disputes also have unsettled these dominant 
assumptions.  Theorists of “the public” have engaged in long-standing debates about 
whether the public and private stand in rigid opposition to each other, about whether 
publics are singular or multiple, and about how religion’s place in public life should be 
normatively defined.  My interest in this section, however, is to analyze the notion of the 
public that emerges from these sound disputes and to consider its implications for the 
study of religion.  I find that in these case studies, the public defined particular places, 
which contestants invested with meaning through particular embodied practices.  But 
sound mapped these public spaces’ boundaries dynamically, complicating efforts to 
locate religion’s place within them.  And, perhaps most critically, these public places 
were not necessarily constituted by choice.  Contrary to dominant assumptions that 
American religion is private and voluntary, therefore, I find that these case studies offer a 
conception of legitimate religion as in fact public and involuntary. 
Attempting to demarcate a clear boundary between public and private has 
constituted a central feature of modern social order.  As the political theorist Jeff 
                                                 
4For a theory of religion that emphasizes how religion both marks boundaries and mediates crossings, see 
Thomas A. Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006).  Tweed uses aquatic metaphors to emphasize religion’s boundary-crossing propensities, while 
I have called attention to the auditory. 
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Weintraub describes it, “The public/private distinction stands out as one of the ‘grand 
dichotomies’ of Western thought, in the sense of a binary opposition that is used to 
subsume a wide range of other important distinctions and that attempts (more or less 
successfully) to dichotomize the social universe in a comprehensive and sharply 
demarcated way.”  Most important for the purposes of this project, the public/private 
distinction regularly has been advanced as a solution to the “problem” of religion in a 
plural culture.  This arrangement makes space for religious differences by confining them 
to a protected but marginalized private sphere and has its roots in the history of early 
modern Europe.  As one version of this story goes, religious identity was gradually 
disentangled from political identity in the wake of the religious wars that followed the 
Protestant Reformation, and liberal political frameworks emerged that rendered religion 
non-threatening by imagining it as properly individualistic, private, and increasingly 
irrelevant.5
This account proved critical to the historical development of religious liberty and 
toleration in the United States.  Historians such as Sydney Mead and Thomas Curry have 
described constitutional disestablishment as the product of an alliance between eighteenth 
                                                 
5Jeff Weintraub, “The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction,” in Public and Private in 
Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy, ed. Jeff Weintraub and Krishan Kumar, 1-42 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 1, quoting Norberto Bobbio, “The Great Dichotomy: 
Public/Private,” in Democracy and Dictatorship (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).  On 
the public/private divide as constitutive of religion’s place in the modern social order, also see Jose 
Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1994, especially 
chapter 2.  For a discussion and critique of the public/private divide as offering a solution to interpreting 
religion’s place in plural culture, see John F. Wilson, “The Public as a Problem,” in Caring for the 
Commonweal: Education for Religious and Public Life, ed. Parker J. Palmer, Barbara G. Wheeler, and 
James W. Fowler, 9-22 (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1990).  Also see Richard A. Shweder, 
Martha Minow, and Hazel Markus, eds., Engaging Cultural Differences: The Multicultural Challenge in 
Liberal Democracies (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), especially the introductory essay.  For a 
provocative critique of the dominant historical narrative that describes the gradual rise of religious 
toleration as the product of the European Enlightenment, see Benjamin J. Kaplan, Divided by Faith: 
Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007). 
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century rationalists and Protestant evangelicals.  Both groups conceived of religion as a 
private matter between an individual and God and thus beyond the scope of civil 
government’s power.  As Thomas Jefferson wrote in his Notes on the State of Virginia, 
“The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others.  
But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god.  It 
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”  Properly conceived as a matter of freely 
chosen belief, one’s religious commitments made little difference for anyone else, 
Jefferson implied.  As long as religion did no “injury” to others, it bore no public 
relevance.6
In 1844, the Presbyterian minister and historian Robert Baird celebrated—and 
defined the limits of—American religious liberty in similar terms.  “The Christian,” Baird 
wrote, “be he Protestant or Catholic, the infidel, the Mohammedan, the Jew, the Deist, 
has not only all rights as a citizen, but may have his own form of worship, without the 
possibility of any interference from any policeman or magistrate, provided he do not 
interrupt, in so doing, the peace and tranquility of the surrounding neighborhood.”  Baird 
acknowledged that religious freedom entailed practices and not merely beliefs, but he 
implied that such practices were best kept private, contained behind the concrete walls of 
religious institutions or homes and away from the pluralistic spaces of public life.  As 
long as religion did not disturb “the peace and tranquility of the surrounding 
neighborhood,” then it remained irrelevant to others.  In both the cases of Jefferson and 
Baird, prescriptive and descriptive language overlapped.  Like many other historical 
                                                 
6Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on the State of Virginia” in Thomas Jefferson: Writings (New York: The 
Library of America, 1984), 285; Sidney E. Mead, The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in 
America (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in 
America to the Passage of the First Amendment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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thinkers, they each described religion’s normative boundaries in such a way as they 
deemed necessary for accommodating and circumscribing religious differences.7
In the noise disputes that I have discussed, complainants alleged that religious 
sounds had crossed this normative boundary between public and private, and they 
responded by trying to reinforce it, frequently echoing the language of Jefferson and 
Baird in the process.  For example, St. Mark’s Church’s neighbors admitted that bell-
ringing might have a long history, but denied that it might be considered above the law.  
“No one is permitted…to do an act which is unlawful in itself,” they maintained, “nor 
does the law of the land tolerate injuries to person or property because of any persuasion 
on the part of the wrong-doer that the act is necessary as a fulfillment of a duty on his 
part, even though it be a religious duty.”  Like Jefferson, they argued that the right to 
practice religion freely ended as soon as such practice “did injury” to others, and they 
insisted that noise constituted real injury.8
In Lockport and Hamtramck, many of the opponents went out of their way to 
affirm their commitment to religious freedom and toleration.  Like Baird, they insisted 
that individuals had a right to believe and worship as they pleased, provided they not 
interrupt the “peace and tranquility of the surrounding neighborhood.”  They claimed no 
grievances against Jehovah’s Witnesses or Muslims, but merely aimed to keep them 
quiet, to circumscribe the normative boundaries of their practice.  As I noted in chapter 4, 
                                                 
7 Robert Baird, Religion in America; or, an Account of the Origin, Relation to the State, and Present 
Condition of the Evangelical Churches in the United States, with Notices of the Unevangelical 
Denominations (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1856), 645. 
8Report of [George L.] Harrison et al. vs. St. Mark’s Church, Philadelphia: A bill to restrain the ringing of 
bells so as to cause a nuisance to the occupants of the dwellings in the immediate vicinity of the Church: In 
the Court of Common Pleas, no. 2. In Equity. Before Hare, PJ, and Mitchell, Associate J. (Philadelphia, 
1877), 4-5. 
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there have been several other situations in which municipal governments have permitted 
American Muslims to build mosques only after promising never to broadcast the call to 
prayer.  In these instances, neighbors put up with religious differences provided they 
remained confined to discrete religious institutions.  But they resisted and regarded as 
inappropriate public pronouncements that intruded audibly into public space.  They 
imagined religion as “private” either in the sense that it properly was a matter of belief 
between an individual and God, or that it properly was practiced behind the closed doors 
of particular buildings, set off and apart from the “secular” spaces of common social life.  
“Public religion” thus pushed against widespread assumptions about how religious 
groups were expected to behave in the United States. 
These noise disputes hinged on competing conceptions of religion’s proper 
place—or conflicting notions of which spaces were properly invested with religious 
meaning.  In American Sacred Space, Chidester and Linenthal argued that Americans can 
construct “virtually any place” as sacred, citing schools, museums, homes, and 
cemeteries as examples.  But as we have found, Americans also regularly have contested 
the audible sanctification of certain spaces.  In my case studies, complainants cared 
deeply about where they heard the sounds in question.  Hearing sounds as noise depended 
in large part on hearing them as “out of place”—or on hearing religion as out of place, as 
improperly public.  Complainants did not expect to encounter religion in these particular 
public contexts.9
In these case studies, therefore, “the public” emerges as a description of particular 
places, invested with meaning through particular auditory practices.  This conception 
                                                 
9David Chidester and Edward T, Linenthal, eds., American Sacred Space (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), 14. 
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diverges from that of many public sphere theorists.  For example, Jurgen Habermas, who 
is widely credited with reinvigorating debates about the public’s meaning among 
American political and social theorists, imagined the public sphere as a third space 
between the state and the private in which communication could serve as the basis for 
will-formation.  Although Habermas chose a distinctly spatial metaphor in describing the 
public as a “sphere,” his conception mostly disregards the material realities of how 
people negotiate actual geographic spaces.  By describing the public sphere as a singular, 
abstract, disembodied, discursive realm, he implicitly frames questions about public 
religion solely in terms of truth claims.  Religion becomes something that is believed and 
talked about.10
But in these noise disputes, participants responded to the sounds of religious 
practices and debated how these sounds affected the “public” character of particular 
places.  They debated religion’s place in American public life as a question of when and 
where it was appropriate to hear religious devotion.  They responded to religion as 
practiced rather than as believed.  Such a notion resonates more sympathetically with 
how Sally Promey describes public religion in her essay, “The Public Display of 
Religion.”  A practice or display is public, Promey proposes, to the extent that it may be 
seen by others.  Promey interprets the public not as “one term of a static, paired 
opposition (as in public versus private),” but instead as “one direction along a conceptual, 
practical, and experiential continuum of accessibility.”  Practices are thus not simply 
public or private, she argues, but rather more or less public depending on the degree to 
                                                 
10For Habermas’ most influential writing on the public sphere, see Jurgen Habermas, The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1989).  Also see Craig J. Calhoun, ed, Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1992). 
254 
which they are visible.  Similarly, we might define religious sounds as public to the 
extent to which they are audible to others.  And I have suggested that religious sounds are 
heard by multiple audiences, who respond to them and interpret their meanings in 
multiple ways.  Promey likewise emphasizes that “no rhetorically all-inclusive ‘public’” 
underlies her argument.  Instead, she suggests that public displays of religion are viewed 
by and constitute multiple publics, which can change over time.  “Whenever something is 
set out for others to see,” she writes, “what they see depends on both who they are and on 
what is displayed.  The plurality of publics for the display of religion increases the 
contingency of the display’s significance.”  Promey thus calls attention to public 
religion’s inherently unstable and unpredictable meanings, which emerge from numerous 
perceivers’ active engagement with each other and with the object of their attention.11
Promey’s expansive conception of the public seems useful for interpreting these 
religious noise disputes.  But her exclusive emphasis on the visual undercuts the force of 
her argument, since sight maps a relatively static conception of space, set out before the 
viewer for inspection.  Attending to religion as auditory practice, as heard rather than 
seen, offers a more dynamic understanding of public space.  As the cultural geographer 
Paul Rodaway describes it, “Acoustic space is dynamic, not static.  It is an appearing and 
disappearing of sounds, of single sounds and sounds voicing together.  It is a world of 
nothing but action.”  Indeed, soundfields are fluid and constantly changing, mapping a 
complex, shifting geography that is distinct from spatial maps organized along visual 
lines.12
                                                 
11Sally M. Promey, “The Public Display of Religion,” in The Visual Culture of American Religions, ed. 
David Morgan and Sally M. Promey, 27-48 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 31-33. 
12Paul Rodaway, Sensuous Geographies: Body, Sense, and Place (London: Routledge, 1994), 102-3. 
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In these religious noise disputes, the “public” defined particular places, but sound 
mapped these spaces dynamically, not statically.  Attending to sound complicates efforts 
to locate religion and demarcate its proper place, for where exactly was “religion” in the 
case studies that I have analyzed?  Sound travels through the air, produced in one place, 
yet heard in several others while also dissipating with time.  Sounds such as church bells 
and the azan originate within the traditionally sacred spaces of the church and mosque, 
yet are heard throughout surrounding neighborhoods, blurring the boundary between 
inside and outside, public and private, religious and secular.  In the Lockport case, the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses similarly used amplifying technologies to render religion portable, 
spilling over into the city’s streets, homes, and public parks.  They could temporarily 
transform any place into a religious space, a site for amplifying difference and for 
expanding the boundaries of their acoustically-defined community. 
Furthermore, listeners hear sounds with varying intensities, depending on 
position, distance from point of origin, environmental and architectural factors, and other 
acoustic properties.  While visual displays such as religious architecture and works of art 
can seem relatively stable, sounds are ephemeral, produced and heard only at particular 
times.  In fact, disputants regularly contested competing conceptions of sacred time 
through these disputes about noise.  In Philadelphia, for example, the leaders of St. 
Mark’s Church asserted their right to ring bells every day of the week, while the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court restricted their sounding to particular religious and civic 
festivals.  Through these differences, disputants debated whether religion properly 
belonged in the midst of social life or set off as distinct and apart.  In Lockport, the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses similarly asserted a right to preach the gospel every day of the 
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week, yet their opponents complained that the sounds of their preaching actually 
desecrated the Sabbath peace.  In Hamtramck, the azan’s advocates compared its 
regulation of time to the regular ringing of church bells, while complainants insisted that 
the city’s bells marked “secular” time, not religious time.  And while many Hamtramck 
Muslims heard the azan as a regularly recurring, five-times-a-day reminder to pray, many 
of their non-Muslims opponents heard it as an irregular irruption, unfamiliar with its 
solar-based rhythms. 
All of this is simply to say that “soundfields” are not static, but are fluid and 
constantly changing, distinct from spatial maps drawn along visual lines. When we listen 
to religious sounds, we confront a complex, shifting, and contested sacred geography.  In 
these disputes, contestants aimed to demarcate religion’s proper place by locating it in 
space and time, yet they could not fix nor circumscribe auditory religion’s boundaries so 
easily.  Keeping religion private meant keeping its auditory practices out of particular 
public places, yet sounds mapped the boundaries of those spaces dynamically and often 
unpredictably.  Sound regularly crossed the very boundaries that were meant to contain it. 
If sounds map the boundaries of public space dynamically, then they also imply a 
conception of publicity that is not necessarily defined by choice.  Complainants in these 
disputes repeatedly protested that they could not shut their ears to the sounds that spilled 
over into public space.  In many cases, they objected to public sounds precisely because 
they were unavoidable.  This question of choice proved critical, complicating theories of 
the public that implicitly assume or take for granted its voluntary constitution.  For 
example, Michael Warner has argued that a public is self-organizing, constituted merely 
through the act of paying attention, existing only “by virtue of being addressed.”  Warner 
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defines the public not in spatial terms, but as a mode of address, as a cultural form that 
mediates relationships among strangers engaged in reading similar texts.  This conception 
offers an alternative means for interpreting these noise disputes, focusing our attention 
not on where these practices were heard, but on to whom they were addressed.  Or, to put 
it another way, Warner might encourage us to consider not only the audience that 
broadcasters intended to target, but also who considered themselves addressed by these 
sounds, whether intended or not, an issue to which I will return in the next section.13
But Warner argues that publics are “united through the circulation of their 
discourse” and that “the idea of a public” is necessarily “text-based.”  Although he 
defines “texts” broadly enough so as potentially to include the kinds of auditory 
announcements at issue in these disputes, his notion of texts assumes that they are 
consciously picked up and read.  “A public is constituted through mere attention…,” he 
insists, “The cognitive quality of that attention is less important than the mere fact of 
active uptake.”  Warner implies that publics are self-organized voluntarily, that 
individuals freely choose which texts to read and respond to and thus in which publics to 
participate.  I would suggest that Promey’s exclusive focus on the visual achieves much 
the same effect, for seeing always involves an element of choice.  Individuals must turn 
their bodies in a certain way and choose to keep their eyes open.  Individuals likewise can 
choose whether to enter a church, mosque, or other house of worship.  But hearing seems 
different, for individuals cannot choose as readily what sounds they hear on city streets.  
As Rodaway describes it, “Auditory phenomena penetrate us from all directions at all 
times.  The auditory perspective is not linear but multidirectional.”  In his St. Mark’s 
                                                 
13Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 67. 
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bells decision, Judge Hare made a similar point when he wrote, “Light may be shut out, 
and odors measurably excluded, but sound is all-pervading.”  In other words, the publics 
constituted by sound are not necessarily constituted by choice.14
In each of my case studies, opponents assumed a right to regulate what sounds 
they would have to hear in public spaces, yet they repeatedly found this expectation 
confounded.  In Lockport, for example, park-goers distinguished the sounds of the 
Lutheran rally from the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ preaching because individuals had chosen 
to attend the former, while they could not avoid the latter.  In Hamtramck, some of the 
most vocal opponents complained that the azan violated their right to be shielded from 
religious difference.  They assumed that religion was properly private and voluntary, that 
it properly was a matter of personal choice.  Therefore, they objected to having to hear 
the sounds of religious others.  For the azan’s proponents, however, the competing chords 
of religious variety merely made audible the realities of American pluralism.  These 
disputants advanced conflicting notions of the nature of public space.  The auditory 
announcements’ defenders imagined public places as necessarily polyphonic and noisy, 
as spaces for amplifying difference.  But opponents aimed to shelter public spaces from 
the particularistic sounds of religious variety.  They circumscribed religion’s boundaries, 
confining it to certain times and places where individuals could choose how and whether 
to encounter it.  They aimed to protect public spaces from potentially chaotic 
cacophony.15
                                                 
14Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, 67-8, 86-7; Rodaway, Sensuous Geographies, 92; Harrison v. St. 
Mark’s, 490. 
15Mark M. Smith similarly has studied racial segregation as an effort to regulate sensory contact with racial 
others in public spaces.  See Mark M. Smith, How Race is Made: Slavery, Segregation, and the Senses 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 
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But interpreting these noise disputes in this way perhaps reaffirms Warner’s 
argument that publics are constituted voluntarily.  Hamtramck opponents certainly were 
listening consciously to the sound of the azan, for example.  Although they may not have 
chosen whether to hear it, they did choose, in a way, to consider themselves part of the 
public to which the azan’s call was addressed.  And they argued that religion properly 
was kept private.  But in that case, defining publics as constituted by choice would render 
only certain religious sounds problematic, those to which attention was paid.  Only those 
sounds which were noticed could be characterized as improperly public.  However, the 
azan was not the only religious sound that spilled over into Hamtramck’s streets.  
Similarly, the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ preaching was not the only public religious sound in 
Lockport.  While critics complained that these sounds constituted noise and 
inappropriately intruded onto “secular” space, these same critics regularly ignored the 
chiming of nearby church bells.  The sounds of religious dissenters stood out as aural 
annoyances, while the sounds of the historically dominant faded into the background.  
Church bells went unmarked and unnoticed, taken for granted, precisely as they 
participated in the acoustic construction of public space.  Hearers did not even seem to 
realize that they had become part of the public constituted by the bells’ chimes.16
In fact, what made Christianity public in these particular, dynamically defined 
spaces was precisely that no attention was paid to its sounds.  Indeed, as soon as 
disputants noticed bells, they heard them as problematic and circumscribed their 
boundaries in various ways.  In Philadelphia, for example, St. Mark’s Church’s leaders 
                                                 
16I purposely describe the church bells as “unmarked” in order to echo scholarship on “whiteness” that 
traces how whiteness came to be “unmarked” racially.  For example, see Richard Dyer, White (London: 
Routledge, 1997). 
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presumed their right to make noise because they regarded bell-ringing as perfectly normal 
and unobjectionable.  But as soon as neighbors complained, as soon as they paid attention 
to the sound of the bells, as soon as they complained that the bells had come to constitute 
noise, then a court intervened to restrict the bell-ringing to particular times.  As soon as 
the bells were noticed, they became problematically public.  In Hamtramck, Muslims 
analogized the azan to bell-ringing, calling attention to a practice that previously had 
gone unnoticed.  And some opponents responded by redefining bells as secular, 
maintaining that their only function was to mark quarter-hour time increments.  As soon 
as neighbors noticed the bells, therefore, as soon as neighbors paid attention to them, they 
rhetorically stripped the bells of their religious significance.  They redefined the bells as 
not religious precisely because they were public and unavoidable.  In each of these case 
studies, in other words, those religious sounds to which attention was paid were 
circumscribed as properly kept private, while those religious sounds that went unnoticed 
remained publicly permissible.  Attending to these noise disputes thus has illuminated the 
concrete processes through which certain sounds—and groups—have become normative 
while others have been contested as “out of place.”  It has raised critical questions about 
the construction of “secular” public spaces that regularly have been shaped by the sounds 
of certain religious groups and not others. 
We find in these case studies, then, an important relationship between public 
sounds and social legitimacy.  Contests over producing religious sounds publicly have 
hinged on who was engaged in the disputed noise-making and on the power to declare 
certain public sounds legitimate and others illegitimate.  These disputes about religious 
noise centered on defining which sounds would be rendered publicly permissible and thus 
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whose sounds would become unavoidable.  Defining publics in textual or visual terms has 
implied that they are constituted simply through choice.  But such a notion renders 
problematic only those religious sounds to which attention is paid while ignoring the 
sounds of the historically dominant that go unnoticed.  Attending to disputes about 
religious noise thus offers a different conception of the public and of religion’s place in 
relationship to it.  As I have argued, the public that emerges from these case studies 
defines particular places, mapped dynamically, but not necessarily constituted by choice.  
Americans have long conceived of religion as properly private and voluntary.  Yet in 
these case studies, those religions that were deemed legitimate were precisely those 
which seemed public and involuntary, those whose sounds became unavoidable as they 
spilled over into public spaces.  As I noted in chapter 4, for example, most of the 
Hamtramck residents with whom I have spoken claim no longer even to notice the sound 
of the azan.  Perhaps Islam became public in that context precisely as neighbors stopped 
paying attention to it, precisely as its sounds came to resound alongside those of the city’s 
church bells, acoustically shaping public spaces in remarkably unremarkable ways. 
 
Religion and Religion 
In the pluralistic, dynamically defined spaces of American public life, the sounds 
of bells, preaching, and the azan have been heard by both intended and unintended 
audiences, willing and unwilling listeners.  These sounds have reached not only 
homogenous, bounded religious groups, but multiple, diverse hearing communities who 
have interpreted and responded to them in different ways.  While scholarship on religion 
and sound generally has emphasized how auditory practices function within particular 
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religious traditions, this dissertation has encouraged attention to how sounds mediate 
contact, both blurring and reinforcing boundaries among religious communities.  In this 
section, I consider how these audible announcements—and the conflicts they prompted—
generated social spaces for constructing, negotiating, and reconfiguring individual and 
collective identities, processes that proved fluid and varied. 
On the one hand, these public sounds offered an important site for demarcating 
difference.  Scholarship on religious auditory cultures has emphasized how groups have 
created their “own” sounds in order to mark the boundaries of communal membership.  
For example, Charles Hirschkind has examined how cassette sermon tapes constitute 
modern Muslim subjects.  Grant Wacker has discussed how speaking in tongues provided 
“audible proof of baptism” for early twentieth-century American Pentecostals.  Michael 
McNally has argued that hymn-singing offered an important spiritual resource for Native 
Americans resisting colonialism.  And Daniel Ramirez has studied the sonic world of 
U.S.-Mexico borderlands religion and found that Latino Pentecostals borrowed elements 
from Anglo-Protestant, African-American, and Mexican traditions to forge a distinct 
musical style.  In fact, after surveying musical traditions across a wide range of American 
ethnic and religious communities (including Muslims, Jews, Chinese Christians, Old 
Regular Baptists, Maine Wabanakis, and Russian Orthodox), the editors of a recent 
volume presumed music’s role in constructing collective identity to be so strong that they 
concluded that “American religious experience is fundamentally communitarian, that it 
depends on the ways music shapes and bounds communities of believers.”17
                                                 
17Philip Bohlman, Edith Blumhofer, and Maria M. Chow, eds., Music in American Religious Experience 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 12-13.  Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette 
Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Grant Wacker, 
Heaven Below: Early Pentecostals and American Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
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In my case studies, religious devotees similarly constructed identity in relation to 
their “own” sounds.  As I have argued in preceding chapters, sounds such as church bells, 
the azan, and public preaching oriented listeners in space and time, acoustically mapping 
the boundaries of communal membership.  But as these sounds reached heterogeneous 
audiences in pluralistic public spaces, listeners also fashioned identity in relation to or in 
opposition to others’ sounds.  Demarcating which sounds were not one’s own proved at 
least as significant as demarcating one’s own sounds.  In Philadelphia, for example, St. 
Mark’s neighbors came to define bell-ringing as unnecessary for Christian life in 
response to the odious clamor of a church that most of them did not attend.  “We” did not 
need such auditory reminders, they implied.  In Hamtramck, contestants debated whether 
Christians also might affirm the azan’s substantive message, seizing the opportunity 
afforded by the city council hearings to articulate theological differences.  Moreover, in 
both Hamtramck and Lockport, many Christian listeners differentiated the inoffensive 
chimes of church bells from the racket of the Witnesses’ preaching or of the azan.  “Our” 
sounds were not simply noise, they maintained. 
Distinguishing one’s “own” sounds from the sounds of “others” marked religious 
difference.  Jonathan Z. Smith has argued that “The most common form of classifying 
religions, found both in native categories and in scholarly literature, is dualistic and can 
be reduced, regardless of what differentium is employed, to ‘theirs’ and ‘ours.’”  In these 
                                                                                                                                                 
2001), 39-40; Michael McNally, “The Use of Ojibwa Hymn-Singing at White Earth: Toward a History of 
Practice,” in Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice, ed. David D. Hall, 133-159 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Daniel Ramirez, “Alabare a Mi Senor: Hymnody as 
Ideology in Latino Protestantism,” in Singing the Lord’s Song in a Strange Land: American Protestant 
Hymnody, ed. Edith Blumhofer and Mark Noll, 196-218 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004).  
For the purposes of this dissertation, I have not found it necessary to distinguish music from the broader 
sonic world of religious devotion, though if I were pressed for a minimal working definition, I might 
suggest that music is “patterned sound.” 
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case studies, participants mapped religious boundaries by classifying sounds as “ours” 
and “theirs”—and as correspondingly welcome and unwelcome.  This indicates, in part, 
the important work that complaints about “noise” performed.  Historian Robert Orsi 
warns, “The mother of all religious dichotomies—us/them—has regularly been 
constituted as a moral distinction—good/bad religion.”  Distinguishing “our” sounds 
from “their” sounds similarly reinforced evaluative hierarchies.  “Our” sounds were 
pleasing, necessary, melodious, and meaningful.  “Their” sounds were offensive, 
unnecessary, disruptive, and meaningless.  “Their” sounds were noise.  Attending to 
public religious sounds thus offers a concrete vehicle for studying how Americans have 
marked and policed the boundaries of religious difference.18
But at the same time, public sounds crossed these lines precisely as disputants 
worked to fortify them.  Sounds demarcated difference, but they also collapsed 
boundaries between self and other.  Listeners may have differentiated “our” sounds from 
“theirs,” but they still all were hearing the same sounds.  They did not agree about who 
constituted these sounds’ intended audience.  But diverse hearers still considered 
themselves similarly addressed by the same sounds and felt called to respond to them, 
                                                 
18Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. 
Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 276; Robert Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 183.  Other scholars also have considered how groups 
respond to the sounds of religious others.  For example, Paul Moore has studied the different sounds 
associated with Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland.  Paul Moore, “Sectarian Sound and Cultural 
Identity in Northern Ireland,” in The Auditory Culture Reader, ed. Michael Bull and Les Back, 265-80 
(Oxford: Berg, 2003).  Shane and Graham White have studied how whites responded to the sounds of black 
slave religion.  Shane White and Graham White, “‘At Intervals I was Nearly Stunned by the Noise He 
Made’ : Listening to African American Religious Sound in the Era of Slavery,” American Nineteenth 
Century History 1 (Spring 2000): 34-61.  Laurie Maffly-Kipp has studied how nineteenth-century Euro-
Americans found themselves alternately attracted to and discomfited by the novel sights, sounds, and 
smells of Chinese temples in the American West.  Laurie Maffly-Kipp, “Engaging Habits and Besotted 
Idolatry: Viewing Chinese Religions in the American West,” Material Religion 1, no. 1 (2005): 66-91.  
And Leigh Eric Schmidt has described how non-evangelical Protestants responded to the sounds of 
evangelical revivals in the early nineteenth century.  Leigh Eric Schmidt, Hearing Things: Religion, 
Illusion, and the American Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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engaging with each other in the process.  These public sounds constituted an 
intersubjective relationship among diverse audiences, blurring the boundaries that 
separated them.  When individuals heard the sounds of church bells or of the azan, they 
actually were participating in the act of being called to pray, whether willingly or not, and 
even as they interpreted its meaning in different ways.  Whether they responded to these 
sounds positively, negatively, or indifferently, they still were responding in some way to 
the call.  Differences mattered, but they also were muted in the common experience of 
hearing.  Sounds were never simply “other.” 
In other words, interpreting American religious diversity requires noting that what 
it means to be Catholic in Hamtramck, Michigan, today, is not only to listen to church 
bells but also to be called to pray by the muezzin five times a day.  At the same time, part 
of what it means to be Muslim in Hamtramck is not just to heed the azan’s call, but also 
to respond to churches’ chimes.  Hamtramck Catholics and Muslims undoubtedly hear 
the azan differently, but so, too, do Muslims in Hamtramck and in Bangladesh.  Different 
listeners interpret the meanings of these sounds in different ways, but these differences 
are shaped by the particular contexts in which these sounds are heard, not simply by pre-
existing or eternally fixed religious divisions.  By suggesting that sounds cross social 
boundaries, I do not mean to ignore or efface differences, therefore.  Instead, I want to 
encourage attention to how diverse audiences have re-constructed and re-negotiated these 
boundaries when they have heard others practice religion out loud. 
Attending to public sounds thus offers a model for interpreting diversity that 
avoids reifying difference.  In recent years, anthropologists and social theorists have 
criticized classic conceptions of “culture” that treat discrete cultures as bounded, 
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meaningful wholes.  Lila Abu-Lughod has faulted scholars for interpreting cultures as 
timeless, coherent, and homogenous, thereby reducing them to their essences and 
ignoring both internal heterogeneities and interconnections that cut across boundaries.  
Comparative studies of religion have been criticized in similar ways.  For example, 
Richard King has suggested that in many cases, “Difference is perceived in oppositional 
rather than pluralistic terms, and differences between cultures become fetishized at the 
same time as internal heterogeneities within each culture are effaced.”  When studies of 
American religious diversity adopt tradition-by-tradition structures, as is the case in many 
recent volumes, or when they consider discrete religious traditions in isolation from each 
other, they similarly risk essentializing religious differences, treating boundaries as 
necessarily fixed or pre-existing, rather than as actively constructed in situations of 
contact.19
At the same time, pluralism discourses that have sought commonalities across 
religious traditions have risked obliterating difference altogether.  For example, many of 
the advocates for the Hamtramck noise ordinance amendment defended it in the name of 
religious pluralism.  They argued that every religion had a way of calling its adherents to 
worship and that American law should make space for each of them.  Muslims called the 
                                                 
19Lila Abu-Lughod, “Writing Against Culture,” in Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present, ed. 
Richard Gabriel Fox, 137-62 (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 1991); King, 
Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India, and ‘the Mystic East’ (London: Routledge, 1999), 
188.  My use of the terms “diversity” and “difference” follows, in part, Homi Bhabha, who distinguishes 
between cultural diversity, imagined as a pre-existing fact or condition, and cultural difference, understood 
as actively constructed and articulated in situations of contact.  See The Location of Culture (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 49-50.  Recent examples of the tradition-by-tradition approach in studies of American 
religious pluralism include Jacob Neusner, ed., World Religions in America: An Introduction, 4th ed. 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009);  Diana L. Eck, A New Religious America: How a 
“Christian Country” Has Now Become the World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation (San Francisco: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 2001); and Stephen R. Prothero, ed., A Nation of Religions: The Politics of Pluralism 
in Multireligious America (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2006), although each of these 
volumes also include a few thematically-organized chapters. 
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azan, they maintained, just as Christians rang church bells and Jews blew shofars, or 
ram’s horns.  But in the rush to celebrate commonality, they ignored significant 
differences between these auditory practices, differences shaped by particular historical 
and sociological forces.  For example, Jews typically blast shofars only at particular 
times of year, especially around the autumn High Holidays, not as daily reminders to 
pray.  More significant, perhaps, Jews rarely have sounded shofars beyond synagogue 
walls in areas where they have lived among religious others.  This fact seems likely 
connected to Jews’ historic status as a minority, facing frequent threats of persecution and 
discrimination.  In some cases by prohibition, in other cases by choice, there were 
particular reasons why Jews did not audibly call attention to themselves in this way.  
Furthermore, according to one account of the azan’s origins, Muhammad chose the 
human voice as medium precisely in order to differentiate Muslims from Christians, who 
used bells and other instrumental sounds.  The azan thus offered an important vehicle for 
early Muslims to fashion distinct religious identities.  When Hamtramck disputants 
conflated the sounds of the azan, of church bells, and of the shofar, treating them all as 
particular manifestations of the same universal, cross-cultural phenomenon, they ignored 
the particular historical processes and practices through which differences had been 
constructed.20
These problems related to essentializing religion have not been confined to 
discourses about pluralism.  American legal discourse similarly has tended to reify 
                                                 
20A Detroit Jewish writer discussed shofar usage in an editorial at the time of the azan dispute, writing, “In 
Judaism, the blast of the shofar welcomes and ends the High Holidays.  But the curved horn of a ram is 
blown inside the synagogue, not over an outside loudspeaker.”  Robert A. Sklar, “Editor’s Notebook: Not 
Just Noise,” Detroit Jewish News Online, June 7, 2004, http://detroit.jewish.com/modules.php?name=News 
&file=article&sid=1467.  For one account of the story of the azan’s origins, see Muneer Goolam Fareed, 
“Adhan,” in The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, ed. Richard C. Martin (New York: 
MacMillan Reference USA: Thomson/Gale, 2004), 13.  For an example of an early-modern European 
synagogue that was not permitted to sound the shofar publicly, see Kaplan, Divided by Faith, 190. 
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boundaries among religious communities.  As Winnifred Sullivan has argued, laws 
enforcing rights to religious freedom require claimants to establish that their practice is in 
fact religious or religiously required.  Such a project assumes a doctrinal, dogmatic, 
hierarchical, and institutionalized conception of religion that seems at odds with the fluid 
boundaries of American religious life.  It presupposes religions with clear demands and 
unambiguously defined sources of authority, rendering internal heterogeneities inherently 
problematic.  Yet in my three case studies, differences within religious communities 
regularly proved as significant as differences across religious boundaries.  In nineteenth-
century Philadelphia, for example, Episcopalians debated amongst themselves whether 
bell-ringing was necessary, and Muslims in twenty-first century Detroit similarly 
disagreed about the necessity of broadcasting the azan publicly.  Unexpected alliances 
also formed across religious boundaries, as Philadelphia Catholics lent their support to St. 
Mark’s bell-ringing, and an interfaith alliance defended the rights of Hamtramck’s 
Muslims.  In these case studies, religious boundaries proved permeable.21
These noise disputes underscore how devotees make sense of themselves when 
they encounter others precisely because hearing implies interrelationship and 
intersubjectivity.  The American composer John Cage described hearing as “a 
quintessentially public sense” because it could “make contact across space.”  Indeed, as I 
have suggested, auditory practices link broadcaster and receiver, the producers of sound 
and their audiences.  In fact, participants in these disputes rarely clarified whether the 
purported right in question was the right to hear or be heard, the right to call or be called.  
Practicing religion out loud was not individualistic, but instead constituted a relationship 
                                                 
21Winnifred Fallers Sullivan The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), especially 142-3. 
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among diversely religious subjects.  Sounds mediated contact among multiple listening 
publics who responded to them in different ways.22
Sounds collapsed the boundaries among religious communities, and many 
disputants responded by re-fortifying them, differentiating sounds as “ours” and “theirs,” 
as welcome and unwelcome, legitimate and illegitimate.  Scholars often have defined 
discrete religious traditions by distinguishing their core beliefs and practices.  But such 
essentialized notions fail to describe how public religious sounds both map and mute 
differences.  Homi Bhabha has suggested that in order to avoid reifying cultural 
difference, scholars should focus not on the center, but on the margins, and on the spaces 
between, where subjects actively construct and negotiate collective identities.  “These 
‘in-between spaces,” he writes, “provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of 
selfhood—singular or communal—that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites 
of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself.”  
Sounds, I propose, focus our attention on these “in-between spaces” as they travel 
through the air, crossing and potentially collapsing the boundaries between self and other, 
broadcaster and receiver, subject and object.  These audible announcements—and the 
conflicts they prompted—generated social spaces for constructing, negotiating, and 
reconfiguring individual and collective identities.  If sounds oriented listeners in space 
and time and in relation to each other, then new sounds invited hearers to re-orient 
themselves, to imagine new possibilities or new ways of being.23
                                                 
22Mark M. Smith, “Introduction: Onward to Audible Pasts,” in Hearing History: A Reader, ed. Mark M. 
Smith, ix-xxii (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2004), xiii. 
23Bhabha, Location of Culture, 2.  For theories of religion that use the trope of “orientation,” see Charles H. 
Long, Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Interpretation of Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1986); Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling. 
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Listening to religious difference thus navigates the fluid and permeable 
boundaries of American religious identities.  In her article on public religious displays, 
Sally Promey similarly suggests that seeing religious difference in public might broaden 
conceptions of who we are as Americans, offering witnesses new opportunities “to 
imagine perspectives different from their own.”  But vision implies an overly static 
conception of social boundaries.  Vision reifies the boundary between subject and object 
as much as it blurs it.  Seeing displays of difference turns them into spectacles, 
potentially reinforcing that they are different from or “other” to oneself.  As John Dewey 
once suggested, “Vision is a spectator; hearing is a participator.”  Hearing implies a more 
dynamic relationship among multiple diverse audiences.  Moreover, as I argued in the 
preceding section, individuals can choose what to look at, just as they can choose whether 
to enter a house of worship.  They can close their eyes to the differences that surround 
them.  Sounds seem more unavoidable, demanding response.24
Finally, acoustic space is also inherently plural and thus potentially more 
pluralistic.  Steven Connor contends that “the singular space of the visual is transformed 
by the experience of sound to a plural space; one can hear many sounds simultaneously, 
where it is impossible to see different visual objects at the same time without disposing 
them in a unified field of vision.  Where auditory experience is dominant, we may say, 
singular, perspectival gives way to plural, permeated space.”  In other words, multiple 
sounds can share the same space without necessarily clashing.  The ear can accommodate 
plurality more readily than the eye.  In the case studies that I have analyzed, disputants 
grappled over the boundaries and content of public acoustic space, aiming to regulate 
                                                 
24Promey, “Public Display of Religion,” 48; John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (New York: H. Holt 
and Company, 1927), 219. 
271 
whose sounds would predominate and whose sounds would be excluded.  But the plural 
nature of acoustic spaces implies that dissonance need not necessarily sound 
cacophonous.  Attending to auditory religion, therefore, might in fact open up new 
possibilities for imagining and interpreting cultural identities in the plural, for analyzing 
how communal boundaries are constructed and configured, but also how they cross, 
intersect, and overlap.25
 
Religion and Non-Religion 
In these three case studies, religious noisemakers argued that their sounds were 
different because they were religious.  Justifying their practices, in part, in the name of 
religious freedom, they distinguished religion from non-religion and suggested that 
religion could not constitute noise.  But complainants drew lines of their own.  They 
argued that noise was noise, regardless of source or purpose, while they differentiated 
noise from sounds that did not threaten public order.  Contestants thus debated whether 
these disputes essentially were about religion or noise.  They aimed to draw clear lines—
between religion and non-religion, between sound and noise—but these boundaries 
blurred almost as soon as they were demarcated, complicating legal regulatory efforts 
that demanded clear, fixed lines.  In this section, I consider how the indeterminate 
meanings of religion and noise proved pragmatically malleable and strategically useful.  
Legal scholars have engaged in long-standing debates about the meaning of the First 
                                                 
25Steven Connor, “Sound and the Self,” in Hearing History: A Reader, ed. Mark M. Smith, 54-66 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1997), 56-7.  Richard Cullen Rath makes a similar point about the auditory 
public sphere as a site of dissonance and its implications for conceptualizing American identities in How 
Early America Sounded (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 178-80.  On imagining cultural identities 
in the plural, see Michel de Certeau, Culture in the Plural (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1997). 
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Amendment religion clauses and about the normative conceptions of religion and 
religious liberty that underlie them.  My interest in this section, however, is to consider 
how disputants imagined the meanings of religion and noise, how they deployed these 
categories to countervailing ends, and how legal frameworks and power dynamics shaped 
their contests.  Rather than treat “religion” as a fixed or natural category, therefore, I 
examine how it was constructed through these disputes and how its meaning was 
negotiated in relation to the similarly indeterminate category of noise. 
The religious noisemakers defended their rights through a wide range of 
arguments that varied from case to case.  But common to each conflict was the contention 
that religious sounds could not constitute a public nuisance in the same way that non-
religious sounds could.  In each case study, religious adherents maintained that their 
sounds were different and therefore should have been regulated differently.  Their sounds 
were not simply noise. 
They justified this claim in different ways.  In Philadelphia, St. Mark’s leaders 
cited history and custom, and they appealed to their denomination’s codified rules and 
regulations.  Bell-ringing was a well-established tradition in Anglican and Episcopalian 
churches, they maintained, a part of divine worship, and their practice was “in conformity 
with the recognized usage of such churches.”  The Lockport Jehovah’s Witnesses also 
described their preaching as a form of worship, but they justified their practice as 
divinely ordained and Biblically sanctioned.  They appealed directly to the authority of 
God, contending that the city of Lockport had no right to interfere with the fulfillment of 
a religious obligation.  Abdul Motlib of Hamtramck’s al-Islah Islamic Center similarly 
described the azan as a “religious duty” or as a normatively sanctioned religious ritual.  
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As opposed to the Lockport Witnesses, however, Motlib willingly submitted this practice 
to the Hamtramck city council’s regulatory authority.  In fact, it was the council members 
who decided that religion should be regulated differently and who carved out an 
exemption from the city’s noise ordinance for “reasonable means of announcing religious 
meetings.”  In each of these disputes, we find claimants grounding religious rights in 
different sources of authority.  The Philadelphia Episcopalians appealed to their 
denominational institutions, the Witnesses appealed directly to God, and the Hamtramck 
Muslims appealed to the state’s authority.  But in each case, they maintained that 
religious sounds were different, that they were necessary, and that they should be 
regulated accordingly.26
In fact, I should emphasize that these religious practitioners rarely even described 
their auditory announcements as “sounds.”  I have chosen that descriptive term in order 
to avoid the more pejorative and value-laden category of “noise” that complainants 
applied to them.  But those who interpreted these sounds as religious obligations used a 
different set of terms.  They tended to describe these sounds as worship, as preaching, or 
as prayer.  These sounds served particular functions within the context of devotional life.  
In other words, these sounds constituted religion, their proponents maintained, not merely 
sounds, and certainly not noise. 
Describing these public sounds as religious implied particular assumptions about 
the nature of religion.  As I have emphasized in the preceding sections, religion out loud 
underscores the centrality of practices rather than beliefs.  Auditory religion is collective, 
forging an intersubjective relationship between broadcaster and receiver, and it can be 
                                                 
26Harrison v. St. Mark’s, 19; Abdul Motlib to the Common Council Members, City of Hamtramck, 28 
December 2003 (copy on file with author). 
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understood in a sense as involuntary.  Practitioners also justified their practices with 
reference to institutional authority and tradition.  They argued that their sounds should be 
regulated differently, specially protected as religion.  If these sounds were religion, they 
implied, then they could not constitute noise.  Yet their conception of religion pushed 
against how the U.S. constitutional legal order traditionally has understood it.  In fact, 
religious freedom in the United States generally has meant the right to be religious only 
in certain ways, ways that did not necessarily make space for these kinds of auditory 
practices. 
As an expanding body of scholarship has suggested, the category of “religion” has 
a particular history.  While the term itself may have much earlier origins, Talal Asad has 
argued that the modern conception of “religion” was the product of particular post-
Reformation and post-Enlightenment processes that associated religion with belief, 
thereby marginalizing it within the conditions of modernity.  Jonathan Z. Smith famously 
has argued that the generic category of “religion” was “solely the creation of the scholar’s 
study,” while other scholars, such as Richard King and David Chidester, have explored 
how scholarly discourses about religion emerged in colonial contexts.  But particular 
legal processes also produced “religion,” and the conception of religion that underlies 
American constitutional order also has a particular history.  For example, legal historian 
Mark DeWolfe Howe argued over forty years ago that nineteenth-century U.S. courts 
emphasized equality among believers, rather than equality between religion and non-
religion, elevating religion to a special status of protection.  Howe insisted that the 
rationale for these special protections was informed by evangelical presuppositions that 
religion was grounded in belief and that religion should be free so that it might flourish in 
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pursuit of truth.  Philip Hamburger has traced how popular support for “separation” of 
church and state grew among nineteenth-century anti-Catholic nativists, who regarded 
clerical authority as inimical to ideals of individualism and personal liberty.  And Sarah 
Gordon has argued that one important product of the nineteenth-century Mormon 
polygamy cases was to enshrine in the First Amendment religion clauses a particular 
Protestant conception of religion as properly individualistic, voluntary, and believed.  As 
the U.S. Supreme Court announced in Reynolds v. United States, a year after the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved the St. Mark’s bells case, “Laws are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and 
opinions, they may with practices.”  United States courts repeatedly have reaffirmed this 
distinction between belief and conduct, implying that religion ultimately is something 
that an individual believes, not necessarily something that a community performs.27
In the noise disputes, many of the complainants seemed to share this conception 
of religion.  Therefore, they were able to affirm their commitment to religious freedom 
even as they objected to these auditory announcements by arguing that the disputed 
practices were fundamentally unnecessary for religion.  In fact, they maintained, once 
these sounds became a nuisance, once they became noise, it no longer mattered whether 
or not they were purported to be religious, for surely religion had no need to make noise.  
                                                 
27Talal Asad, “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category,” in Genealogies of Religion: 
Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993), 27-54; Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), xi; King, Orientalism and Religion; David Chidester, Savage Systems: Colonialism 
and Comparative Religion in Southern Africa (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996); Mark 
DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional 
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: 
Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2002); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879). 
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In Philadelphia, for example, both neighbors and newspaper editorials argued that the 
purpose of religion was to save souls, not to rattle unsteady nerves or to disrupt the sleep 
of newborn babies.  Church bells might strike some listeners as aesthetically pleasing, but 
they served no utilitarian function and thus could be silenced without significant 
consequence.  In Lockport, city officials emphasized that they had not prevented 
Jehovah’s Witnesses from distributing literature to further their proselytizing efforts.  But 
how could God’s law demand the use of electro-acoustic loudspeakers?  Many 
Hamtramck residents wondered the same thing.  In each of these cases, complainants 
denied that it made any difference whether sounds were deemed religious.  They insisted 
that the disputed sounds should be treated no differently from the other noises of modern 
urban life.  They did not even seem to regard the practices in question as religion, 
properly understood.  Noise constituted the limit of what they counted as free religion. 
Defending particular sounds in the name of religious freedom required their 
advocates to differentiate clearly religion from non-religion.  As Winnifred Sullivan has 
suggested, “In order to enforce laws guaranteeing religious freedom you must first have 
religion.”  But opponents in these disputes advanced competing conceptions of what it 
meant to be religious, and they deployed these understandings in different ways.  By 
describing their sounds as religion and by framing these disputes as entirely about 
religion, proponents were able to ignore any legitimate concerns that their opponents 
might have expressed about volume or public disturbance.  They frequently dismissed 
their opponents as motivated by religious intolerance, rather than by any “real” concerns 
about noise.  Most significant, they were able to defend their practices even if these 
practices infringed on the rights of others.  But arguing that these disputes had nothing to 
277 
do with religion also did important work for critics.  Opponents could affirm their 
commitment to religious freedom at the same as they circumscribed its boundaries, 
asserting that noise was not necessary for religion properly understood.  Furthermore, 
they could affirm their commitment to American ideals of equality and fairness by 
maintaining that all sounds should be regulated in the same way, regardless of source or 
purpose.  Noise was noise, they maintained, whether produced in the context of religious 
devotion or not.28
Complainants thus engaged in line-drawing exercises of their own.  Just as 
proponents argued that these disputes were entirely about religion, many critics 
maintained that they had nothing to do with religion.  They insisted that they objected 
only to noise.  When religious practices began to infringe on the rights of others, 
opponents suggested, they ceased to be entitled to absolute protection.  But if proponents 
had to distinguish religion from non-religion, then complainants had to define noise.  In 
order to argue that noise was noise, regardless of source or purpose, they had to 
differentiate noise from other sounds that did not threaten public order.  Yet noise proved 
no more stable or uncontested a category than religion.  Just as contestants deployed 
competing conceptions of the nature of religion and religious obligation, they also 
disputed the meaning of noise. 
  On the one hand, complaints about noise expressed concerns about volume, 
personal injury, and disturbance of the peace.  In Philadelphia, for example, neighbors 
insisted that the chimes of St. Mark’s Church posed genuine health risks, aggravating 
nervous conditions, disrupting sleep, and even threatening the structural stability of 
                                                 
28Sullivan, Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 1. 
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nearby buildings.  In Lockport, it is not difficult to imagine how amplified preaching 
might have disturbed Sunday afternoon park-goers who were enjoying family picnics and 
horseshoe tournaments.  And in Hamtramck, some opponents of the noise ordinance 
amendment proposed that the city council might prescribe a fixed decibel level above 
which sounds would come to constitute noise, rather than single out religious sounds for 
special treatment.  They implied that objective criteria could be applied to differentiate 
potentially harmful noise from the general din of urban life without discriminating among 
types of sounds. 
This decibel level proposal was not without precedent.  As I have suggested 
throughout this dissertation, noise, like religion, also has a particular history.  Since the 
standardization of the decibel as a unit of measurement in the 1920s and 30s, anti-noise 
advocates have hoped that precise scientific measurement might offer a workable 
solution to urban noise problems.  Recall that in Saia, Justice Douglas permitted cities to 
restrict sounds above a fixed decibel level, though he would not allow them to prohibit 
outright the use of amplification systems or loudspeakers.  Indeed, United States courts 
frequently have expressed a preference for quantitative noise legislation that offers the 
allure of objectivity.  By defining noise in terms of decibel level, such regulations imply 
that noise in fact can be straightforwardly differentiated.29
However, this ideal of objectivity has proven elusive.  Complaints about noise 
have not been prompted “only” by concerns about volume or health risks.  Like religion, 
the category of noise also has a particular cultural history to which I have tried to attend.  
Early noise legislation tended to target not noise in general, but particular types of sounds 
                                                 
29Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948). 
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or particular classes of noisemakers.  Indeed, complaints about noise seemingly always 
have been entwined with concerns about who was making the noise.  Noise has been 
defined socially as much as it has been defined scientifically.  Interpreting noise as 
“unwanted sounds” has underscored the ways that noise has been used to demarcate 
certain groups as unwanted.  As Justice Douglas emphasized in Saia, “Annoyance at 
ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound.”  The Jehovah’s Witnesses alleged in that 
case that facially neutral ordinances could be applied discriminatorily against the sounds 
of religious and political dissenters.  Even the decibel level has failed to offer a clear 
boundary between sounds and noise as evidenced by the case of the Dearborn mosque 
that I discussed in chapter 4.  In that case, the city of Dearborn followed the advice of a 
Michigan court and prescribed a decibel limit above which sounds would come to 
constitute noise.  But the members of a local mosque complained that city officials 
purposely had chosen a decibel limit below that of the azan.  Defining noise in terms of 
decibels did not offer a workable solution to the problem of urban noise, therefore, but 
instead masked the cultural work of containment that noise was performing behind the 
veneer of objectivity.30
Noise also has been defined as “unnecessary” sounds, underscoring the same 
theme of necessity that figured in debates about religion’s meaning.  Particularly in the 
case of St. Mark’s Church, these cultural discourses about religion and noise overlapped.  
Contestants disputed which sounds were necessary in urban contexts just as they debated 
which sounds were necessary for religious life.  Which sounds represented material 
progress and prosperity, and which sounds were properly heard as inefficient, 
                                                 
30Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. at 562; Dearborn v. Hussian, et. al., No. 79-933979-AR (Wayne County Ct. 
June 3, 1980). 
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unnecessary, or uncivilized?  Were religious sounds such as church bells necessary 
components of devotional life, complementing the sounds of factories and industrial life, 
or were they unnecessary relics of the past, serving no utilitarian function?  Debating 
whether religious sounds could constitute noise became enmeshed within broader debates 
about religion’s place in the modern world.  Hearing these sounds as noise, as 
fundamentally “out of place,” both expressed genuine concerns about volume and served 
to circumscribe religion’s normative boundaries. 
Despite the claims of contestants on both sides, there seems to be no coherent way 
to determine definitively if these noise disputes ultimately were about noise or religion.  
In many instances, hostility or antagonism toward the noisemakers in question was clear, 
but at the same time, religion out loud could prove exceedingly annoying.  Concerns 
about volume and about content, about quantity and quality, both crossed and overlapped.  
Disputants aimed to draw clear lines—between religion and non-religion, between sound 
and noise—but these boundaries blurred almost as soon as they were demarcated.  The 
meanings of both religion and noise proved indeterminate and thus strategically useful, 
negotiated in relation to each other and deployed to countervailing ends. 
But these unstable boundaries complicated legal regulatory efforts that demanded 
clear, fixed lines.  Winnifred Sullivan recently has argued that it may be impossible for 
U.S. courts to distinguish religion from non-religion coherently.  In these disputes, courts 
avoided even trying to demarcate this divide.  In fact, it seems significant that in none of 
these case studies did courts accommodate religious sounds as religion, even in those 
instances where the disputed sounds were permitted.  In fact, none of these disputes were 
settled with any reference to the First Amendment’s religion clauses.  The St. Mark’s 
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bells case was resolved over fifty years before the U.S. Supreme Court began to apply the 
First Amendment protections against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment 
(though it did raise some of the same questions that the Court adjudicated in the 
contemporaneous Reynolds polygamy case).  In the St. Mark’s case, Judge Hare 
emphasized that Christianity should retain an important public presence precisely as he 
circumscribed that place, treating its sounds the same as any other sounds which might 
come to constitute a public nuisance.  In the Saia case, the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down Lockport’s noise ordinance as unconstitutional, thereby affirming the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses’ right to use loudspeakers, but the Court did so by treating the Witnesses’ 
preaching as speech, not religion.  It sidestepped the question of whether religious sounds 
were inherently different.  The Hamtramck dispute offers the only example that I have 
considered in which religious sounds were protected as such, in which religious sounds 
were singled out for special treatment under the law.  Yet this dispute significantly was 
resolved through political processes, not through judicial intervention.  Hamtramck 
residents voted not to repeal the council’s noise ordinance amendment, and opponents 
never challenged its constitutionality in court.  In none of these case studies, therefore, 
did U.S. courts carve out space for religion practiced out loud within the protections of 
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause.  In none of these episodes did U.S. courts 
even attempt to distinguish religious sounds clearly from non-religious sounds or to 
suggest that the normative conception of religion underlying guarantees of religious 
freedom might include a right to make or hear noise publicly.31
                                                 
31Sullivan, Impossibility of Religious Freedom.  Sullivan has argued that courts increasingly seem to be 
avoiding having to distinguish religion from non-religion and suggests that religious rights increasingly 
have been governed by politics rather than law.  While Sullivan tries to avoid staking a normative position 
on this development, Marci Hamilton recently has argued that debates about religious exemptions from 
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But in this project, I have not focused primarily on judicial discourse, but on how 
“ordinary” Americans constructed the meanings of religion and noise through these 
disputes.  For these participants, it was not so much that they could not differentiate 
religion from non-religion or noise from sounds, but that they could do so in many 
different ways toward different strategic ends.  While legal scholars have tended to treat 
religion as a fixed or natural category, I have tried to explore how it was produced, in 
part, through these legal disputes, through the competing conceptions that disputants 
advanced.  I have attended to the work that these categories performed for contestants in 
framing what they understood as at stake.  An expanding body of scholarship recently has 
encouraged attention to how the analytical category of religion performs important 
cultural or political work.  But my study has moved beyond the confines of academic 
discourse to consider how popular debates about religion’s meaning have carried 
implications for regulating religious life.32
                                                                                                                                                 
generally applicable laws should be conducted in political or legislative arenas, rather than at the judicial 
level.  Hamilton argues that courts have tended to adopt a romantic view of religious communities that 
ignores the harm committed in religion’s name.  Marci Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel: Religion and the Rule 
of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager 
also have argued that legislatures should play an important role in regulating religious freedom, but they 
understand legislatures and courts as partners rather than adversaries.  See Christopher L. Eisgruber and 
Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2007), especially chapter 7. 
32My argument here is similar to that of Jonathan Z. Smith, who suggests that the general disagreement 
among Religious Studies scholars about how to define religion offers evidence only that religion may be 
defined in several different ways, not that religion cannot be defined.  See Smith, “Religion, Religions, 
Religious.”  Even Eisgruber and Sager, two prominent legal scholars who have offered a theory of religious 
freedom that is premised on not treating religion as significantly different from non-religion, continue to 
assume that religion is readily identifiable, if not easily defined, and can be differentiated coherently from 
non-religion.  See Eisgruber and Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution.  For examples of religious 
studies scholarship that considers the political or cultural work performed by religion as an analytical 
category, see Russell T. McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and 
the Politics of Nostalgia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of 
Religious Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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  Framing my approach in this way, as focusing on the countervailing ends to 
which disputants deployed competing conceptions of religion and noise, makes audible 
the power dynamics that inevitably accent such definitional disputes.  In other words, 
these case studies centered on the right to define religion and noise as much as they did 
on the actual meanings of the terms themselves.  Disputants did not reject the distinctions 
between religion and non-religion or between sound and noise so much as they contested 
who should have the authority to make those distinctions.  And in so doing, I have 
argued, they contested who should have the authority to demarcate the proper place of 
religion and religious adherents in their communities.  Defining sounds as religion or as 
noise, or defining religious sounds as comparable to or essentially different from non-
religious sounds, offered disputants competing strategies for mapping religion’s place in 
American public life.  Attending to these case studies thus has offered a concrete vehicle 
for analyzing the particular processes through which Americans have negotiated 
religion’s normative boundaries. 
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation has attended to complaints about religion as noise.  Through my 
analysis of three case studies, involving different religious traditions at different historical 
moments, I have explored what it has meant for Americans to hear religion as noise.  I 
have considered what it has meant for Americans to hear particular religious sounds—or 
particular religious practitioners—as “out of place.”  Through these disputes, I have 
argued, Americans have contested religion’s proper place in spatial and social order.  
Noise complaints have offered a useful means for containing religion, for demarcating 
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and delimiting its boundaries, but religious devotees also have used public sounds to 
claim place for themselves, pushing against popular notions of what religion was 
supposed to be like.  Through these disputes, opponents have offered competing 
conceptions of the nature of religion and of its place in American public life. 
In this chapter, I have explored how religious sounds both mapped and crossed 
normative boundaries.  I have suggested that participants in each dispute aimed to 
demarcate religion’s place by drawing clear lines between public and private, between 
religion and religion, and between religion and non-religion.  Yet religious sounds also 
crossed and blurred these symbolically significant and pragmatically useful boundaries.  
Religious sounds regularly proved difficult to contain.   
Complainants conceived of religion as properly private and voluntary, arguing 
that religious practice was best kept quiet.  They contended that they should not have to 
hear the disputed sounds as they spilled over into pluralistic public spaces.  But 
soundfields mapped a complex, shifting sacred geography, the borders of which were not 
easily fixed.  The disputed sounds crossed and blurred boundaries between public and 
private and between sacred and secular.  Moreover, those sounds that elicited complaints 
were only those that were noticed, those to which attention was paid.  But other public 
religious sounds went unnoticed and thus uncontested.  These case studies therefore have 
offered a conception of “legitimate” religion as in fact public and involuntary, as 
including those religions whose sounds have become unremarkable—and unavoidable—
as they have spilled over into public space without controversy.  Attending to these noise 
disputes thus has illuminated the processes through which certain sounds—and groups—
have become normative while others have been contested as “out of place.”  In other 
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words, despite the supposedly “secular” character of American public spaces, arguing 
that religion should be kept quiet has rendered only certain sounds—and certain groups—
problematically public. 
Contestants also re-fashioned collective identity in relation to each other and to 
the disputed sounds.  They constructed difference by demarcating sounds as “ours” and 
“theirs,” as “good” and “bad,” by distinguishing meaning from noise and order from 
disorder.  But sound also muted differences as it crossed boundaries, mediating contact 
among diverse listening communities.  Multiple audiences, intended and unintended, 
willing and unwilling, heard and responded to the same sounds, albeit in different ways.  
These public sounds—and the conflicts they prompted—generated social spaces for 
reconstructing and reconfiguring individual and collective identities, processes that 
proved fluid and varied.  Attending to the pluralistic nature of acoustic space thus has 
opened up new possibilities for imagining and interpreting cultural identities in the plural, 
for analyzing how disputants reinforced and re-fortified communal boundaries, but also 
how these lines crossed, intersected, and overlapped. 
Finally, disputants drew lines in different ways between religion and non-religion 
and between sound and noise.  Religious noisemakers argued that their sounds were 
different, that religious sounds could not constitute noise.  And complainants responded 
that noise was noise, regardless of source or purpose, and worked to distinguish noise 
from other sounds that did not disturb the public peace.  But neither the meaning of 
religion or noise was fixed, complicating legal regulatory efforts that demanded clear 
lines.  Instead, disputants advanced competing conceptions of these categories, and their 
indeterminate meanings proved strategically valuable, deployable to diverse ends.  These 
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conflicts were never simply about religion or noise, but instead about how contestants 
negotiated these categories’ meanings in relation to each other.  And through their 
different understandings, I have suggested, they differently mapped religion’s proper 
place. 
By attending to these noise disputes, this dissertation thus has navigated the 
shifting and permeable boundaries of American religious life.  It has offered a model for 
interpreting American religious diversity that centers themes of embodiment, contact, and 
exchange, while it also has underscored how American law has mediated and shaped 
public interactions among diverse religious communities.  And it has called attention to 
the everyday material practices through which Americans have mapped religion’s 
boundaries and negotiated religious difference, rather than analyzing these boundaries as 
products of abstract intellectual debate.  Interpreting American religious life, I have 
proposed, will require scholars to become more attuned to the sounds of religious 
difference.  In debates about whether religion should be practiced quietly or out loud, we 
hear competing conceptions of religion’s place in the modern world.33
But I want to conclude by returning one last time to Hamtramck, to once again 
make these broader themes more concrete by emphasizing how religious sounds mediate 
contact in pluralistic public spaces.  In July 2007, a few years after the azan dispute had 
been resolved, I stood about a block and a half from the al-Islah Islamic Center as four 
twenty-something urban hipsters passed by me.  Dressed in black, one had spiked hair, 
and another had dyed her hair pink.  And at that moment, the call to prayer echoed 
                                                 
33For a valuable collection of scholarship on the meaning of “everyday life,” see Ben Highmore, ed., The 
Everyday Life Reader (London: Routledge, 2002).  In his introductory essay, Highmore encourages 
scholars to attend to the material realities of cultural life and to how social actors enact and perform 
boundaries. 
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through the streets.  The hipsters looked at each other, and one said, “What is that?”  
Another responded: “You know, that Muslim call to prayer thing…don’t you remember 
that whole controversy?”  “Oh, yeah,” replied the first, “Hey, anybody want to pray?”  
And they broke into laughter as they continued down the street.  But for that brief 
moment, the sound of the azan had captured their attention.  It had publicly pronounced 
Islamic presence in Hamtramck.  It had reminded them of the contentious debates about 
whether religious practice belonged in public.  And it had called them to pray.  As this 
religious sound spilled over into Hamtramck’s city streets, it had taken on new meanings 
and reached new audiences.  While these unintended listeners may have responded 
sarcastically, while they may have heard the azan as “out of place,” they still felt called to 
respond—in one way or another.  Religion practiced out loud had crossed and blurred the 
boundaries of religious difference.  For that brief moment, these Hamtramck hipsters had 
become part of the acoustic community constituted by the call of the muezzin.34
                                                 
34Fieldnotes, July 9, 2007. 
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